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 tä t— Łsti ”
(“the what it is”)
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, Z, 1030a.
RESUMO
Esta tese investiga o significado de interpretar a mecânica quântica não relativista e
os limites filosóficos de tal interpretação. Buscando uma postura realista científica, um
método metametafísico é expandido e aplicado na avaliação de interpretações rivais da
mecânica quântica, com base na distinção conceitual entre ontologia e metafísica, para
a escolha objetiva de teoria em discussões metafísicas relativas à mecânica quântica.
Três casos são examinados, dos quais o método metametafísico determina quais são
as alternativas erradas para interpretar a mecânica quântica em termos metafísicos.
Os dois primeiros casos foram considerados como falhas por diferentes tipos de sub-
determinação. No terceiro caso, diferentemente da subdeterminação, onde há muitas
escolhas a serem feitas, uma “determinação nula” é proposta, de acordo com a qual
não é possível haver escolhas metafísicas na literatura metafísica disponível. Conside-
rando o que foi discutido, uma posição filosófica agnóstica é mantida, considerando a
possibilidade de interpretar QM a partir de um ponto de vista do realismo científico.
Palavras-chave: Metafísica. Metametafísica. Ontologia. Realismo científico. Mecânica
quântica não-relativista.
RESUMO EXPANDIDO
Introdução
Esta tese investiga o significado de interpretar a mecânica quântica não relativista e
os limites filosóficos de tal interpretação. Diferentemente das abordagens lógicas às
teorias científicas, nas quais a noção de “interpretação” é ligada às visões sintática e
semântica, é argumentado que a mecânica quântica é um caso sui generis na qual o
termo “interpretação” relaciona-se com a resolução de problemas nos fundamentos da
teoria. Interpretar a mecânica quântica, sob essa perspectiva, gera teorias quânticas
distintas, com contrapartidas ontológicas distintas, que podem ser interpretadas de
modos metafisicamente distintos.
Objetivos
Buscando uma postura realista científica, um método metamafafisico é expandido e
aplicado na avaliação de interpretações rivais da mecânica quântica não-relativista,
com base na distinção conceitual entre ontologia e metafísica, para a objetiva escolha
de teorias em discussões metafísicas relativas à mecânica quântica. Tendo em vista
um objetivo sobretudo metodológico, o foco recai sobre duas interpretações da mecâ-
nica quântica não-relativista consideradas casos “fáceis” do ponto de vista da análise
filosófica, por serem explícitas quanto aos seus comprometimentos ontológicos. As
interpretações utilizadas como exemplos na tese são: a interpretação da consciência
causal, pouco popular do ponto de vista da adoção por parte da comunidade científica,
e a interpretação dos muitos mundos, bastante difundida. É importante lembrar que a
mecânica quântica não implica na existência de universos paralelos ou consciências
causais. Mesmo em casos nos quais interpretações da mecânica quântica são con-
sideradas teorias científicas, é defendido que a mecânica quântica, entendida como
uma única teoria científica independente de interpretações, é algo sem sentido.
Metodologia
Após uma breve revisão bibliográfica, são buscadas inovações conceituais para tratar
problemas antigos de novas maneiras. Uma questão metodológica central é a distinção
entre ontologia e metafísica, segundo a qual a primeira trata de questões existenciais
e a segunda explica o que são as entidades encontradas na ontologia. O método
metametafísico desenvolvido na terceira parte da tese exemplifica os limites do projeto
de naturalização da filosofia com a ontologia, e mostra como é possível conhecer
negativamente as opções metafísicas para interpretar a mecânica quântica. A principal
estratégia para a aplicação do critério metametafísico é importar certas credenciais
epistemológicas das teorias científicas para julgar quais teorias metafísicas não são
aplicáveis na interpretação de conceitos científicos.
Resultados e Discussão
Três casos são examinados, nos quais o método metametafísico consegue determinar
quais são as alternativas erradas para interpretar a mecânica quântica em termos
metafísicos, isto é, quais são os perfis metafísicos incompatíveis com a teoria científica
em questão. Os dois primeiros casos foram considerados como falhas por diferentes
tipos de subdeterminação: no primeiro, perfis metafísicos fisicalistas são considerados
incompatíveis com a formulação da mecânica quântica na qual a consciência do obser-
vador é causal, ao passo que encontra compatibilidade em alguns tipos específicos de
dualismo metafísico. No segundo, a formulação fenomenológica da mecânica quântica
é determinada compatível com somente um tipo de redução fenomenológica. No ter-
ceiro caso, diferentemente da subdeterminação metafísica, onde há muitas escolhas a
serem feitas, é proposta uma “determinação nula”, de acordo com a qual não é possí-
vel escolhas metafísicas na literatura metafísica disponível. Com isso, propomos que
um dos papéis da metafísica analítica contemporânea seja o de desenvolver novas
teorias metafísicas que considerem diretamente para as teorias científicas as quais
interpretam.
Considerações Finais
Ainda que teorias metafísicas feitas sob medida para a mecânica quântica cumpram o
papel de explicar melhor certas abordagens de fenômenos microfísicos, não é possível
livrar-se da subdeterminação na mecânica quântica. Há uma subdeterminação teórica
quanto metafísica. Considerando o que foi discutido, uma posição filosófica agnóstica
é mantida, considerando a possibilidade de interpretar a mecânica quântica a partir de
um ponto de vista do realismo científico.
Palavras-chave: Metafísica. Metametafísica. Ontologia. Realismo científico. Mecânica
quântica não-relativista.
ABSTRACT
This thesis inquires what it means to interpret non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM),
and the philosophical limits of this interpretation. In pursuit of a scientific-realist stance,
a metametaphysical method is expanded and applied to evaluate rival interpretations
of QM, based on the conceptual distinction between ontology and metaphysics, for
objective theory choice in metaphysical discussions relating to QM. Three cases are
examined, in which this metametaphysical method succeeds in indicating what are
the wrong alternatives to interpret QM in metaphysical terms. The first two cases
failed in doing so due to different kinds of underdetermination. In the third case, unlike
underdetermination, where there are many choices to be made, a “null-determination”
is proposed where there may be no metaphysical choices in the available metaphysical
literature. Considering what has been discussed, an agnostic philosophic position is
adopted concerning the possibility of interpreting QM from a scientific-realistic point of
view.
Key-words: Metaphysics. Metametaphysics. Ontology. Scientific realism. Non-
relativistic quantum mechanics.
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INTRODUCTION: A “SMOKY DRAGON”
“I think I can safely say that
nobody understands quantum
mechanics”
RICHARD FEYNMAN
The Character of Physical Law
This thesis focuses on the philosophy of non-relativistic quantum mechanics
(hereafter, just “Non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM)”).2 But why QM? As Laura
Ruetsche (2018, p. 293) remarks, QM is the perfect contender for contemporary meta-
physical debates concerning scientific realism because of its empirical success. To
point a few of its achievements:3
[. . . ] it explains the stability of the stable atoms and nuclei and predicts the
decay rates of the unstable ones; it accounts for the different manifestations
of matter such as gaseous, liquid and solid, metallic and insulating, magnetic,
superfluid and superconducting; it forms the basis of our chemical knowledge;
and it provides the conceptual framework of all contemporary models for the
fundamental constituents of matter. (FRIEDERICH, 2014, p. 3).
Roughly speaking, scientific realism claims that science provides information
concerning how the world is. Judging by its applications and the precision of its theoret-
ical predictions for experimental phenomena yielded by QM, the theory can be market
as one of the most empirically successful physical theories in the history of modern
science. Thus, it makes sense to expect QM to tell us what the world is like, right?
But yet, Richard Feynman (1965, p. 129) said that “[. . . ] nobody understands quantum
mechanics”. Why is that so? Curious as it may sound, the empirical success of QM
does not lead to a single worldview. It has been argued instead that it leads to plenty of
them. We fully disagree with such a position: QM is compatible with several worldviews
but leads to none of them. In this sense, QM contradicts intuition even in relation to the
most basic commonsensical conception that best scientific theories are epected to pro-
vide a worldview (for starters, this kind of expectation is the most basic scientific-realist
stance). Operationally, QM is almost uncontroversial; its meaning, though, is not.
Let us (literally) draw the big picture. Wheeler (1986, p. 314) once famously
characterized QM as a “[. . . ] great smoky dragon whose tail is sharply defined, whose
2 It should be clear from start that this study does not engage in any other scientific theory: relativistic
theories, such as quantum field theories, are not even addressed. The focus here lies exclusively in
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, since it suffices for the philosophical discussion presented, which
can be extended (with due qualifications) to the relativistic domains.
3 We quote below Friederich’s (2014) list of actual applications of QM. The interested reader may also
consult the list, made by Professor Newton da Costa (2019, pp. 91–92), of possible applications of
QM.
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bite is also well marked, but which in between cannot be followed”. It is not by chance
that Wheeler’s smoky dragon resembles the famous Mach-Zehnder experiment, which
illustrates one of the greatest problems in the foundations of QM: the measurement
problem.
Figure 1 – The “great smoky dragon”, extracted from Miller and Wheeler (1983)
The dragon’s tail resembles the source of signals, while its head alludes to
the detectors that capture the signals emitted by the quantum objects. These are
uncontroversial parts: if one launches an electron, one can expect to capture a signal
emitted from an electron, considering the experimental setup to be correct. However,
what happens in the middle is not so simple. Which path did the quantum object take?
What it is like? Was the detected object the same one that was launched? And one of
the most controversial questions of all: what happens during a measurement process?
First, it is important to keep in mind that there are at least two types of measure-
ment problems: (𝑖) what happens in a measurement (Maudlin’s problem), and (𝑖𝑖) what
happens while the object is not being measured. Problem (𝑖𝑖) is tackled by Pessoa
Junior (2003, p. 4), who presents a taxonomy that divides interpretations in four main
groups:
Wave interpretations states that quantum systems are waves, and thus have wave-
like behavior such as manifesting interference patterns.
Corpuscular interpretations states that a quantum object is a particle, which is man-
ifest when detected.
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Dualist/realist interpretations states that quantum systems are simultaneously
waves and particles.
Complementarity interpretations which states that quantum objects manifest physi-
cal aspects (wave-like or particle-like) according to the experimental setup.
This thesis implicitly adopts a wave-interpretation stance, and therefore the prob-
lem (𝑖𝑖) of interpretation is not discussed here. I am concerned with problem (𝑖), which
relates to the stories that are told concerning what happens from the beginning to the
end of experiments. Therefore, this study is driven not only by the smoky part, but by
the whole dragon!
The main reason for the existence of a nine decades-old debate on the meaning
of QM is centered around the concept of “measurement” in QM. For many, the contro-
versy lies in the detection element. I resist this idea, arguing that detection is common
ground in every approach to QM: all views lead to the same experimental outcomes.
The reasons why it happens, however, remain non-consensual. In this work, the inter-
est lies particularly in the in between, considered the backbone of quantum mechanics
interpretation:4 there is no certainty regarding what happens in such a smoky area.
This is no reason to discourage scientists and philosophers, as there is no
need for a unified theory of everything in order to legitimate speculate about scientific
theories. We can fight with what we have, and we have QM. Numerous attempts to
understand QM were developed, and here we will present and try to evaluate some of
these attempts using philosophical standards.
There are no established ways to compared different interpretations of QM using
purely scientific criteria (physical, mathematical, or else): all interpretations of QM
considered in this work account for experimental phenomena in the same equivalent
manner. Therefore, there is no experimental reason for believing in one interpretation
instead of another. This familiar worry is called “underdetermination”. In this thesis, I
am concerned with the here called “interpretational underdetermination”: QM does not
determine its interpretation. In this sense, this work discusses theoretical, ontological,
metaphysical and structural underdetermination.
As means to address interpretational underdetermination in its completeness,
this thesis employs an increasingly common – but by no means standard – distinction
between “ontology” and “metaphysics”.5
The main motivation for employing such a distinction lies in metaphysical and
methodological debates on the relationship between philosophy and science, as well as
in metaphysical debates concerning scientific realism. In order to launch us at the head
of the debate, it is possible to follow Thomas Hofweber in general lines, who distilled
such a distinction in its essence.
4 That is, the term “interpretation” as in the sense (𝑖) that we began to define in the previous paragraph.
5 See Arenhart (2012, 2019), Berto and Plebani (2015) and Tahko (2015).
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In metaphysics we want to find out what reality is like in a general way. One
part of this will be to find out what the things or the stuff are that are part of
reality. Another part of metaphysics will be to find out what these things, or this
stuff, are like in general ways. Ontology, on this quite standard approach to
metaphysics, is the first part of this project, i.e. it is the part of metaphysics that
tries to find out what things make up reality. [. . . ] Ontology is generally carried
out by asking questions about what there is or what exists. (HOFWEBER,
2016, p. 13).
Thus, this is a matter of disciplines. Metaphysics is the widest one, dealing
with the most comprehensive questions about reality. Ontology, in turn, is a part of
metaphysics related to that what exists. Under the risk of stating the obvious, ontology
poses the ontological question: “what there is?” while metaphysics asks “what are those
things that there are?” – hence, “the what it is” (ARISTOTLE, Z, 1032a).
Therefore, the role of philosophy needs to be analyzed in order to better under-
stand QM. This does not imply an attempt to solve the problems of interpretation that
plague QM from its foundations. Instead, the focus lies on finding legitimate venues
for philosophy in the debate and seek available options for interpreting – and thus
understanding – QM in philosophical terms.
This work focuses on evaluating metaphysical theories associated with QM,
through the proposal of a metametaphysical method focusing on relatively “simple”
cases. The choice of almost unpopular interpretations of QM in terms of adherence
by the physics community was founded in the sheer array of philosophical problems
existing around them. Perhaps, if it is possible to apply the method presented here to
seemingly easier cases, it might be possible to apply it to increasingly difficult cases in
the future.
In this sense, the interpretation that posits human conscious action in quantum
systems and the interpretation that posits infinite branchings of the universe seem to
constitute fitting candidates for a metametaphysical evaluation. Nevertheless, the reader
of this thesis should bear in mind that the cases analyzed in the QM are not the only
possible cases, but cases in which the philosophical problematic is evident (perhaps
more so than in other solutions more accepted by the scientific community). This work
attempts to simply compare between the cases, thus focusing in the methodology of
interpretation of QM and its philosophical perspectives.
In order to do so, this thesis is structured in three parts. Part I deals with problems
in logic, mathematics and physics. 1 attempts to provide a precise account of what it
means to interpret QM, following the traditional characterization of scientific theories
following syntactic and semantic views. Chapter 2 presents a characterization of QM
using set theory as a tool, showing how QM leads to the measurement problem and how
interpretations are essentially solutions of such foundational problem. The terminology
and examples adopted in Chapter 2 are employed throughout the thesis.
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Part II deals more directly with philosophical issues. Chapter 3 explicitly con-
fronts such issues with the debate concerning scientific realism. Chapter 4 deals with
the characterization of the place and necessity for ontology and metaphysics in the
interpretational debate within QM related to scientific realism. I also present consid-
erations regarding the philosophical aspects of interpretations presented in Chapter
2
Finally, Part III deals with the evaluation of ontological and metaphysical possi-
bilities that raises interpretational underdetermination in QM. Chapter 5 expands the
“meta-Popperian” method by Jonas Arenhart (2012) to a metametaphysical method for
theory choice in metaphysics related to science – which is now labeled as the method
of “Unavailable Metaphysical Stories”. The next chapters present applications of this
method. Chapter 6 the focus falls on narrowing the metaphysical options in order to
interpret Wigner’s (1983) interpretation of QM, as well as more precisely present kinds
of metaphysical options that are not compatible with such interpretation. Chapter 7 con-
centrates on London and Bauer’s (1983) interpretation, dismissing a phenomenological
approach as an incompatible metaphysical profile for their formalism. Lastly, Chapter 8
presents another application of the method, considering DeWitt’s (1971) interpretation
of QM, showing that there are no metaphysical options available for metaphysically pro-
filing it thus far. In this chapter, a new problem is posed for scientific realism: contrary to
metaphysical underdetermination, which occurs when there are numerous metaphys-
ical options for interpreting a theory, it was identified the lack of metaphysical options
also poses a problem to scientific realism: after all, without saying what are the objects
with which the theory is existentially committed, what is its realism is about?
Since the measurement problem is crucial to this discussion, this work adopts
the strategy of diluting its formulation instead of condensing it in one place, so that
several chapters deal with different aspects of this foundational problem. In Chapter 2,
the problem is presented in Maudlin’s (1995) standard taxonomy; in Chapter 4, we state
the problem by describing a famous experiment, the Mach-Zehnder interferometer; in
Chapter 5, we briefly state the famous thought experiment of Schrödinger’s cat, revisited
in more detail in Chapter 8; in Chapter 6 we state the problem via Heisengerg’s cut;
the same formulation of the problem is revisited in Chapter 7 through von Neumann’s
chain.
This thesis is concluded with a somewhat detailed revision of what was achieved
(and what was not). Finally, we return to the “smoky dragon” analogy in order to draw
some speculative reflections concerning the efforts of interpreting QM in metaphysical
terms.
Part of the material presented here was previously published in the following
events, papers and chapters:
∙ Part of Chapter 1 was presented in the III Colóquio de Pesquisa em Filosofia da
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UFSC, held in Florianópolis, Brazil, in 2019, by the title of “Da Lógica à Física:
Interpretando a Mecânica Quântica” (ARROYO; FLAUSINO, 2019); written and
presented in co-authorship with Joanne Flausino.
∙ Part of Chapter 2 was presented in the VI Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and
Quantum Information: Identity and Individuality, held in Florianópolis, Brazil, in
2019, under the title “Building Quantum Theories” (ARROYO; GRACHER, 2019);
written and presented in co-authorship with Kherian Gracher.
∙ Part of Chapter 4 was presented in the 11th Principia International Symposium,
held in Florianópolis, Brazil, in 2019, under the title “Floating free from physics?
The metaphysics of quantum mechanics” (ARROYO; ARENHART, 2019b);6 writ-
ten and presented in co-authorship with Jonas Arenhart.
∙ Part of Chapter 5 was presented on the IV International Workshop on Quantum
Mechanics and Quantum Information, held at the Federal University of Santa Cata-
rina in 2017, under the title “On physics, metaphysics and metametaphysics” (AR-
ROYO; ARENHART, 2017b), written and presented in co-authorship with Jonas
Arenhart.
∙ A modified version of Chapter 6 appeared in the volume called “Quanta and Mind”,
edited by José Acácio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor, as a chapter entitled
“Between physics and metaphysics: a discussion of the status of mind in quantum
mechanics” (ARROYO; ARENHART, 2019a) that was written in co-authorship
with Jonas Arenhart.
∙ An early draft of Chapter 7 was presented in the 10th Principia International
Symposium, held in Florianópolis, Brazil, in 2017, by the title of “Underdetermina-
tions of Consciousness in Quantum Mechanics”. Later, part of the chapter was
published in the Principia: an international journal of epistemology by the title of
“On Quantum Mechanics, Phenomenology, and Metaphysical Underdetermination”
(ARROYO; NUNES FILHO, 2018), written and presented in co-authorship with
Lauro Nunes Filho.
∙ An early draft of Chapter 8 was presented on the 1st Colloquium on Image and
Imagination, held in Florianópolis, Brazil, in 2017, by the title of “Quantum me-
chanics, many worlds and fiction” (ARROYO; ARENHART, 2017a), written and
presented in co-authorship with Jonas Arenhart.
I am very grateful to my co-authors and relevant publishers for permission to use
and re-write this material. One last thing: from now on, the pronoun “we” will often be
used in place of the pronoun “I”, except when expressing the author’s own opinion.
6 To appear in the World Scientific book edited by Christian de Ronde.
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Knowledge is a product of humanity, and therefore collective. There is no “I” in
“team”.7
7 Except for any errors that may be contained herein. These are entirely my responsibility.
Part I
ON PHYSICS
24
1 INTERPRETING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
What is a scientific theory? In principle, if one desires to inquire about the inter-
pretation of quantum theory, this seems a good place to start. Redhead (1987, p. 69)
stressed that “[. . . ] the word ‘interpretation’ is used with a number of different senses
in philosophy of science”. We begin our work, then, by revisiting the syntactic-semantic
debate in order to present a more precise account for the endeavor of interpreting QM.
The search for a characterization of scientific theories has occupied much of
the debate in contemporary philosophy of science. Since the 20th century, it is widely
accepted that the quandary revolves mainly around two formal characterizations of the
concept of a “scientific theory”: a syntactic and a semantic view. Simply put, the debate
unfolds as follows: in syntactic approaches, scientific theories are identified as sets of
formalized sentences and some connection rules; in semantic approaches, scientific
theories are identified as classes of models. The main question is: which view is best?1
Historically, the syntactic view ascended and declined along the Logical Empiri-
cist program, while the semantic view flourished with the development of model theory
(mainly due to Tarski’s work). Semantic views, then, are considered to be the current
new orthodoxy,2 even though the syntactic approach still gathers numerous followers
to this day.
Unfortunately, the transition in the dominant view took place based on somewhat
misleading standards regarding the syntactical approach.3 The whole endeavor of the
syntactical approach was identified by a straw man version of it – that is, frequently
attaching several highly implausible theses to it.4 This fact can be characterized as a
case of “Received View on scientific theories”, as termed by Putnam (1966, p. 240),
which is a sort of automatic identification of any approach to scientific theories, in
particular, the syntactic approach. A similar situation is frequently happens with the
semantic approach, in such a manner that Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 1) state that
“there was not really a debate”. Therefore, distinguishing between straw man aspects of
each approach and their fundamental characteristics seems to pose as a good warm
up for this discussion. In order to do so, we divide the approaches in two further groups:
1. radical and moderate syntactical approach;
2. radical and moderate semantic approach.
As we shall see, contemporary debate shows that the radical versions of both ap-
proaches are untenable, while their moderate versions converge, thus regarding them
1 For early prospects on the debate, see Suppe (1977).
2 See Contessa (2006).
3 See Lutz (2015) and Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §1).
4 See Lutz (2012).
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as complementary rather than rivals.5 This statement somewhat sketches our commit-
ment to a theoretical stand in such debate. However, before focusing on this matter, let
us present the discussion in more detail, starting from the syntactical approach.
1.1 THE SYNTACTICAL APPROACH
Among the main tenets of the syntactical approach is the formal treatment of sci-
entific theories as an axiomatic calculus. The broader sense of the syntactical approach,
however, is characterized in numerous ways according to the radical and moderate ap-
proaches.
The radical syntactical approach
As mentioned before, the syntactical approach has been wrongly identified ex-
clusively with regards to the radical syntactic approach in the past. Mainly rooted in
the theses put forth by several members of the Vienna Circle (such as Carnap and
Hempel), the radical syntactic approach to scientific theories is characterized by five
main requirements, succintly presented by Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 4):
Language: The non-logical vocabulary of the scientific formal language is divided in
two parts: the theoretical terms (𝑉𝑇 ) and the observational terms (𝑉𝑂), being the
latter related to empirical phenomena and the former prima facie not.
Logic: The formal language has a set of logical axioms, which gives rise to its underly-
ing logic.
Theoretical axioms: A set of 𝑉𝑇 sentences that are taken as axioms.
Semantics for 𝑉𝑂: Empirical entities are informally connected to 𝑉𝑇 , which is related
to a theory of meaning based on a criterion of verifiability.
Correspondence rules: A partial interpretation connects 𝑉𝑇 to 𝑉𝑂, that is, relates
purely theoretical parts of scientific theories with empirical data.
From this perspective, the radical syntacticist answer to the million-dollar ques-
tion of “what is a scientific theory?” is: an axiomatic calculus with theoretical axioms
connected to empirical observation by means of correspondence rules. This also ex-
plains the meaning of interpreting a theory: to interpret, then, is to connect the theory
with entities in the world according to specific rules. As the name suggests, the theo-
retical vocabulary 𝑉𝑇 corresponds to non-observable objects, while the observational
vocabulary 𝑉𝑂 relates to objects that can be directly observed by an experimental ar-
rangement. This is, perhaps, the most intuitive way to see the distinction within the use
5 See Halvorson (2012, 2013), Lutz (2015), and Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §1).
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of a formal language: whereas the entities designated by 𝑉𝑂 can, at least in principle,
be observed, the entities designated by 𝑉𝑇 can only be obtained by means of a mathe-
matical formula. Consider, for example, the concept of “density” (𝐷): in basic chemistry
textbooks, it is said that density is the ratio of the mass (𝑚) to the volume (𝑣) of a given
material (solid, liquid or gaseous), yielding the following equation: 𝐷 = 𝑚
𝑣
. Notice that
the physical quantities 𝑚 and 𝑣 can be measured by means of measuring devices, thus
counting as observational terms,6 whereas 𝐷 can be indirectly obtained through the
equation, therefore constituting an example of a theoretical term.
These features were subject to criticism, inasmuch as the radical syntactic ap-
proach has historically been closely linked to the Logical Empiricist program.7 Suppe
(2000, p. S103) forged a very succinct list of six reasons that led to the decline of the
radical syntactic view. According to the authr, the two most serious objections related
to the view are the untenability of its observational-theoretical distinction and a “[. . . ]
confusion of meaning relationships, experimental design, measurement, and causal
relationships some of which are not properly parts of theories” concerning the corre-
spondence rules.
The most criticized, if not the most controversial, aspect of the radical syntac-
tic approach lies on the proposed division of vocabulary between observable 𝑉𝑂 and
non-observable (theoretical) 𝑉𝑇 terms, a fundamental point for the effective applica-
tion of correspondence rules. As pointed out by Dalla Chiara and di Francia (1979,
pp. 148–149), a simple observation of a fish through an aquarium, per example, may
be considered a theoretical term to some extent, inasmuch the lens precludes a direct
observation required for 𝑉𝑂. Similarly, Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 5) point out that
a purely theoretical term, such as “electric current”, could be, in principle, directly ex-
perienced simply by putting one’s finger inside an electric socket (something that no
one should do!). Therefore, this distinction seems to be highly implausible, and as such
does not seem fit to serve as foundation for scientific theories.
These aspects, responsible for bringing issues to the syntactic approach, are
entirely exclusive of the radical approach, while also being somewhat disposable. Thus,
it can be said that they do not configure essential traits of the syntactic view per se.
However, as one of the main tenets of syntactic approaches is the formalization
of scientific theories according to a logical language, there is a line of criticism that
encompasses the syntactic view as a whole: the restrictions made upon the very use
of formal languages.
6 We will try to clear up a confusion related to the terms “language” and “meaning”. Terms are the
linguistic representations for certain quantities – for example, the term “mass” designates the physical
quantity known as mass. Measuring, thus, is related to quantities, not their linguistic representations.
In this sense, terms cannot be measured.
7 There is a huge literature discussing the matter. For the classical exposition an criticism of the
“Received View”, (here referred to as the radical syntactic approach) the reader should be referred to
Suppe (1977). As we mentioned earlier, this work is retained to the most recent debate.
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Such aforementioned formal language may be considered to be a first-order
language.8 This point is easily accepted to what concerns formal theories such as
mathematics or logic, however, seems inadequate when considering formal description
of scientific theories,9 given that most contemporary scientific theories, such as QM,
involve more than simple relations among elements of the domains.10 Generally, order-1
structures encompass a non-empty domain 𝐷 and distinguished elements of 𝐷, 𝑛-ary
relations on 𝐷 and 𝑛-ary functions on 𝐷. An order-𝑛 structure, 𝑛 > 1, may encompass
elements, relations and operations of higher orders, not only dealing with the individuals
of 𝐷, but also with collections or properties of such individuals, and so on.
Moreover, the attempt of applying this kind of formalization to relatively compli-
cated scientific theories would be impractical. Consider, example, a scientific theory
such as QM: before formalizing the theory itself, one would first need to formalize sev-
eral general ideas related to set theory, as well as the required mathematics (such as
several topics of standard functional analysis, e.g., Hilbert spaces, differential calculus,
etc.). This kind of criticism makes the ideal of formalization useless for real scientific
purposes, since this situation proves itself to be far from actual scientific practice –
which is a serious constraint.
Nevertheless, as Lutz (2015) pointed out, there seems to be no textual evidence
that the proponents of the radical syntactic approach restricted the language of for-
malization to order-1 structures. In fact, as Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 7) argue,
order-𝑛 languages are frequently employed by proponents of syntactic approaches
such as theory of types – see Carnap (1958). In addition, the alleged obligatory require-
ment of preliminary formalization from scratch seems not to exist – notably, there is no
documentation of such requirement made by proponents of the radical syntactic ap-
proach, as Lutz (2015) remark. Therefore, this criticism seems to configure yet another
straw man attack on the radical syntactic approach (LUTZ, 2012).
Lastly, it is relevant to address the criticism of the radical syntactic approach
termed the “individuation problem”. This objection states that the radical syntactic ap-
proach identifies a theory with regard to its linguistic formulation. But if theories are not
linguistic entities (which does seem to be the case), the conclusion that follows is that
theories are individuated incorrectly by the radical syntactic view. Similarly to several
of the criticisms briefly presented in this section, the individuation problem would rep-
resent a severe drawback of the radical syntactic approach, were it legitimate, since it
would render impossible to formulate the same theory using different vocabularies.
This, however, appears not to be the case, insofar as there seems to be no
evidence that the radical syntactic approach is committed to this sort of individuation
8 From this point forward, we will adopt the notation presented by Krause and Arenhart (2016b), who
call first-order structures as “order-1”, and high-order structures (e.g., with 𝑛 > 1) as “order-𝑛”.
9 See, for instance, Suppes (2002, p. 4).
10 See Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §6.1).
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of theories based on formal vocabulary. It seems, in fact, that the radical syntactic
approach does not necessarily promises to provide an explication of the concept of
“scientific theory” in general. This seems to be yet another widespread misunderstand-
ing concerning both syntactic and semantic approaches to characterization of scientific
theories (KRAUSE; ARENHART, 2016b, p. 8). If it were to do so, such attempt would be
made to fall since not every scientific theory is well developed to the point that allows it
to be axiomatized as a formal system.
Following Lutz (2015, §5) and Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 9), proposals of
the radical syntactic approach should be seen as a rational reconstruction of particular
scientific theories (thus avoiding the individuation problem). This formal reconstruction,
in turn, should be understood as an ideal rather than as a criterion of which theories
ought to meet in order to be considered scientific theories.
The preliminary discussion here presented allow u to proceed to a more sensi-
ble conception of syntactical approaches, here referred to as a “moderate syntactical
approach”.
The moderate syntactical approach
As pointed out by Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 6), it is possible to refrain
from most controversial aspects of the radical syntactical approach without forfeiting
the syntactical approach: one is not obliged to adhere to a verificationist theory of
meaning, per example, neither to accept the relation between theories and experience
via specific rules of correspondence or the division of vocabulary between 𝑉𝑇 and 𝑉𝑂
in order to employ a syntactic view of scientific theories. As argued by Krause and
Arenhart (2016b, p. 77), the radical syntactic approach is nothing but a “folklore”, which
has been “demystified” mainly by Lutz (2012, 2015).
This demystification of the syntactic view is not, however, widely known. The
effort to rule out the most problematic features of the radical syntactic approach, while
sticking to basic tenets of the syntactic view is precisely what constitutes the “moderate
syntactical approach”. Following Lutz (2015, p. 5) and Krause and Arenhart (2016b,
p. 10), the main traits of the view can be presented as follows:
Formal language: A scientific theory can be presented in a formal language of order-
𝑛.
Theoretical equivalence: An equivalence between theories can be put forth, so that
different formulations could count as the same theory.
Partial Interpretation: Some sentences of the formal language must be partially inter-
preted in the sense that the theoretical language of the theory refers to empirical
objects, thus granting that the theory is an empirical theory.
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The theoretical equivalence feature seems act as a clarification of the individ-
uation problem allegedly presented in the radical syntactic view. Accepting the com-
mitment to individuation of a theory as formulated in one unique language makes it
possible to accept equivalent formulations of a theory.11
One does not need to commit to order-1 structures in order to present an ax-
iomatization of a scientific theory – this can also be achieved in order-𝑛 structures, e.g.
type theory. Before advancing in direction to the main goal of this work, however, it is
fit to digress towards the notion of “axiomatization”, which plays a central role within
this discussion. So far, “axiomization” and “formalization” have been terms used inter-
changeably. However, as pointed by Suppe (1977, p. 110), that does not seem to be
the case, thus being important for the discussion to distinguish both terms from this
point forward.
Following Charles Parsons (1974, p. 27), “axiomatization” may be defined as an
organization of a body of knowledge (such as a scientific theory) in order to clarify its
structure, by singling out certain concepts as “primitive” (or “undefined”) and others as
“defined” or “derived”. The main point achieved by such definition is the possibility of
presenting the theory as a deductive system, in which certain propositions singled out
as axioms may provide the deductive derivation of all other propositions. It should be
remarked that the matter of axiomatization is marked by several misunderstandings
concerning its corrigibility. In the traditional sense, named “concrete axiomatization”,
axioms are taken to be sacred truths, immutable by their own nature. Fortunately, this
is not relevant to the current situation of mathematical development, which conversely
defines axioms as expressions of tacit assumptions, in order to make them explicit.
Quoting Dalla Chiara and di Francia (1979, p. 134): “[t]o axiomatize is not to dogma-
tize!”. Once a theory is properly axiomatized, it can be interpreted within its axiomatic
constrains, that is, the domain of interpretation is restrained to the situations in which
the axioms are true. This observation leads to the formalization of a theory: for such
an interpretation to be considered precise, one must replace its language by a formal
(artificial) syntax – and that is the meaning of formalize.
As for partial interpretation, it is noteworthy to reiterate that this concept carries
no commitment to specific correspondence rules, differently from the radical syntactic
approach. Moreover the criticism to which this notion was subjected seems to disappear
when the dichotomy between 𝑉𝑇 and 𝑉𝑂 is abandoned (SUPPE, 1989, §1). This line
of thought renders the criticisms of Putnam (1966, pp. 244–248) and Achinstein (1968,
pp. 85–91) regarding the Received View’s partial interpretation inaccurate with concern
to the moderate approach. The notion of partial interpretation shall be used here in the
11 See Halvorson (2012, p. 191) for a development of this trait.
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sense of attributing partial meaning to propositions,12 e.g., physical meaning.13
Moreover, as argued by Suppe (1989), this particular feature of the moderate
syntactical approach makes sense only when attached to semantical concepts such as
metalanguage:
Since it would appear that little more can be said syntactically in the way of
characterizing partial interpretation, if we are to find an adequate analysis of
the concept, we must turn to semantic considerations. (SUPPE, 1989, p. 43).
In this sense, a physical theory can be said to be a metatheory inasmuch as it
assigns physical meaning to a purely mathematical language that is not necessarily
connected to anything but mathematics. The plot thickens right here, since this posi-
tion corroborates the thesis enunciated previously: moderate versions of syntactic and
semantic approaches converge, rather than compete with each other.
Let’s take this hook to move on to the analysis of the semantic approach.
1.2 THE SEMANTIC APPROACH
The elemental aspect of the semantic approach is the identification of a scien-
tific theory as a class of models. However, unlike syntactical approaches, there is no
unified view called the semantic approach. Rather, there are several accounts on what
“models” are, how they can relate to reality, and the role of formalized language in the
characterization of scientific theories. For instance, according to Suppes (2002, §2.1),
there are numerous ways to understand the concept of “model”, e.g., iconic models,
analogy models, logical models, and others. Moreover, the followed question can be
posed: is it the role of models to represent something? If so, what should them repre-
sent: phenomena, data, theories, or something else? Yet, what is the ontological status
of models, that is, what are models? Are they physical objects, fictional, or purely formal
set-theoretical entities?
Such debate is not part of the scope of this work,14 but, notwithstanding, it
focuses on a specific approach regarding models. Given this plurality, we adhere to
the Suppesian set-theoretical development of models, called by Krause and Arenhart
(2016b, p.11) the “hegemonic version of the semantic approach”; This choice is made
mainly due to the fact, as put by da Costa and French (2000), “models” are said to be
structures (of one kind or another) in all these accounts, and as such this notion may
12 It is noteworthy to mention that the terminology of “partial interpretation” is employed here in a non-
standard way. It shall not to confused with its standard meaning: if every elementary statement in a
theory 𝑇 has a correspondent in its models, then it is considered to be a “full interpretation”; otherwise,
it is a “partial interpretation” (see HASKELL (1963, p. 48)).
13 But not philosophical meaning. This matter shall be discussed in more dept in the following chapters.
14 The interested reader may be referred to a general account of these problems in Frigg and Hartmann
(2017).
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configure a better path to the philosophical purposes of this study due to its generality.15
Moreover, the goal here is to inquire about the semantic approach to scientific theories
in general, and so it would be prudent to keep this inquiry self-contained in regard to
the role of models as models of scientific theories.
Therefore, mentioning the concept of a “model”, it should be assumed the accep-
tance of a set-theoretical entity, typically built in a set theory. In this context, this work
proceeds by supposing a development inside the usual Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
The following sections present the radical and the moderate version of this view of
semantic approaches, beginning with a more radical stance.
The radical semantic approach
Considering such set-theoretical approach to models the following fundamental
tenets the radical semantic approach are, according to Krause and Arenhart (2016b,
p.11):
Reification: A scientific theory is a class of models.
Language independence: A scientific theory is language-independent.
Set theoretical structures: Models are understood as set theoretical structures.
According to say the radical semanticists, “scientific theories are classes of
models”, which, in the terms of van Fraassen (1980, p. 222), means to “reify” a theory.
But from there arises the question: what, then, is a model? Traditionally, mostly due to
Tarski (1956), a “model” ℳ is defined as an ordered pair such as
ℳ = ⟨𝐷, ℐ⟩
where the domain 𝐷 is a non-empty set and ℐ is the interpretation function. Intuitively,
the interpretation function ℐ involves the interpretation of a language L (the object-
language), which means assigning the function truth-values in a metalanguage trough
mapping of the non-logical elements of a formal language, relating each symbol to
an element in 𝐷, the domain of interpretation: individual constants, functions and
predicate symbols. In this sense, to interpret a theory is to correlate a language with
set-theoretical elements of a structure, in a purely mathematical manner.
More specifically, the standard textbook approach of this matter (CHANG;
KEISLER, 1990, pp. 18–36) goes as follows: order-1 models are defined as structures
in the form of the ordered pair ⟨𝐷, ℐ⟩ (with the domain 𝐷 ̸= ∅), where the interpretation
15 We must not lose sight of the main goal here, which is to make sense of the interpretation(s) of QM.
Thus, the more general the approach of models, the better.
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function ℐ maps each one of the constant symbols 𝑐 to a constant 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷, each 𝑚-place
function symbols 𝐹 to an 𝑚-place function 𝐺 : 𝐷𝑚 −→ 𝐷 on 𝐷, and each 𝑛-ary rela-
tion symbols 𝑆 to an 𝑛-ary relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝐷𝑛 on 𝐷. Constants and relations on 𝐷 are
extensional concepts, and thus two relations {𝑅,𝑅′} are identical if they have the same
extension, that is, if ∀𝑥[︀(𝑥 ∈ 𝑅) ↔ (𝑥 ∈ 𝑅′)]︀, then 𝑅 = 𝑅′.16 However, the existence of
two different relation symbols {𝑆, 𝑆 ′} with the same extension of their interpretation is
possible. If a structure ⟨𝐷, ℐ⟩ contains an exclusive interpretation for multiple relation
symbols {𝑆𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 that maps every 𝑆 to the same 𝑅, there would be only one relation,
so its image would lead to ⟨𝐷, {𝑅}⟩. As remarked by Hodges (1993, pp. 1–4) and Lutz
(2015, p. 11), this extensional account of relations is precisely the involvement with
language. From now on, these kinds of structures, formalized with a vocabulary, will be
called “labelled structures”.
As famously stated by van Fraassen (1989, p. 366), however, the independence
of a specific language (i.e., a syntax) should be a fundamental trait of the semantic view:
without it, its motivation is lost when “[. . . ] models are defined, as in many standard
logic texts, to be partially linguistic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax.” Thus,
the requirement of language independence seems to seriously constrain this traditional
Tarskian-like account of models, since it is precisely “yoked to a particular syntax”. In
fact, Halvorson (2012) argues that any appeal of language, e.g. the labelled-structure
account of models, could reduce the semantic approach into a syntactic approach.
Moreover, the traditional characterization of ‘models’ via labelled structures is,
very restrictive. Since it quantifies over elements of 𝐷, it only functions when consider-
ing order-1 structures, which are not able to comprise most of the best contemporary
scientific theories. Thus, when adopting models for the characterization of scientific the-
ories, this definition presents itself as problematic. As Bueno and Krause (2007) argued,
the literature on models is elusive in this aspect, and any semantic approach which at-
tempts to characterize scientific theories needs some sort of re-conceptualization when
intending to characterize contemporary physical theories such as quantum mechanics.
The major drawback presented by this stance is that a proper model theory needs to be
comprised exclusively in order-1 structures: strictly speaking, there is no model theory
for order-𝑛 structures,17 since fundamental theorems of standard model theory (such
as the Löwenheim-Skølem theorem)18 only holds for systems of order-1 logic.
According to Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 12), the set-theoretical characteri-
zation of structures poses as the most common alternative for the traditional, language-
16 Although Chang and Keisler (1990) work only with order-1 structures, the idea can be generalized.
17 This is also the case for non-standard semantics, such as Henkin semantics, see Henkin (1950) and
Enderton (2015, §3). Nevertheless, we will stick with the standard case.
18 Roughly speaking, the Löwenheim-Skølem (1879) theorems state that order-1 theories have a count-
able (ℵ0) model, implying that the theorems are unable to control the cardinality of their transfinite
models. Thus, no order-1 theory (with transfinite models) can have a unique model (up to isomor-
phism).
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dependent, account of models as labelled structures. Following this characterization,
ℳ is defined as a 𝑛-tuple such as
ℳ = ⟨𝐷,𝑅𝑖⟩𝑖∈𝐼
where 𝐷 is a non-empty set and 𝑅𝑖19 stands for a family of relations on the elements
of 𝐷. Note that 𝑅𝑖 does not relate only elements of 𝐷, therefore it could give rise
to order-𝑛 structures (with 𝑛 > 1). As for the language-independence criterion, this
type of structure is defined independently from a specific vocabulary when written as
𝑛-tuples containing a domain and a family of relations (comprised of functions and
constants). This can be seen clearly in order-1 structures, trough the definition of the
algebraic structure of “group”. A group 𝐺 may be written as ⟨𝐺, ∘, 𝑒,−⟩, where: “𝐺” is
a non-empty set; “∘” is a binary operation (the composition function on 𝐺); “𝑒” is the
neutral (identity) element; and “−” is the inverse (opposite) operation. As an example
of an order-𝑛 structure there is the case of “topological space”, written as the structure
⟨𝐷, 𝜏⟩, with 𝜏 ∈ P(P(𝐷)), since 𝜏 is a family of subsets of 𝐷. In cases such as this, the
family of relations 𝑅𝑖 is interpreted as an indexed structure, so the structure could be
written as ⟨𝐷,𝑅0, . . . , 𝑅𝑛⟩ and the position of the relations of 𝐷 in the structure takes
the role of the index, so that it could be read as ⟨𝐷, {𝑅𝑖}𝑖∈{1,...,𝑛}⟩. It should be noted
that indexed structures contain more information than the image of an interpretation of
labelled structures.
After clarifying the main tenets of the set-theoretical semantic approach, it is
possible to present its application, based on the example made famous by van Fraassen
(1980, pp. 41–44)20 called the “seven point geometry”, also known as the Fano plane
(Figure 2). Suppose the need to present a theory 𝑇 of a projective plane, where we take
“point” and “line” are taken as primitive concepts presenting the following sentences as
axioms:
1. For any two lines, there is at most one point lying in both.
2. For any two points, there is exactly one line containing both.
3. On any line there are at least two points.
Let {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, . . . } represent individual variables of a domain 𝐷, and {𝐿, 𝑃} repre-
sent unary predicates in a universe 𝑈 consisting of lines and points, so that 𝐿(𝑥) means
that 𝑥 is a line, and 𝑃 (𝑥) means that 𝑥 is a point. It is possible, then, to present an
unique metalinguistic scheme of order-1 comprising all three axioms as follows:
19 Decomposed as 𝑅𝑖 = ⟨𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑛⟩𝑛∈𝐼 , with 1 6 𝑖 6 𝑛.
20 See also van Fraassen (1989, pp. 218–220).
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∀𝑥∀𝑦
(︁
𝐿(𝑥) ∧ 𝐿(𝑦) ∧ 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 → ∃!𝑧(︀𝑃 (𝑧) ∧ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑦)︀)︁
This theory 𝑇 can be presented as the ordered triple ⟨𝐷,𝐿, 𝑃 ⟩. Suppose a model
ℳ1 of 𝑇 as the following sentence: “a single line with two points in it”. This assertion
renders the axioms true, so ℳ1 𝑇 . Subsequently, consider a second model ℳ2,
which comprises the Fano plane picture in Figure 2: it interprets and makes true the
whole set of axioms of the theory 𝑇 true, so that it is possible to write, also, that ℳ2 𝑇 .
Figure 2 – The Fano plane (ℳ2)
This example illustrates a central characteristic of semantic approaches in a very
intuitive manner: if a theory is true with respect to a model, then it is possible to say that
this is a model of the theory. In other words, a model is that which makes the axioms
true.This example, then, indicates the manner in which a geometric model provides a
semantics – or, concerning the case of interest here, an interpretation) – for the axioms
of a theory.
Moderate semantic approach
In the light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to drop the “language indepen-
dence” requirement from the basic traits of the semantic approach to scientific theories.
Call, then, the semantic approach following this decision a moderate semantic approach.
Is it, however, enough to fix an answer for the question of “what is a scientific theory?”
in indexed structures? As it will be argued, not quite so. Consider the discussion of
group theory previously presented, written as the ordered quadruple ⟨𝐺, ∘, 𝑒,−⟩: is this
an exhaustive answer to the inquiry on what is a class of groups? No. Alternatively, one
can argue that a group can be represented by the triple ⟨𝐺, ∘,−⟩, the triple ⟨𝐺, 𝑒, ∘⟩, or,
yet, the pair ⟨𝐺, ∘⟩.21 None of these structures are the same, and therefore language
seems to be important here.
The dilemma established by Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 13) is then given:
in one hand, models comprise a vocabulary when identified as labelled structures
which yields a not so different result from the syntactic approach (HALVORSON, 2012).
21 For simplicity, from this point forward the description of these structures’ components shall be fixed
as defined in the previous paragraph.
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Moreover, if such a language is of order-𝑛, then it is not covered by any model theory
at all. Alternatively, models identified as indexed structures do not result in much of
semantics in stake, insofar as the models does not make anything true. Furthermore,
considering a language-free ideal scenario, there shall be no language according to
which the structures are interpreted: the semantic approach to scientific theories, then,
in agreement with this fairly general characterization, would refer solely to purely formal
set-theoretical structures – which are unsound point, since scientific theories must
relate to empirical data in some manner (LUTZ, 2015, p. 14).
1.3 TOWARDS A UNIFIED APPROACH
A fairly well-accepted settlement to this so-called “dilemma” has been presented
by Craver (2008), Krause, Arenhart, and Moraes (2011), Lutz (2015) and Halvorson
(2016). That is precisely the recognition that issues concerning the “labelled structure”
and the “indexed structure” views on the semantic approach arise only when one ac-
cepts the ideal of identifying scientific theories with something (e.g., these formulations).
As soon as this ideal is abandoned, it becomes clear that both views are attempts to
apprehend aspects of scientific theorizing, in the sense that they are distinct repre-
sentations of scientific theories – and thus do not provide the essence of scientific
theorizing itself. In this sense, these views must not be considered as competitors,
which is perhaps the major upshot of recent debate.
Following the adaptation made by Lutz (2015, §5.3) of the argument presented
by Halvorson (2016, §2), it is possible to interpret an indexed structure (semantic) as a
labelled structure (syntactic). Consider the structure 𝐴 as follows:
𝐴 =
⟨︀
𝐷,𝑅1
⟩︀
,
where 𝐷 = {𝑎, ⟨𝑎, 𝑎⟩} and 𝑅1 = {⟨𝑎, 𝑎⟩}. Presented as such, it is not clear in this indexed
structure whether 𝑅1 describes a relation over a set of elements or over a set of tuples
of elements of the domain. As a result, it is also unclear what this structure is. If one
understands a mathematical structure solely as a set of mathematical entities endowed
with mathematical relations, it is not possible to advance from this point. To push the
argument a little further, consider now the structure 𝐴′:
𝐴′ =
⟨︀
𝐷′, 𝑅′1
⟩︀
,
where 𝐷′ = {𝑎, 𝑏, ⟨𝑎, 𝑏⟩} and 𝑅′1 = {⟨𝑎, 𝑏⟩}. A question arises: are 𝐴 and 𝐴′ isomorphic
structures? This information is not provided by the description. The answer lies in the
arity of relations 𝑅1 and 𝑅′1, that is, in their classification as unary or binary relations.
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Thus, if a bijective function 𝑓 : 𝐷 → 𝐷 and if ⟨𝑙,𝑚⟩∈𝑅1 , then ⟨𝑓(𝑙), 𝑓(𝑚)⟩∈𝑅1 . This crucial
information is not explicitly given: if the relations have the same arity, yes; otherwise, no.
However, to explicitly provide information regarding non-logical terms of the structure
(e.g., a mapping from the index set of the indexed structures to the elements or types
of elements of the structure) is to transform the indexed structure into a labelled struc-
ture, since the result carries the indexed set’s index taken as a vocabulary (CHANG;
KEISLER, 1990, p. 19).22 In other words, the indexed structure may be converted to a
Tarskian-like structure when the index set 𝐼 is defined as the non-logical vocabulary of
a language, thus transforming the indexed set into a labelled set with concern to the
indexation status of interpretation. Therefore, as Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 16) ar-
gue, “[. . . ] an isomorphism may be defined both in the presence as well in the absence
of a language in which the structures are interpreted”, rendering both approaches to
models meaningful.
As Lutz (2015, §7) states, [. . . ] the syntax-semantics debate was about a distinc-
tion that marks no difference”, to the extent that one approach can be freely translated
into another. Similarly, as noted in the pictorial analogy of the “duck-rabbit”, made fa-
mous by Wittgenstein (1953, II §xi), one can see, in the same image, either a duck or a
rabbit, thus making it pointless to identify the picture with solely one of these comple-
mentary points of view. Moreover, Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 17) remarked that,
specifically within the semantic approach, the discussion related to whether or not to in-
clude the requirement for language independence is unimportant considering that both
structures (language-dependent and “independent” are convertible into one another).
In fact, that is precisely what Suppes (1967) means when distinguishing between the
complementary intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to theories: the former consists in
the axiomatization via linguistic resources (e.g., via labelled structures, or syntactically );
when no such axiomatization is viable, one can proceed with the latter by characterizing
the class of models of the theory directly in set theory.
Ultimately, it seems that philosophers of science have not provided a satisfying
answer to the question of “what is a scientific theory?”, as its most plausible answer
would be, after all, “I don’t know”. Although an answer concerning what a scientific
theory is in its essence could not be provided, we may say in which ways it could be
represented for philosophical purposes. In that sense, both syntactic and semantic tools
can be employed in philosophical inquiry.
Based on the discussion presented so far, it is relevant to notice that both the
syntactic and the semantic approaches are live options in current practice of philosophy
of science. Even if both approaches are viable, they are not considered to be equally
adequate to treat scientific theories philosophically. For instance, notice that models
are models of something: when they are models of some axiomatic, it would only make
22 See also Lutz (2015, §5).
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sense to call it “model” as if there if a set of axioms modeled by the structure. Then, it
would be necessary to provide an axiomatics of the theory before modeling it in a set
theoretical structure. Is not that, however, a major shortcoming of the radical syntactic
approach mentioned earlier? Recall the syntactic approach: the goal is to axiomatize
a theory, by describing it from its underlying logic to its specific axioms. Therefore, this
seems to be an inconvenient for the semantic approaches. Naturally, this is a simple
matter when the theory in question is a simple as well, such as the theory concerning the
projective plane. Suppose, however, that the theory to be modeled requires several “sub-
theories”, which must all be axiomatized. Consider QM, which encompasses several
underlying theories such as the tensor calculus, theory of differential equations, vector
spaces, and so on. This would render the axiomatization impracticable.
In this sense, Zahar (2004) and Worrall (2007) seem to pursue a syntactic kind
of axiomatization, relating the use of set theory to axiomatization – either its vocabulary
(WORRALL, 2007) or set-theoretical axiomatization of parts of theories (ZAHAR, 2004).
According to Suppes (1967), this categorizes an “extrinsic approach”. Nevertheless, we
consider the criticism of Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §5.1) to this kind of approach
(in their vocabulary, the “external axiomatization”) to be crucial when considering the
matter models. Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 79) argue that this kind of approach
either (𝑖) cannot provide its models, in the sense that if a set-theory (such as the
standard Zermelo–Fraenkel, or any other known set theory) is supposedly consistent,
it cannot provide its own models in the object language, but only in a metalanguage
in which it is constructed. This leads to the objection that (𝑖𝑖) this fact would render
axiomatization impracticable due to the need for axiomatizing its models entirely, which
involves huge structures. The argument made by Krause and Arenhart (2016b, p. 79) is
therefore accepted here, in what concerns their affirmation that states that “[t]hat goes
beyond what any philosopher of science would be willing to take into account.”
This point, however, is not entirely correct, as not any philosopher of science
would decline this kind of axiomatization. In fact, this is precisely how da Costa and
Chuaqui (1988) lead their axiomatization process.23 It should be remarked, though, that
this kind of detailed axiomatization is fairly distant from the working scientific practice;
by contrast, it is fundamentally the logician’s approach, which proves to be more useful
to the philosopher of science than to the working scientist. Call this approach “rigid
axiomatization” – which is also a formalization of scientific theories.
At the same time, Suppes’ (2002) argues that, ideally, all “step-theories” (axiom-
atized in the rigid approach) can be presupposed as obtainable within a set theory.
23 It should be remarked that both Suppes (2002) and da Costa and Chuaqui (1988) consider their
approaches to be part of the so-called “Suppes’ predicate”, but their approach clearly differ. Krause
and Arenhart (2016b, §5, §6) present a detailed discussion on these differences, surpasses kinds of
axiomatization. However, for the purpose of this work, a superficial account on their differences based
on different methodological approaches to axiomatization suffices.
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This yields that only the specific axioms of the theory must be presented. The impor-
tant point, then, are its set theoretical structures, which model the theory’s axioms, i.e.,
the models of the theory. Therefore, this it is a less rigid axiomatization, yet properly
semantic in the sense that the elements of the theory are defined in its satisfiability in
relation to the axioms.
A brief commentary on some authors discussed in this chapter: Lutz reduces
the syntactic approach to the semantic approach applying set theory in order to demon-
strate a certain equivalence. Note, however, that such equivalence is made in a set
theory! Thus, it is not a neutral way of assessing an equivalence between theories. In a
way, this “begs the question”. These are tacit assumptions that commonly go unnoticed
but can be questioned. Something similar could be said of Halvorson, who presents
this equivalence in a stronger theory, namely in a category theory. Mutatis mutandis,
category theory faces the same problem stressed when addressing set theory: the
semantic approach is already bought in advance by the authors who claim to establish
an equivalence between the syntactic and semantic approaches. However, it is still
possible to question whether it is conceivable to establish a theoretical equivalence
from a “cosmic exile”.
We believe it is not.
1.4 INTERPRETATION: FROM LOGICS TO PHYSICS
Since apparently some crucial aspects of the previous debate are needed in
order to discuss the efforts of interpreting QM, an assessment of the matter shall be
provided, even if in passing. Syntax is needed to better specify some concepts, as well
as semantics, in order to interpret scientific theories – recall that a purely syntactical
approach is rigid enough to preclude this possibility.24
As discussed above, to interpret a scientific theory (according to the syntactic
and semantic views) is an issue mainly concerned with concepts in logics.25
In the syntactic approach, to interpret is to connect an axiomatic system with
empirical data. Take as a rough example the following: suppose a formal system A =
⟨F,𝒜,ℛ⟩, where F is the set of formulas, 𝒜 are the axioms, and ℛ are the rules of
inference. To interpret A is to add a “physical counterpart”. In order to do so, consider
the language ℒA of the system A; consider also the addition of new symbols to its
primitive alphabet (which may be denominated after “theoretical terms”), as well as the
addition to A of a set (not necessarily finite) of “specific axioms” of the new system A*.
The rules in ℛ remain the same. Evidently, there is now an extended axiomatic system,
which may be denominated as a “theory”. In this manner, A* = ⟨F*,𝒜*,ℛ⟩, where F*
24 As will be presented in Chapter 4, it is also essential to move away from formalization in order to
discuss several aspects of metaphysics. These questions are aside until Part II of this thesis, however.
25 See Shapiro and Kouri Kissel (2018, §4) for a comprehensive guide to interpretation in logics.
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represents the new set of formulas obtained by the application of the grammatical rules
of ℒA to the finite sequence of the extended alphabet, and 𝒜* is the union of 𝒜 with the
new specific axioms. Thereby, one may go from mathematics to physics.
As stated by Wallace (2012, p. 17), to do so is to surpass the “bare formalism” to
an empirically adequate theory, which, in the specific case of QM, is the introduction of
the concept of measurement: “[. . . ] if we are to extract empirical content from the math-
ematics, we seem to have to introduce the notion of measurement as a fundamental
concept”. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapters, such introduction leads to
the (in)famous measurement problem, one of the backbones of interpreting QM.
As for the semantic approach, all that one is required to do in order to interpret
a physical theory such as 𝒜* is to find the models in which its axioms 𝒜* are true (as
indicated in the Fano plane example).
But is that the case with regard to QM? In case there was a single method to
axiomatize QM, then to interpret QM would mean finding the models in which its axioms
were true. However, were it not the case, both the syntactic and the semantic approach
present an relevant issue, and an interpretation of QM does not have the same meaning
as an interpretation in logics.
Unfortunately, this seems to be precisely the case. Different interpretations of
QM have different axioms. For the sake of argument, take as example only two “families”
of interpretations of QM: the collapse interpretations and the no-collapse interpretations.
They have different axioms (i.e., the collapse). How to proceed, then? If it is not as in
logics, what does it mean to interpret QM? The next chapter provides a discussion
concerning what is QM and what it means to interpret it, utilizing both syntactic and
semantic concepts.
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2 BUILDING QUANTUM THEORIES
“[. . . ] physicists come up with
interesting results but are not
sufficiently literate as
philosophers to articulate the
broader significance of their
discoveries for our conception
of physical reality, so the
philosophers come in afterward
as a sort of cleanup crew to
sanitize the messy metaphysics
of the physicists. This division
of labor relegates the
philosopher to a rather boring
and sterile role.”
JEFFREY BUB
Elegance and Enigma: The
Quantum Interviews
THE PROBLEM
What is QM? It is a settled fact that QM can be formulated in several ways.1 Since
the seminal work of von Neumann (1955) on the axiomatization of QM, developments
and debates on QM employ, predominantly, the Hilbert space formulation.2 However,
when adhering to such formulation, one can still be bothered with the problematic
question: what is quantum mechanics?
It is a widespread belief that the formalism of QM can be interpreted in numerous
ways (JAMMER, 1974; LEWIS, P., 2016), as if a single theory, The QM – with a capital
“T” – exists, from which various interpretations emerge as solutions to the measurement
problem (FRIEDERICH, 2014, §2). The work of C´irkovic´ (2005) challenges such a
picture, stressing that different “interpretations” of QM, such as collapse and no-collapse
interpretations,3 yield different experimental outcomes, and, therefore, be considered
1 See Styer et al. (2002).
2 According to Auyang (1995, p. 16), “[. . . ] Despite their mathematical sophistication, all rivals [for-
mulations of QM] have to make contact with the Hilbert space formulation, which yields almost all
experimentally verifiable results. Hence it is fair to say that the Hilbert space formulation has a special
status”. For a critical summary of various formulations of QM, see Wightman (1976), Gudder (1979),
Styer et al. (2002), and references therein.
3 This topic is even more problematic when considering other theoretical developments on quantum
phenomena which modifies the formalism, such as the hidden variable theories (BOHM, 1952). This
subject is briefly covered in Appendix A.
Chapter 2. Building quantum theories 41
different quantum theories.4
The so-called “interpretations of QM”, then, are claimed not to consider the
same set of axioms (regarding the collapse axiom) neither the same set of equations
(regarding the Schrödinger equation), so that interpretations do not depart from the
same point in order to “interpret” a single theory. Along these lines, Maudlin (1995, p. 7)
stresses that “[a]ny real solution [to the measurement problem] demands new physics”.
This explains the followed statement made by Sklar (2003, p. 281): “I doubt that one
can draw any principled line between replacing a theory and ‘merely interpreting’ it”.
Closely examine the arguments put forth by C´irkovic´ (2005, pp. 821–822), as follows.
Consider that theory 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ are different theories if at least one of the three following
criteria is fulfilled:
1. 𝑇 predicts new phenomena, nonexistent in 𝑇 ′, subject to empirical verification
(even if only in principle);
2. The formal parts of 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ are different;
3. 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ differ in the description of observed phenomena.
It is important to recall that undisputed cases, such as spontaneous-collapse
theories (GHIRARDI; RIMINI; WEBER, 1986)5 and hidden-variable theories (BOHM,
1952), must be set aside from the discussion.6 The most difficult cases, represented
by collapse and no-collapse versions of QM, constitute the cases of interest here. It
is safe to state that these cases do not satisfy item 1. Item 2 may be disputed, as
collapse and no-collapse versions of QM can be placed in “external” descriptions as
different structures, with different axioms (e.g., one structure with the collapse axiom,
and another structure without it). Since other mathematical aspects of both approaches
(e.g., the equations) remain the same, it becomes easy to see how item 2 is traditionally
considered unfulfilled in this case. Although we disagree with such assessment, we will
not put it in dispute at this moment, in accordance with the standard practice. Therefore,
the debate shall move onto item 3.
Thus far, collapse and no-collapse approaches to QM are empirically indis-
cernible, meaning that both leads to the same set of laboratorial consequences. Main-
taining the analogy of Wheeler’s (1986) smoky dragon made in the Introduction, the con-
tent of the head remains the same – For all practical purposes (FAPP). However, what
to say of conceivable experiments, even those not forthcoming in the near future? As
4 Indeed, as C´irkovic´ (2005) stated, there are many thought experiments that, in principle, yield different
results depending on whether one accepts or abandons the axiom of collapse. These results cannot,
in fact, be currently tested in practice, contributing to the unfeasibility of opting for a theory.
5 Following the common practice in this field (FRIEDBERG; HOHENBERG, 2018, p. 321), non-standard
collapse theories are not analyzed in this work.
6 For those cases, see the references cited in C´irkovic´ (2005, p. 821).
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C´irkovic´ (2005, §3) emphasizes, there are several thought experiments available in the
literature that should not go unnoticed.7 Considering that thought experiments demon-
strate experimental differences according to the adoption of collapse or no-collapse
approaches to quantum phenomena, item 3 could be considered the epistemologically
weakest of the three items.
This situation seems to amount to one’s definition of “quantum theory”, arising
the following dilemma. First off, if the accepted definition is excessively narrow, one is
unable to comprise several theoretical programs for investigating the phenomena on
a quantum level, commonly referred to as QM. This appears to pose a pragmatical
drawback for the narrow definition of “theory”, as numerous working physicists inclined
to different solutions of the measurement problem could work in various subjects without
ever disagreeing, even without realizing that they are working with distinct physical
theories.
On the other hand, if one’s definition is too wide, one may substantially conflate
different nuances of several theoretical approaches to quantum phenomena, such as
different predictions of experimental outcomes, or different ways of calculating the
motion of a quantum object. In this sense, QM presents a unique case in which the
theory’s very axioms depend on a choice of interpretation.
This chapter proposes a characterization of a “quantum theory” considering a
modification of the semantic approach, that is, by stating basic requirements in order to
obtain the theory’s specific axioms, offering a basic formulation of QM that can serve as
a common ground for several theoretical programs on the study of quantum phenomena.
Collapse (VON NEUMANN, 1955) and no-collapse (EVERETT, 1957) theories are the
examples that serve as focuses of this discussion.
The offering of a basic schema, considering convenient set-theoretical tools,
allow for further definition of the differences among several approaches to quantum
phenomena. Furthermore, in addition of additional assumptions traditionally made upon
such basic schema clarifies the modifications resulting from each response to a foun-
dational problem concerning the basic structure in order to obtain the axioms of the
theory at stake.
This basic structure is here called “QM𝑏𝑎𝑠”. With these efforts, This work seeks
to advance towards a more accurate account of what QM could be and what it means
to interpret it. In our terms, QM is formed by a basic mathematical structure QM𝑏𝑎𝑠
with General Principles that result in the measurement problem To interpret QM, then,
means to instantiate the General Principles of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 in order to solve the measurement
problem, often at the cost of creating new quantum theories. In this sense, the notion
of “interpretation” of QM is introduced here as the very axiomatic structure of each
7 For a brief analysis of seven thought experiments that show the differences in experimental results
between collapse and no-collapse approaches versions of QM, see C´irkovic´ (2005, pp. 823–834).
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subsequent “quantum theory” that solves the measurement problem.
The subject is delicate and deserves some comment. When referring to axioms,
it may seem that the subject is that of formal theories. However, stating that theories
may be different if their formal parts are different, as C´irkovic´ (2005) does, may be quite
confusing. Indeed, theories may have distinct axioms and yet be equivalent. For exam-
ple, take 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ to be axiomatic formal theories. Provided that the translation of the
axioms of 𝑇 into 𝑇 ′ are theorems of 𝑇 ′ and vice versa, 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ are equivalent theories.
By stating that theories may be different when nonexistent predictions regarding one of
them are made in the other, the situation grows even more puzzling, as it is not believed
to exist a concept of “prediction” among formal theories. The literature is elusive at
this point. For instance, Dalla Chiara and di Francia (1979) mention “formal physical
theories” (sic). It seems strange to discuss empirical predictions within a purely formal
schema. Therefore, the concepts of “physical systems”, “observables” and “properties”
in some of the General Principles shall be carefully introduced so to grant a degree of
“physicality” to the scheme.8
2.1 WHAT IS QUANTUM MECHANICS
We present a semantic characterization of QM, briefly explained as follows. As-
suming that a semantic axiomatization can be done at least in principle, the adequate
manner to axiomatize parts of present-day physics, such as the Standard Model of
particle physics, is still unknown. Moreover, it should be noted that this study works
exclusively at the broader, informal level, for simplicity of presentation. For the sake
of precision, if the reader thinks necessary, the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the
axiom of Choice (ZFC) can be assumed.9 “Axiomatize”, then, simply means that non-
trivial assumptions are at stake. Therefore, this chapter does not present a complete
axiomatization of QM, as this would be a Herculean task, beyond the scope of this work.
It is assumed, though, that this can be done – even if not here. Following the lead of
Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §5.8.1), this work proposes, as for heuristic objectives,
answers to the question of so-called “interpretations of QM” as well as aims to explicit
their differences.
A major problem of presenting QM according to the semantic approach is the
fact that a quantum theory depends on its axioms. Simultaneously, the theory’s axioms
largely depend on the chosen interpretation, since QM can be presented with differ-
ent axioms motivated by a given choice of interpretation. Consequently, as previously
stated, the frontiers between replacing a theory and interpreting it are blurred, and this
8 I would like to thank professor Adonai Sant’Anna for this point.
9 The debate between the syntactic and semantic approaches to scientific theories (SUPPE, 1977;
LUTZ, 2015) is not of interest here, because, as we saw in Chapter 1, it can be considered as a case
of two complementary approaches, not competing ones – see Halvorson (2013), Lutz (2015), and
Krause and Arenhart (2016a, §1).
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seems to be a sui generis case of QM: if the focus were to lie only on the axiomatic
structure of QM, it could be presented with different axioms, resulting in different QMs,
without a common starting point.
For instance, von Neumann (1955) presents QM with the so-called “collapse
axiom”, whereas Everett (1957) drops this axiom in his approach. As C´irkovic´ (2005)
argues, however, adopting collapse axiom entails in principle that a particular set of
experimental predictions divergent from those in which such axiom is dropped.
Thus, to present an axiomatic structure for each quantum theory does not seem
to result in a path towards a unified view on QM. The discussion here presents, then,
precisely this common starting point. For instance, a recent effort to present an axiomati-
zation of QM conducted by Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §5.8.1) is also committed with
collapse as an axiom of QM, thus appearing to be an axiomatization of an interpretation
of QM, and not of QM per se. In order to encompass a wider variety of approaches to
QM, we propose a different definition of a quantum theory with an emphasis on the met-
alanguage. So, instead of presenting its axioms, something similar to the role played by
axiom schema in systems of logic is attempted. In essence, axiom schemata generalize
the notion of axiom by stating the rules by which axioms are generated. Here, the set
of “axiom schema”, in QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is labelled as “General Principles”, denoted as 𝒫. These
General Principles may establish a common ground that can be instantiated in specific
axioms of each quantum theory. As stated above, this work conceives each formalized
interpretation of QM as a physical theory (MAUDLIN, 1995; C´IRKOVIC´, 2005), in order
to allow for the examination of theories as different extensions or formulations derived
from the same fundamental General Principles: hence, a basic schematization for QM.
In our proposal, modifying the semantic approach, to present QM is to present its
(specific) General Principles. In this way, our definition of QM is a basic schematization,
in the meta-level, of a common ground to several independent research programs
towards quantum phenomena, known as “QM”. Each General Principle, on its turn, can
be instantiated as a theory’s specific axiom.
With these instruments in mind, the basic schematization of QM, labelled “QM𝑏𝑎𝑠”,
is now presented. It should be clear that there is no claim that this structure is adequate
for all cases; rather, limit cases of the standard Hilbert-space formulation of QM are
being considered, hoping to extract some philosophical lessons from it.10 For instance,
only pure states and observables with discrete, non-degenerate spectra are being con-
10 In this sense, it should be clear that the semantic approach to scientific theories, which states that a
scientific theory is a mathematical structure, is not being followed here. For references and criticism,
see Krause and Arenhart (2016b, §1) and Lutz (2015). Here, the theory is simply represented by
such structure for philosophical purposes. Moreover, the emphasis on the structure’s metalanguage
(i.e., to present its General Principles instead of already-instantiated axioms of the theory) is not a
standard attitude within the semantic approach.
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sidered here.11 Following the previous discussion, it is possible, then, to elaborate a
structure that furnishes the tools for representing a QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 as a schema for the con-
struction of quantum theories, based on the standard (orthodox) formulation of QM. So,
QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is a structure presented as a 𝑛-tuple of the form:
QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 = ⟨F,𝒫 ,ℛ⟩ (1)
where:
1. F is the set of formulas of the language of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠. F is obtained from a basic
language ℒ consisting of a primitive vocabulary and rules of formation12 of well-
formed formulas or expressions – which in turn are finite sequences of such
symbols. So, in F there is a set of purely mathematical, uninterpreted symbols,
which composes the formal (both logical and non-logical) vocabulary of the theory.
2. 𝒫 is the set of General Principles of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠. The General Principles of 𝒫 are
stated in the language of F. Since we are dealing solely with the Hilbert-space
formulation of QM, the mathematical axioms of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 are the axioms of standard
functional analysis, while the logical axioms and rules of inference ofQM𝑏𝑎𝑠 are the
axioms and the rules of classical logic.13 The logic is assumed in the background.
Thus, listing rules of inference is not necessary there is the desire to introduce
some rule as one of the principles of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 – which is not the case. Therefore,
the essential matter to be stated here relates to the specific General Principles of
the theory, which will be informally presented. Again, dealing with the standard
Hilbert-space formulation of QM implies a commitment to a specific set of the
theory’s General Principles. This presentation follows mainly von Neumann (1955),
Jammer (1974, §1), Auyang (1995), Krause (2016), Krause and Arenhart (2016b),
and Takhtadzhian (2008). The General Principles of 𝒫 are:
11 The description of rigged Hilbert spaces will not be presented, albeit it being necessary to describe
observables with continuous spectrum. Statistical mixtures are not covered here either, which requires
to treat systems in which the knowledge of its initial state is not available. Nevertheless, a description
is provided in order to consider the measurement problem, a fundamental aspect of the interpretations
of QM.
12 See ℛ ahead.
13 There is an ongoing debate raised from the seminal work of Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), to
whom the logic of QM is not the classical logic. This discussion will not be covered here. Rather,
following Dalla Chiara (1977, 1981), this work accepts that the role of the so-called “quantum logic”
is not played within the domain of rules of inference. As a consequence, as Dalla Chiara (1981,
p. 337) argues, the general logic of QM is not quantum logic, but classical logic; quantum logic is
to be introduced as “[. . . ] a particular physical sub-language of [QM]”. An interesting point concerns
the nature of 𝑆. Since quantum objects may be indiscernible without turning to be the same object,
𝑆 should not be viewed as a set. Quasi-set theory can formalize such situation, being enough to
substitute Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of Choice; see French and Krause (2006) and
Dalla Chiara and di Francia (1993).
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𝒫1 [Hilbert Space]: A Hilbert space ℋ is a linear space with inner product, com-
plete in relation to the norm introduced by the inner product comprising
a set of vectors denoted as {|𝜓⟩, |𝜙⟩, |𝜓1⟩, . . . }. The field is usually taken
to be that of complex numbers, where elements are termed “scalars” and
denoted by Latin lower-case letters, occasionally with indexes. When ℋ is
infinite-dimensional, it is assumed to be separable (i.e., it has an enumerable
orthogonal basis).
The states of quantum-mechanical systems 𝑆 are represented by vectors
|𝜓⟩ in a complex, infinite-dimensional, separable Hilbert space ℋ. A pure
quantum state |𝜓⟩ is a summary of the physical characteristics of 𝑆 in a
specific instant of time 𝑡. The description of 𝑆 employing |𝜓⟩ consists of
constant characteristics (such as mass, charge, spin, etc., of the system)
and variable characteristics changing over time. A state of a quantum system
can be represented by a unitary vector |𝜓⟩ (also called “state vector”), which
norm is unity, up to a phase factor. If |𝜓⟩ represents a state, then 𝑒𝑖𝜃|𝜓⟩ also
represents the same state, where 𝜃 is the phase factor (an arbitrary number).
The set of all states permissible for a quantum system to assume is theoreti-
cally represented by the concept of “state space”, a complex ℋ. |𝜓𝑖⟩ and |𝜓𝑗⟩
are orthogonal if ⟨𝜓𝑖|𝜓𝑗⟩ = 0 and orthonormal if ⟨𝜓𝑖|𝜓𝑗⟩ = 𝛿𝑖𝑗, where 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 0 if
𝑖 ̸= 𝑗 and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝑖 = 𝑗.
Vectors can be represented as a linear combination (sum) of other vectors.
In the same sense, a state can be represented as a linear combination of
other states. A set of vectors |𝛼𝑖⟩ forms a basis of ℋ if every vector in ℋ can
be written as a linear combination of its members and this set of vectors is
linearly independent. So |𝜓⟩ can be written as a set of basis states {|𝛼⟩} in
the form:
|𝜓⟩ =
∑︁
𝑖
⟨𝛼𝑖|𝜓⟩|𝛼𝑖⟩ =
∑︁
𝑖
𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩, (2)
where 𝑐𝑖 ∈ C are the Fourier coefficients 𝑐𝑖 = ⟨𝛼𝑖|𝜓⟩, where the basis is com-
posed by orthonormal vectors. According to the theorem of Gram–Schmidt,
every vector space with an inner product has an orthonormal basis. This
is the superposition principle. Intuitively, the sum of quantities of the same
type is also a quantity of that same type. Thus, as the sum of two lengths
is a length, the superposition principle asserts that the sum of states of a
quantum system is a state of such a quantum system.
𝒫2 [Quantization Algorithm]: The physical observables 𝐴 are represented by self-
adjoint operators in ℋ. The quantization algorithm introduces a set of basis
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states in which the states of observables can be revealed upon measurement.
Observables embody quantum-dynamical variables (position, momentum,
non-relativistic spin, and so on), and can be incompatible in the sense of
the theoretical impossibility of simultaneously obtaining the values of two
incompatible observables (such as position and momentum). In addition to
describing the state, an observable also yields the possible outcomes of
measurements.
An observable associated with a quantum system is represented by a self-
adjoint operator 𝐴 on its Hilbert space. The spectrum of the operator 𝐴
indicates the possible values that can be found when the observable in
question is measured. There are many operators in QM, but only operators
in the class of 𝐴 represent observables.
A self-adjoint operator is a linear transformation of a Hilbert space ℋ into it-
self, and its spectrum consists only of real numbers. Therefore, for an observ-
able 𝐴, the spectrum Λ(𝐴) of its representing self-adjoint operator stipulates
all possible values that the measurements of the physical observables repre-
sented by 𝐴 may obtain. As this work focuses only on observables within the
discrete spectrum, the spectrum of an observable 𝐴 is Λ(𝐴) = {𝑎𝑖}, where
{𝑎𝑖}∈R are real numbers named eigenvalues, which represent the possible
results of experiments, or measurement outcomes. The self-adjoint operator
maps one state into another. Thus, a state |𝛼𝑖⟩ for an observable 𝐴 is written
as 𝐴|𝛼𝑖⟩ = 𝑎𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩. The states |𝛼𝑖⟩ are called the eigenstates of 𝐴; they are in-
variant under the operation of 𝐴, as 𝐴 multiplies the state |𝛼𝑖⟩ by a numerical
factor 𝑎𝑖. From the set of eigenstates {|𝛼𝑖⟩}, in the non-degenerate case, it
is possible to obtain a basis of ℋ, such that any state |𝜓⟩ can be expressed
by a linear combination called “superposition of states”. Since the interest
here lies in observables with non-degenerate spectra, each eigenvalue is
associated with a single eigenstate.
𝒫3 [Statistical Algorithm]: The statistical algorithm does not mention the prob-
ability of a state to have a specific eigenvalue; contrarily, probability and
eigenvalue are concepts related to measurement outcomes. The concept of
probability is used since the observed result of a single pure state is at stake.
The squared norm of the Fourier coefficients 𝑐𝑖 = ⟨𝛼𝑖|𝜓⟩ is a numerical factor
|𝑐𝑖|2 which gives the probability for a measurement made upon an observable
𝑆 to yield the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑖 when the system is in the eigenstate |𝜓⟩. Therefor,
for the discrete and non-degenerate state:
Prob
|𝜓⟩
𝑆 (𝑎𝑖) = |⟨𝛼𝑖|𝜓⟩|2 = |𝑐𝑖|2 (3)
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The statistical algorithm states that the measurement values are probably
found in an interval of R. This is frequently called the “Born rule”.
𝒫4 [Dynamics]: The motion of quantum states through time is governed by the
unitary operator ?ˆ? , which maps the states from |𝜓(𝑡0)⟩ to |𝜓(𝑡𝑥 ̸=0)⟩ in the
form of ?ˆ?(𝑡)|𝜓0⟩ = |𝜓(𝑡)⟩. Such temporal evolution is represented by linear,
differential equations of motion. The linearity feature of ?ˆ? implies that |𝜓1⟩
evolves to |𝜓′1⟩, and |𝜓2⟩ evolves to |𝜓′2⟩, then 𝑎|𝜓1⟩+ 𝑏|𝜓2⟩ evolves to 𝑎|𝜓′1⟩+
𝑏|𝜓′2⟩.
𝒫5 [Measurement ]: A measurement M transforms a superposition of states in
a single eigenstate from |𝜓𝑖⟩ to |𝜓𝑘⟩. When the state of a physical system 𝑆
described as the superposed state
|𝜓⟩ =
∑︁
𝑖
𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩, (4)
is subject to a measurement process M, the system 𝑆 ceases to be de-
scribed by ?ˆ? and stats being described by the corresponding eigenstate in
the form of
|𝜓⟩ =
∑︁
𝑖
𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩ M−→ |𝛼𝑤⟩, (5)
where |𝛼𝑤⟩ is one of the elements of the expansion, with a probability given
by the statistic algorithm in 𝒫3, which is |𝑐𝑖|2 = |⟨𝛼𝑖|𝜓⟩|2. It is worth remember-
ing the following: it is agreed that the values of eigenstates are set according
to measurement results. An eigenstate, however, is not the result of mea-
surement.14
3. ℛ is the set of of the inference rules of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠, that is, a collection of relations
between finite sets of formulas and formulas. Each relation has an arity 𝑛 > 0,
and are inference rules of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠. Following common practice, we assume that
the rules of inference in ℛ are the standard rules of inference of classical logic.
We aim at to generalize the notion of “measurement” with the symbol M defined
in 𝒫5, whose function is to give the eigenvectors of the systems in the cases of superpo-
sition, without committing ourselves with the theoretical mechanisms by virtue of which
14 There is some consensus concerning this mode of presentation of measurement results. For the sake
of precision, it is essential to emphasize that this applies to measurements of the first kind. There are,
however, measurements where this does not occur: where the eigenstate does not correspond to the
eigenvalue. The position measurement satisfies the postulate presented, but, strictly, this does not
apply to the measurement of energy.
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this process occurs – this will vary depending on the interpretation of QM one adopts,
e.g., it can be represented by a state-vector collapse (VON NEUMANN, 1955), by a
branching-recognition process (EVERETT, 1957), and so on.
The measurement problem
It is remarkable that, in order to make empirical statements, the concept of
“measurement” represents a phenomenological statement about actual (laboratorial)
measurement outcomes, rather than a statement buildable within the theoretical appa-
ratus constructed so far. Moreover, the notion of measurement, here called M, is broad
enough to be completely neutral regarding questions related to its causal agent or its
theoretical mechanisms: instead, these questions concern the interpretation of QM in
a broader sense.
But where does interpretation comes across? Here is the hook: even this work’s
definition of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is problematic when jointly considering assumptions made upon 𝒫1,
𝒫4 and 𝒫5. This difficulty is known as the “measurement problem”, and interpretations
of QM are essentially responses to the measurement problem (FRIEDERICH, 2014,
§2).
There are numerous ways to define the measurement problem, one of the central
issues of QM.15 In order to keep this work self-contained, the language employed so
far will be maintained, defining the measurement problem as follows. The taxonomy
presented by Maudlin (1995) shall be followed, which distinguishes three instances of
the measurement problem. In order to fulfill the purposes of this work, Maudlin’s (1995)
first measurement problem will be approached, defined as the conjunction of three
assumptions, added to the General Postulates (𝒫):
1.A The (pure) state vector |𝜓⟩ gives a complete description of 𝑆.
2.A The state vector |𝜓⟩ is always governed by a linear dynamics.
3.A Measurements always have definite outcomes, up to probability.
While General Principle 𝒫4 states that the description of 𝑆 is governed by ?ˆ? ,
General Principle 𝒫5 determines that the description of 𝑆 is not governed by ?ˆ? (but, at
best, by a statistical algorithm). Therefore, both General Principles, when considered
jointly, seem to contradict each other. This is, in a nutshell, a manner to perceive the
measurement problem in QM. In this sense, the non-trivial role played by interpretation
is precisely that of accounting for it: to save the theory’s very consistency. As remarked
by Peter Lewis (2016, p. 50), without an answer to the measurement problem, QM is
trivialized ; what Ruetsche (2018, p. 296) calls an “empirical contradiction”.
15 There are indeed authors, such as Gibbins (1987, p. 104), who consider the measurement problem
to be the central problem of QM.
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We do not think that a formal contradiction is involved. A closer look in the mea-
surement problem is needed in order to explain such a view since many assumptions
were made, and it is not clear whether there is a formal manner to state this so-called
contradiction. Regarding informal proof, Esfeld (2019, p. 223), claims that Maudlin’s
taxonomy became the standard way of stating the measurement problem in QM:16
If the entire system is completely described by the wave function [1.A], and if
the wave function always evolves according to the Schrödinger equation [2.A],
then, due to the linearity of this wave equation, superpositions and entangled
states will, in general, be preserved. Consequently, a measurement of the cat
will, in general, not have a determinate outcome [. . . ]. (ESFELD, 2019, p. 223).
It is essential, however, to (at least apparently) determine measurement out-
comes [3.A], hence the informal inconsistency. In order to state the measurement prob-
lem more precisely, consider the following case. Suppose that one wants to measure
a position observable of a physical system, denoted as “𝐴”, by means of a macro-
scopic apparatus denoted as “?ˆ? ”. This will be done, in principle, trough the interaction
of these two physical systems.17 Suppose, further, that the initial state of 𝐴 in 𝑡0 is
|𝜓0⟩ =
∑︀
𝑖 𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩ and that the initial state of ?ˆ? is |𝜙0⟩, meaning the apparatus presents
no reading, i.e., it is in the reset button. For ?ˆ? to fulfill its purposes as a measuring
device, it must be prepared in a certain way in which it is susceptible to measure some
quantities of the system of interest 𝐴, to yield an eigenvector of 𝐴. However, by means
of ?ˆ? only, the state of composite system ℋ𝐴 ⊗ℋ?^? , represented by
|𝜓⟩ ⊗ |𝜙0⟩ =
(︃
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩
)︃
⊗ |𝜙0⟩ (6)
evolves to
?ˆ?(𝑡)
[︃Å 𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖|𝛼𝑖⟩
ã
⊗ |𝜙0⟩
]︃
?^?(𝑡)−−→
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖
(︁
|𝛼𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩
)︁
(7)
for any 𝑡 ̸= 0. Remarkably, this result is not an eigenstate of either 𝐴 or ?ˆ? , meaning
that the measurement process must be something else other than the application of ?ˆ? .
16 Another way of stating such problem is relating “open” and “closed” systems – see Pessoa Junior
(1997). This work, however, sticks to Maudlin’s taxonomy as it better relates to the here considered.
17 The belief that the same system can be measured is often found in the literature. For example,
according to Auyang (1995, p. 77), “[a] single observation on a single system tells us nothing; we need
to observe repeated transitions of the system or use ensembles”. In many cases, the measurement
problem is restricted to single measurement cases, and is not so problematic if they are considered
statistical ensembles. This situation is not, however, necessary. In de Barros, Holik, and Krause
(2017), the authors discuss whether it is possible to perform two measurements over a same system.
According to them, we neither perform a measurement twice nor over the same system. To cope
with this idea, they introduced the notion of “indiscernible operators” and use quasi-set theory for
considering indiscernible quantum systems.
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Notice that a superposition is never actually observed. Even in quantum controlling ex-
periments, such as the isolation of a single trapped electron as presented by Wineland
(2013), the measurement outcome is never a vector sum, but a single definite state
vector.
Following the notation adopted so far, the measurement process is described in
the form
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖
(︁
|𝛼𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩
)︁
M−→
(︁
|𝛼𝑤⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑤⟩
)︁
, (8)
with the probability given by the statistical algorithm stated in 𝒫3.
To explain why and how this change in the dynamics occurs is one of the central
issues of approaches to the measurement problem, while the attempts to overcome
these changes are subject to the so-called interpretations of QM. The central point
of the matter is, then: how can one reconcile what the theory predicts with what is
observed? The answer is: “by interpreting it!” However, what does it mean to interpret
QM, exactly? That is where this discussion is headed.
2.2 INTERPRETATION
The variety of answers that the numerous interpretations of QM give to the
measurement problem is not of concern here; instead, the inquiry on what is to interpret
QM is at take. As it should be clear at this point, an interpretation of QM must provide,
among other factors, a solution to the measurement problem, a foundational problem
in the very heart of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠.
Recall that such a solution requires the refusal of at least one of the three
assumptions mentioned earlier, made in addition to the General Principles. In the lan-
guage employed thus far, to solve the measurement problem is, therefore, to instantiate
the General Principles 𝒫 of the structure QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 (1) in specific axioms 𝒜. Often, a so-
lution requires the modification of the elements of 𝒫, as tated by numerous examples
in literature (JAMMER, 1974). As to keep this work self-contained, two examples are
analyzed:18
i) The standard collapse interpretation (VON NEUMANN, 1955), that rejects as-
sumption 2.A in the General Principle 𝒫4 and instantiates the General Principle
𝒫5 in the axiom of the state vector collapse, thus originating the collapse quantum
theory QM𝑐𝑜𝑙.
18 A third example is sketched in Appendix A.
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ii) The branching interpretations (EVERETT, 1957), which rejects assumption 3.A in
the General Principle 𝒫5 and instantiates it in the axiom of the branching process,
thus originating the branching quantum theory QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
Collapse quantum theory
This section begins by presenting the (standard) collapse solution to the mea-
surement problem, as stated by von Neumann (1955). It modifies (or interprets) the
structure of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠, instantiating some of its General Principles in specific axioms of
collapse quantum theories by denying assumption 2.A. Therefore, in an axiomatic struc-
ture, a collapse quantum theory QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is a 𝑛-uple:
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 = ⟨F,𝒜col,ℛ⟩ (9)
where:
1. F is the language of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, the same as QM
𝑏𝑎𝑠;
2. 𝒜col are the specific axioms of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 (i.e. instance of the set 𝒫 of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠). The list
of 𝒜col is:
𝒜col 1 [Hilbert space]: The same as 𝒫1.
𝒜col 2 [Quantization Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫2.
𝒜col 3 [Statistical Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫3.
𝒜col 4 [Undisturbed Dynamics]: Slightly modifies the General Principle 𝒫4; 𝒜col 4
states that the temporal dynamics of the set {𝐴} of observable obeys the
linear evolution of ?ˆ? only when 𝐴 is not subject to a measurement process,
thus denying assumption 2.A. Moreover, 𝒜col 4 instantiates the differential
equation of motion of 𝒫4 in the Schrödinger equation (where 𝑖 =
√−1, ~ is
the Planck constant divided by 2𝜋, and 𝐻 is the Hamiltonian, which gives the
energy of the system) as follows:
𝑖~
𝜕|𝜓(𝑡)⟩
𝜕𝑡
= 𝐻|𝜓(𝑡)⟩, (10)
where ~ is the reduced Planck constant and 𝐻 is the Halmiltonian of the
system.
𝒜col 5 [Collapse]: Slightly modifies the General Principle 𝒫5. 𝒜col 5 states that a
measurement M takes place whenever a quantum system interacts with
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nonquantum-mechanical systems19 which collapses a superposed state in
a single eigenstate of 𝐴. As 𝒜col 4 declares the limited validity of ?ˆ? , 𝒜col 5
states that 𝐴 is found in a single, determined state by virtue of its interaction
with a other systems, enabling the application of M.
3. ℛ are the rules of inference of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, similar to those stated in QM𝑏𝑎𝑠.
Branching quantum theory
Proceeding the branching solution to the measurement problem, according to
Everett (1957): it modifies (or interpret) the structure of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠, instantiating some of
its General Principles in specific axioms of branching quantum theories, by denying
assumption 3.A. Therefore, in an axiomatic structure, a branching quantum theory
QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 is a 𝑛-uple:
QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 = ⟨F,𝒜bra,ℛ⟩ (11)
where:
1. F is the language of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, likewise QM
𝑏𝑎𝑠;
2. 𝒜bra are the specific axioms of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 (i.e. instance of the set 𝒫 of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠). The list
of 𝒜bra is:
𝒜bra 1 [Hilbert space]: The same as 𝒫1.
𝒜bra 2 [Quantization Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫2.
𝒜bra 3 [Statistical Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫3.
𝒜bra 4 [Branching]: Instantiates, also, the differential equation of motion of 𝒫4 in the
Schrödinger equation, similarly to 𝒜col 4, however maintaining its universal
validity. By maintaining the universal validity of ?ˆ? , every time 𝐴 is described
by a superposition, 𝒜bra 4 says that all terms of such superposition exist in
different branches.20
𝒜bra 5 [Branching Recognition]: Instantiates the measurementM as the recognition
of a relative branch, considering a single eigenstate of 𝐴. It is worth noting
that, by virtue of 𝒜bra 4, all other states of 𝑆 are equally real in different
branches. Thus, 𝒜bra 5 implies the denial of assumption 3.A: 𝑆 is found in a
single, determined state by virtue of a recognition of a particular branch of
19 This matter is further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.
20 It is important to say that such a specific axiom is neutral in relation to what enters the branching
process: the states or the systems. This matter is discussed in Chapters 5 and 8.
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the universe, which enables the application ofM. Such determinate outcome,
however, is relative to a branch, and not absolute. For all practical purposes,
𝒜bra 5 resembles the concept of collapse, as stated in QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, but no collapse
really occurs – just the branching.
3. ℛ are the rules of inference of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, similar to those stated in QM𝑏𝑎𝑠.
2.3 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter presented new horizons to old questions: what is QM, and what
does it mean to interpret it? Regarding the first question, we suggest that the structure
QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 can be a first step leading, since: (𝑖) it accounts for central issues of several em-
pirically successful physical theory about quantum phenomena; and (𝑖𝑖) it is sufficiently
broad, meaning it is not committed to any particular approach, but serves as common
ground to several approaches. Concerning the second question, this work suggests
that to interpret QM means solving the foundational problem of measurement by instan-
tiating the General Principles of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 in specific axioms. The main consequence of
such suggestion is that, following Maudlin (1995), to interpret QM means create new
quantum theories. Alternatively, at least, as Esfeld (2019) argues, to interpret QM is to
provide a dynamics for QM in order to solve the problem as posed by Maudlin. Here,
used a meta-theoretical approach that did not commit to a specific interpretation was
adopted, to organize the object and content of interpretations of QM methodologically.
Considering what has been discussed in this chapter, it is possible now to enun-
ciate the specific vocabulary that will be employed throughout this thesis. The figures
that appear at the end of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are divided in discipline levels. So far, the
mathematical and physical levels has been covered. Part II of this thesis deals with the
ontological and metaphysical levels, and Part III connects all levels. The “YES” and “NO”
entries represents the method of Unavailable Metaphysical Stories.
Recalling the three levels of underdetermination, the theoretical underdetermi-
nation is schematically presented Figure 3.
𝑄𝑀 𝑏𝑎𝑠
Measurement problem
𝑄𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑄𝑀𝑏𝑟𝑎
M
athem
atics
P
hysics
Figure 3 – QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 and its interpretations.
In the next Chapter we will begin to address questions of metaphysics and
ontology.
Part II
ON METAPHYSICS
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3 REFLECTIONS ON SCIENTIFIC REALISM
“[. . . ] I am not ready to take
lessons in ontology from
quantum physics as it now is.”
DAVID K. LEWIS
Philosophical Papers II
Crudely, scientific realism is the claim that science describes how the world is,
not only regarding observable but also unobservable aspects. Eventually, the discus-
sion presented in the previous chapters reaches the following point: how can a realist
position concerning theoretical and ontological contents of QM be accepted? It is time,
then, to tackle the debate concerning scientific realism and scientific anti-realism. Much
of what is discussed here is textbook,1 except for the last section, which presents the
author’s impressions of the debate.
3.1 THE ONGOING DEBATE
The quarrel between realism and idealism depicts a classic debate in meta-
physics. In realism, existence precedes perception, that is, the world exists indepen-
dently of a subject that perceives it. Conversely, in idealism, perception precedes exis-
tence, and, therefore, the world only exists through a subject to perceive it. This debate
seeks to understand how the world really is.
One of the main tasks of philosophy of science is to pursue the understanding of
the nature of scientific enterprise, as well as to discover how to interpret what science
really is. In this field, the traditional metaphysical opposition is thus translated in terms
of ‘scientific realism’ and ‘anti-realism’.2
There are numerous forms of realism, as well as various forms of anti-realism.
As a first characterization, “realism” may be compared in metaphysics to “naive realism”.
Similarly “anti-realism” may be compared to “instrumentalism”. The various positions in
the debate between realism and anti-realism may be referred to as a spectrum, where
naive realism and instrumentalism are at the spectral ends of the realist and anti-realist
positions, respectively.
Nevertheless, several stances have essential points in common. As Faye (1991,
p. 198) suggests, the two most general metaphysical theses can be characterized
according to their position in relation to the following assumptions:
1 As in it can be easily found in introductory works such as Chakravartty (2017b).
2 For the sake of simplicity, henceforth the “scientific” part of the terms will be suppressed, an the terms
“scientific realism” and “realism” will be employed interchangeably. The same holds for “scientific
anti-realism” and “anti-realism”.
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1. The existence of the world is independent of people.
2. The notion of “truth” is independent of people.
Thereby, realism categorically accepts both assumptions, whereas anti-realism
provides different answers: an agnostic position towards the first assumption, and re-
jection of the second. This first distinction should suffice in order to delimit the various
characterizations of the realist and anti-realist spectra.
According to realism, the best scientific theories provide a faithful picture of what
the world really is. From this perspective, scientific theories reveal reality. Therefore the
entities assumed by theories actually exist – furthermore, they exist despite scientific
theories, which merely correctly describe what was already there.
On the contrary, anti-realism argues that the best scientific theories act as tools
to predict phenomena. From this perspective, scientific theories are simply explanatory
models for the prediction of phenomena. Therefore the entities assumed by the theories
are only convenient fictions – so that unobserved entities only exist in scientific theories.
Naturally, when scientific theories refer to objects that can be directly shown to
any person endowed with full perceptual faculties, such as this text before your eyes,
realists and anti-realists have little or nothing to disagree. Thus, scientific theories that
work with such objects are not included in the scope of the ontological and metaphysical
aspects of the debate between realism and anti-realism in philosophy of science.
However, when scientific theories address entities which cannot be observed
in this sense, realists and anti-realists disagree. Therefore, the debate depends on
the definition of the term “observable”. Could only “objects” are perceived directly by
the human senses be perceived as “observable”? Or is it legitimate to characterize
as “observable” objects detected by instruments? If so, what would be an acceptable
degree of the instrument’s complexity?
As it is well known, the term “observable” is vague. That is, its field of application
is unclear. There are, however, limiting situations in which the notion applies sufficiently
well: it is safe to say that a green fungus on a Petri dish under an optical microscope is
observable. Likewise, it is safe to say that a subatomic object, such as an electron, is
not.
A central point distinguishing realist and anti-realist approaches relates to the
ontological status of the involved entities: would it be legitimate to infer the existence
of unobservable entities? While realism maintains that such entities do exist despite
our knowledge or ability to detect them, anti-realism, conversely, maintains a skeptical
attitude towards the matter.
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3.2 THE MAIN ARGUMENTS
This section highlights three main arguments in the literature concerning the
debate between these two philosophical conceptions. Firstly, the “Miracles argument”
(sometimes referred to as “no-miracles argument”) is presented, favoring a realistic con-
ception. Then, leaning toward anti-realism, the arguments of “pessimistic metainduction”
and “underdetermination” are discussed.3
The Miracles argument
One of the main arguments in defense of a realistic approach to metaphysics
for scientific enterprise lies in the explanation of the empirical adequacy of scientific
theories. An intuitive attitude towards the empirical adequacy of a given scientific theory
considers that the empirical success and the technological application of scientific theo-
ries attest,somehow, that theories addresses nature directly. Were that not the case, the
fact that a scientific theory makes correct predictions about the world would be marked
as a coincidence, and the empirical adequacy of these predictions would be considered
a miracle. Moreover, it would be a constant miracle to every conceivable prediction with
experimental success. As Putnam (1975, p. 73) famously states, scientific realism is
“[. . . ] the only philosophy of science that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle”.
Thus, realism has a positive argument. Following Ruetsche (2015, §3.3), we will call
this the “Miracles argument”.
Concerning ontology, the Miracles argument takes accepts the point of empir-
ical success as a sufficient condition for existing entities in theory to be considered
existing entities in the world. This is a powerful argument, since science, as a cultural
phenomenon, shaped both the worldview and material conditions of human life. The
Miracles argument argues that objects of scientific theories must correspond to objects
of the world unless the idea that the application (and its empirical counterpart) is a
miracle is accepted without reservations. Thus, realism expresses the idea that truth
is a relation of correspondence to the world, said or thought to be either true or false
under how the world really is. In fact, this is the only argument in favor of realism. The
other two arguments that we will review in the next sessions are arguments against
realism.
Pessimistic meta-induction
From a historical perspective, several scientific theories have obtained empirical
success in their predictions and yet have been replaced by other theories that presented
greater empirical success, and/or higher domain of explanation. That is, the history of
3 Initially, the focus lies on theoretical underdetermination only.
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science recognizes as false numerous scientific theories that were once considered to
be true.
The argument is: the fact that our scientific theories are currently successful does
not guarantee their success in the future; in fact, the history of science provides good
reasons for not believing this will occur. This is called the “pessimistic metainduction”
argument. It is an inductive reasoning (à la Hume) that employs the history of science
when discussing science (thus being metainductive) while maintaining a skeptical atti-
tude concerning the possibility of being on the verge of a final explanation in science
(thus being pessimistic).
Since the focus of the discussion lies in the existence of the entities to which the
scientific theories are committed, the point presented by the argument of the pessimistic
metainduction is as follows: the substitution and subsequent abandonment of scientific
theories result in the replacement of the entities to which the theory was existentially
committed. Therefore, existing entities in theory should not be extended to a real-world
existence, that is, the objects associated with scientific theories should not be taken
as existing outside, despite the theories that introduced them. Thus, if theories truly
describe the world, the notion of “truth” concerning such entities must be regarded as
an epistemic notion.
While the historical argument is also highly intuitive, it does not account for the
line of criticism towards scientific realism as it presents a subjectivistic appeal. In this
sense, one might maintain an optimistic attitude towards the historical perspective by
conceding mistakes of the past while defending opinions like “Now we are on the verge
of getting the truth!”. Ultimately, the optimistic stance lacks justification as much as the
pessimistic stance, as the problem of induction (Hume’s problem) is at stake here. Even
so, this line of criticism against scientific realism does not need to be further considered
in order to present the point: that QM made the realists’ life difficult.
Underdetermination
The argument that scientific theories do not determine their interpretations is the
most powerful one against several forms of scientific realism. It is a central argument in
favor of the point made throughout this thesis, and as such, it is crucial to scrutinize it.
When two theories are equally successful in the empirical domain, that domain
cannot be used as a criterion for choosing among rival theoretical conceptions. QM is
a glaring example of this. As stated in Chapter 2, there are several ways of interpreting
the same basic formalism.4
From an ontological point of view, the argument against scientific realism lies
on the difficulty of asserting that the entities of one interpretation exist while entities of
4 Chapter 4 presents at least two interpretations of QM that are commit to the existence of incompatible
entities.
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others do not, since from an empirical point of view all theories are equivalently correct.
Considering solely evidence, however, the results of predictions of phenomena
and their technological applications are maintained. This suggests that QM, as a scien-
tific theory, does not provide the elements necessary to decide which interpretation is
correct. Therefore, if the interpretation of QM is underdetermined by experimental data,
how can one state that one particular interpretation is a real description of the world
while another is a mere construction? Put differently, how we are justified to be realists
about one interpretation instead of the another?
3.3 REALISM IN THE QUANTUM REALM
Considering the arguments in favor and against scientific realism sketched above,
it is now possible to address the bigger picture: how can one adopt a realist position to
what concerns QM? Should this be done?
Consider the positive argument for scientific realism. Ruetsche (2015, §3.3)
states the Miracles argument as follows.
𝑃1 Theory T is successful.
𝑃2 T ’s truth is the best explanation of this success.
∴ T is true.
This schematization of the argument shows its abductive roots, which have been
criticized.
No support accrues to realism by showing that realism is a good hypothesis
for explaining scientific practice. If we are open-minded about realism to begin
with, then such a demonstration [. . . ] merely begs the question that we have
left open (“need we take good explanatory hypotheses as true?”). (FINE, 1986,
p. 115).
There are, also, versions of the Miracles argument that are not dependent on
truth-statements.
I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not
even surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory
is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only
the successful theories survive – the ones which in fact latched on to actual
regularities in nature. (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, p. 40).
At this point in the debate, it is interesting to set that line of criticism aside and pay
attention to the possible meaning of the Miracles argument as presented by Ruetsche
(2015, §3.3), considering it applied to a specific scientific theory, such as QM:
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𝑃1 QM is successful.
𝑃2 QM’s truth is the best explanation of this success.
∴ QM is true.
As QM is the most successful empirical theory, the first premise is guaranteed
(RUETSCHE, 2018; FRIEDERICH, 2014). Additionally, the deliberate setting aside
of criticisms regarding abduction (or “inference to the best explanation”) and truth-
sentences allows for the acceptance of the following conclusion: QM is true. In this
sense, the following argument defended by Ruetsche (2015, §3.3) is of great interest to
this thesis: what does one believe when one believes a theory’s truth? The answer is:
What a realist believes when she believes a theory 𝑇 is an interpretation of
𝑇 , an account of what the worlds possible according to 𝑇 are like. [. . . ] An
interpretation of QM tells the realist about QM what she believes when she
believes QM. (RUETSCHE, 2018, p. 293).
According to this reasoning, the belief in QM’s truth is the belief in an interpreta-
tion of QM. As stated by van Fraassen (1989, p. 226), “Any question about content is, in
actuality, met with an interpretation”. How to settle the matter, then, considering that QM
underdetermines its own interpretation? Take this re-schematization of the reasoning
mentioned aboce concerning the Miracles argument, employing the characterizations
presented in Chapter 2. Firstly:
𝑃1 QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is successful.
𝑃2 QM𝑏𝑎𝑠’s truth is the best explanation of this success.
∴ QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is true.
Assuming the interpretations of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 represent the beliefs of scientific realists
believes when they believe in QM, the schema changes slightly. It could be written as
follows:
𝑃1 QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is successful.
𝑃2 QM𝑐𝑜𝑙’s truth is the best explanation of this success.
∴ QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is true.
It could, however, be presented like this:
𝑃1 QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 is successful.
𝑃2 QM𝑏𝑟𝑎’s truth is the best explanation of this success.
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∴ QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 is true.
It could, even, be presented as some something else.5 Since both QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and
QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 are empirically successful theories, their success seems to play no role in theory
choice, thus causing the Miracles argument to lose its force. Presented like this, the
Miracles argument must somehow respond to the argument of underdetermination and
any realist account of QM should respond to the underdetermination argument. At any
rate, the Miracles argument seems to be of little help for the realist. Ruetsche eloquently
puts it as follows:
Even if – maybe particularly because – a variety of contenders are available,
there remain several Miracles argument-undermining possibilities. [. . . ] the
criteria by which the realist hopes to select the winning interpretation fail to
single any such out. (RUETSCHE, 2018, p. 298).
Such argument was schematized in Brading and Skiles (2012, pp. 100–101), to
voice criticism towards the so-called “object-oriented” realism concerning metaphysical
underdetermination on the subject of the identity of quantum objects. Their argument
is here modified in order to meet the purposes of interpretational underdetermination.
𝑃1 Object-oriented realists are committed to objects, and such objects may vary: (𝑖)
there is a fact of the matter about whether there are a causal consciousness in
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 or splitting worlds in the world in the case of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 and (𝑖𝑖) there is no fact
of the matter about which one of those objects exist.
𝑃2 If 𝑃1 is the case, then adopting object-oriented realism implies a commitment to
the expectation that the best theories will accurately describe which objects there
are.
𝑃3 The best theories, however, fail to offer an account of what objects there really
are: ontology, as given by the best theories, is ontologically underdetermined.
𝐶1 Therefore, object-oriented realism is (probably) false.
So far, it should be clear that the support of all premises presented above has
been argued for in the previous chapters. If a realist position about the objects postu-
lated by QM is to be adopted, that results in (at least) two possibilities: the objects of
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 or the objects of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎6 – and no objective criteria for deciding a correct one
between them.
5 See APPENDIX A.
6 They are different. See Chapter 4.
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Remarks on structural realism
It has been argued, mainly by French (2011, 2014), that a specific kind of realism
may triumph over anti-realist’s arguments. The author maintains that realism should be
accepted only with regards to the structures of scientific theories. Such position, labeled
as Ontic structural realism (OSR), argues that only the structures are existent – hence
dismissing other less radical structural-realist stances, such as epistemic structural re-
alism.7 As so, OSR could, allegedly, provide an answer to the matters of interpretational
underdetermination (FRENCH, 2014).
Following OSR, the schema presented in Brading and Skiles (2012, p. 101) may
be adapted as follows:
𝑃4 If OSR is true, then the best theories are not infected with ontological underdeter-
mination.
𝐶2 So, everything else maintained, OSR is preferable to object-oriented realism.
Therefore, an OSR-like account of QM seems to suffice: a realist position is only
needed concerning structural aspects of QM. However, Chapter 2 presented QM as
QM𝑏𝑎𝑠: a stripped-down mathematical version of a basic formalism needed to account
for the description of quantum phenomena. QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 itself is so basic, that it requires
interpretation in order to save the theory’s consistency (LEWIS, P., 2016; RUETSCHE,
2018). Then, two other structures were presented in order to interpret it: QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and
QM𝑏𝑟𝑎. Those structures are incompatible with each other; their axioms are different.
Roughly, to raise the idea of representing QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 as a formal system, say ⟨𝐿,𝐴,𝑅⟩,
where 𝐿 is the language, 𝐴 is its axioms, and 𝑅 are its rules of inference, means that
at least the set 𝐴 will contain “collapse” as an axiom. In the same lines, if QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 is
represented as ⟨𝐿′, 𝐴′, 𝑅′⟩, then “collapse” would not be in 𝐴′, differing from 𝐴 at least
in this point. This is precisely where the laws lie.
As Esfeld (2012) argues, “OSR is not an interpretation of QM in addition to
many worlds-type interpretations, collapse-type interpretations, or hidden variable-type
interpretations”, but is attached to a particular interpretation of QM. Thus, when a
structural realist proposes realism concerning QM, is realism concerning QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 or
QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 implied? Furthermre, is another interpretation of QM
𝑏𝑎𝑠 included? The answer is
not clear, as there is a structural underdetermination at sight. These questions ought to
be answered as to the correct interpretation of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 when one adopts a realist position
about such interpretation’s structure. Therefore, any realist account of QM seems to
hold the burden of proof to solve the interpretational underdetermination. However, as
decades of debate without consensus on the foundations of QM attest, this is by no
means an easy task to achieve.
7 There are many variations of structural realism and an extensive literature about it. A comprehensive
survey of the field can be found in Ladyman (2016).
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Another line of criticism may be brought up against those in favor of the OSR.
Some would say that a realism about something (say, structures) lacks content unless a
metaphysical characterization of that something is given (called here the “metaphysical
profile”).8 As acknowledged by Arenhart and Bueno (2015), there are no metaphysical
accounts of what a structure may be. French recognizes such line of criticism.
If the realist were to simply present the core equations of General Relativity
and declaim “There! That is how the world is!”, the reaction would be justifiably
dismissive (certainly from other philosophers or lay-folk, at least!). [. . . ] we
need to interpret these equations. (FRENCH, 2018, p. 394).
There is, then, an interpretational underdetermination concerning QM. The fol-
lowing chapters investigate whether such a debate could be settled within a philosoph-
ical debate. That is, by considering the ontological commitments of the two particular
interpretations ofQM𝑏𝑎𝑠 taken as examples throughout this thesis, these chapters asses
whether it is possible to evaluate the interpretations themselves, without appealing to
hard-scientific criteria (such as experimental falseability).
This scenario can be extended in the following terms. As stated by Esfeld (2019,
p. 222), physics should be about Nature.9 Furthermore, as de Ronde and Massri (2019)
argue, the relation between theory and physis are not necessarily that of one-to-one
representation: according to de Ronde (2018, §7), this representation is multiple. There-
fore, instead of underdetermination, one may argue: why not embrace pluralism,10 e.g.,
theoretical, logical, ontological or metaphysical pluralism? The argument goes when
one takes such an approach, and then any plurality of options would no longer be a
problem.
A possible answer would be based on the subjectivity of such choices. In
essence, pluralism would imply a more optimistic attitude toward the multiplicity of
options, while underdetermination would betoken a more fatalistic one. However, even
if pluralism is adopted, the kind of Physis described by physical theories would still be
questioned: would it be one with or without collapse? An objection to pluralism could
arise related to the unity of truth: there is only one truth about a single universe; in
that sense, there is only one true description of reality. Thus, pluralist or not, scientific
realism still seems to be in trouble.
8 This is Chakravartty’s challenge, presented in more detail in Chapter 4.
9 The ancient Greek term is “FÔsic ” (“Physis”), also commonly translated by “Reality”.
10 See de Ronde (2018, note 11) and references therein, since the author in question is developing a
new kind of realism that does not necessarily correspond to the present terms of the debate, which in
themselves are orthodox to his point of view. However, the the debate here is carried on according to
the tradition established for the time being.
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4 METAPHYSICS AND SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEWS
“Reality resists imitation
through a model.”
ERWIN SCHRÖDINGER
The Present Situation in
Quantum Mechanics
Chapter 2 presented a definition of QM as a stripped-down mathematical and
physical structure. QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 is the best option an instrumentalist can get, as it adopts
a ‘quietist’ attitude towards ontology and metaphysics: it is well-known that the stan-
dard approach for the measurement problem is to “shut up and calculate” (MERMIN,
2004). Any realistic approach, then, must solve the measurement problem and such
solutions, defined as interpretations of QM (more specifically, QM𝑏𝑎𝑠), in principle may
be represented by set-theoretical structures – just as QM𝑏𝑎𝑠.
Thus, if the interpretations of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 yield the realist contents of the theory
(RUETSCHE, 2015), what is an interpretation such as QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 or QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 realist about?
Sets? As argued in the next session, 𝒜col 5 states that consciousness must play a
causal role in the measurement process, in order to solve the measurement problem;
Similarly, 𝒜bra 4 states that reality must somehow be included in a branching process.
Where do such features enter the scenario? How to approach them? Can they
be sets, or they must be something else? This chapter deals with these questions.
4.1 QUANTUM WORLDVIEWS
This section approaches what van Fraassen (1989, p. 193) calls “the foundational
question par excellence”: “how could the world possibly be the way this theory says
it is?”. The question is also called “the question of interpretation”: “[w]hat does it [the
scientific theory] say the world is like?” (VAN FRAASSEN, 1991, p. 242).
In order to address these questions, it is fit to explain how QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎
describe a famous quantum experiment known as Mach-Zehnder interferometer,1 fre-
quently used in descriptions of the measurement problem. The experimental set-up
consists of one monophotonic light source, two silvered mirrors (𝑆2 and 𝑆3), two half-
silvered mirrors or beam splitters (𝑆1 and 𝑆4), and two detectors 𝐷1 and 𝐷2.
One property of half-silvered mirrors is to split light beams into two. Thus, 𝑆1
splits the flash |𝜓⟩ from the source so that the transmitted flash |𝜓𝐴⟩ goes through path
𝐴 and the reflected flash |𝜓𝐵⟩ goes through path 𝐵. The two mirrors 𝑆2 and 𝑆3 are then
1 It is well-known that QM fails to be applied in systems with relativistic mass, such as light photons.
Nevertheless, this experiment is crucial for the exhibition of quantum-like phenomena and has been
replicated in an electronic analog (JI et al., 2003), where QM undeniably applies.
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arranged in a manner to deflect |𝜓𝐴⟩ and |𝜓𝐵⟩, which then rejoin at the second half-
silvered mirror in 𝑆4. The path lengths of the two half beams are set equal. Given that
reflected flashes undergo phase shift of 1/4 of wavelength (𝜆/4), it should be expected
that only 𝐷1 shows detection.
Source 𝑆1 𝑆2
𝑆3 𝑆4
|𝜓⟩
A
B
𝐷1
𝐷2
Constructive
superposition
(detection)
Destructive
superposition
(no detection)
|𝜓𝐵⟩
|𝜓𝐴⟩
Figure 4 – Mach-Zehnder Interferometer.
Consider the following four possible cases below concerning the trajectory of the
quantum system:
1. The eigenvalue corresponding to |𝜓𝐴⟩ is detected in 𝐷1: at 𝑡1 it is reflected by 𝑆1
(phase shift = 𝜆/4); at 𝑡2 it is reflected by 𝑆3 (phase shift = 2𝜆/4); at 𝑡3 reflected
by 𝑆4 (phase shift = 3𝜆/4).
2. The eigenvalue corresponding to |𝜓𝐵⟩ is detected in 𝐷1: at 𝑡1 it is transmitted by 𝑆1
(phase shift = 0); at 𝑡2 it is reflected by 𝑆2 (phase shift = 𝜆/4); at 𝑡3 it is transmitted
by 𝑆4 (phase shift = 𝜆/4).
3. The eigenvalue corresponding to |𝜓𝐴⟩ is detected in 𝐷2: at 𝑡1 it is reflected by
𝑆1 (phase shift = 𝜆/4); at 𝑡2 it is reflected by 𝑆3 (phase shift = 2𝜆/4); at 𝑡3 it is
transmitted by 𝑆4 (phase shift = 2𝜆/4).
4. The eigenvalue corresponding to |𝜓𝐵⟩ is detected in 𝐷2: at 𝑡1 it is transmitted by 𝑆1
(phase shift = 0); at 𝑡2 it is reflected by 𝑆2 (phase shift = 𝜆/4); at 𝑡3 it is reflected
by 𝑆4 (phase shift = 2𝜆/4).
The difference between phase shifts in 𝐷1 being 𝜆/2 results in a destructive
superposition – hence, no detection. The same is not true in 𝐷2, as |𝜓𝐴⟩ and |𝜓𝐵⟩
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shows the same phase, having a constructive superposition – thus enabling detection.
This standard setup accounts for a probability of detection in 𝐷2 equal to 100% and
0% in 𝐷1. As there is always a single photon in the experiment at once, QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 yield
information regarding which path |𝜓⟩ followed, which is the linear combination in the
form of |𝜓⟩ = 𝛼|𝜓𝐴⟩+ 𝛽|𝜓𝐵⟩.
Suppose, however, that the half-silvered mirror 𝑆4 is removed, resulting in a case
where the probability of detection is 50% for 𝐷1 and 50% for 𝐷2.
In this case, QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 yields the following superposition concerning the situation
of a “which-detector ” question, assuming that |𝜓1⟩ is the eigenstate in which |𝜓⟩ is
detected in 𝐷1 and |𝜓2⟩ is the eigenstate in which |𝜓⟩ is detected in 𝐷2:
|𝜓⟩ = 1√
2
|𝜓1⟩+ 1√2 |𝜓2⟩ (12)
The probability of measurement outcomes is given by Prob(|𝜓1⟩) = | 1√2 |2 = 0, 5.
The same holds for Prob(|𝜓2⟩) as both detectors are in orthogonal paths; thus |𝜓2⟩ =
|𝜓1⟩⊥ and ⟨𝜓1|𝜓1⟩⊥ = 0. A measurement will return either |𝜓1⟩ or |𝜓2⟩ as an outcome,
and this happens when the detectors, either 𝐷1 or 𝐷2 respectively, responds.
At this point, Wheeler’s (1986) “smoky dragon”, arises again. Wheeler’s analogy
becomes apparent when taking the dragon’s tail as the source signal, which passes
through 𝑆1. Then, there “is” its head, biting the detectors 𝐷1 or 𝐷2. And which-detector
question brings along the dragon’s smoky parts: one cannot be certain without the help
of an interpretation as this brings the measurement problem to the surface, that is, the
problem of telling a story about what happens in the whole experiment that yields the
empirical result. There is extensive literature on many formulations of the measure-
ment problem. For this chapter’s purposes, it is stated as the which-detector question
concerning the Mach-Zehnder experiment. The endeavor of solving the measurement
problem is an interpretative one. The following discussion explains how the selected
examples so far explains this experiment.
Take, firstly, QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. 𝒜col 4 states that Equation (12) describes the whole system
until detection, when, based on 𝒜col 5 the system collapses to either |𝜓1⟩ or |𝜓2⟩ with
equal probability. There is, however, an ontological counterpart. It has been argued
that the collapse in 𝒜col 5 is somehow related to human consciousness (WIGNER,
1983; LONDON; BAUER, 1983). Therefore, QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 can be argued to be ontologically
committed to consciousness. Such ontological counterpart is extracted from the theory,
and labeled here as Consciousness-based interpretations (CBI). In metaphysical terms,
however, the idea that Consciousness causes the collapse hypothesis (CCCH) may be
entertained.2 It may also be entertained that Consciousness recognizes the collapse
2 See Wigner (1983).
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hypothesis (CRCH).3 Thus, metaphysical underdetermination can be seen right from
the start. This chapter, focuses on CCCH only.4
In ontological terms, von Neumann (1955, p. 421) argues that superposed states
as in Equation (12) collapse with the interaction with the “abstract ego” of an observer.
The detection in 𝐷1 or 𝐷2 would not be enough to cause the collapse, as linearity im-
plies that the detectors’ states are also to be described as superpositions as well. This
situation occurs since the whole system described by |𝜓⟩ is in the same ontological
domain. Thus, physical domain; so, in order to account for measurement outcomes,
only the interaction of a non-physical agent can stop the superpositions and collapse
the superposed state into a single-term state, which is actually observed. Wigner (1983)
suggests, further, that such non-physical agent that causes the collapse is conscious-
ness – hence, CCCH.
Focus now on QM𝑏𝑟𝑎. 𝒜bra 4 states that in the case described by Equation (12),
the superposition is taken literally: both terms are equally real. Therefore, by 𝒜bra 5, if
|𝜓1⟩ is as a measurement outcome, then the outcome |𝜓2⟩ is also true elsewhere.
Elsewhere since QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 does not determine its ontology: according to the Many
worlds interpretation (MWI), the branching splits the worlds (DEWITT, 1971), while
according to the Many minds interpretation (MMI), the branching splits the minds of the
observers (LOCKWOOD, 1989). This work discusses exclusively the former, although
it should be noted that there is also an ontological underdetermination at this point.
An ontological counterpart of 𝒜bra 4 is MWI, according to which the world
branches itself into each possible outcome of a superposition.5 Therefore, if |𝜓1⟩ is
found as a measurement outcome, then we happen to live in this branch of the world
– the outcome |𝜓2⟩ is still true for an orthogonal branch of the world, where such mea-
surement outcome is found simultaneously. Thus, although the collapse is apparently
happening (even if a superposition is not actually seen), it is not really occurring. What
happened, in fact, is the branching of the world in two, although other worlds are not
perceived. This fact also integrates the head of the dragon: determinate outcomes of
measurement are perceived.
The interpretational underdetermination between QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 presented in
Chapter 2 leads to additional cases of underdetermination, which may be ontological
and metaphysical regarding the choice of a theory, say, CCCH or MWI. Ultimately,
distinct physical theories are indeed distinct metaphysical possibilities in the sense of
3 See London and Bauer (1983).
4 CRCH is analyzed in Chapter 7.
5 To avoid possible misunderstandings, it is worth emphasizing that the term “world” refers to the whole
universe, and not a single planet – see Putnam (1974, p. 150).
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distinct proposals about the nature of the physical world.6
4.2 LOST ONTOLOGIES
As presented in Chapter 1, the semantic-like characterization of physical the-
ories is literally about mathematical structures, and nothing else. At most, the matter
includes a representation of real systems, yet not cover those directly. Now, however,
mathematical structures are being related – not the real objects of this world, in both
observable and unobservable aspects. As Frigg (2010, p. 253) remarks, this approach
is metaphysically neutral concerning the nature of the objects in its domain. As so,
relations on this domain are defined extensionally, hence having no properties other
than formal properties (e.g., transitivity, reflexivity, and so on).
This discussion, if based solely on the semantic view, leads to the conclusion that
all that exists is either sets or elements of sets (atoms or “Urelementen”). A structure,
then, does not concern anything in the current phenomenal world. Even if one were to
admit that models are structures connected to physical systems by the setting up of
morphisms between them, it should be recalled that a morphism is a relation between
structures, i.e., purely mathematical, not a relation between a mathematical structure
and a physical object. Moreover, in order to make sense of this morphism between
structures (models) and physical systems (objects), the assumption that these systems
at most exemplify specific structures would be required. As Frigg (2010, p. 254) argues,
these structures “[. . . ] cannot be had without bringing non-structural features into play”.7
As long as we are dealing with empirical theories, it seems to be essential to keep
empirical entities at sight.
As reported by the semantic approach, the best alternative is to assume
that some structure represents the theory’s ontology, in which the beings have set-
theoretical substitutes. This issue is somewhat more straightforward in the syntactic
approach (SUPPE, 1977). Once a theory is axiomatized and formalized, all that re-
mains is attending to the interpretation function, which associates part of the linguistic
vocabulary to entities in the model that simulates the entities – thus endowing the the-
ory with a partial interpretation, which is a physical interpretation. Notice, however, that
even this approach leaves central issues concerning the nature of these entities unad-
6 Peter Lewis shall be thanked for this observation. Naturally, there could be also cases of metaphysical
underdetermination without theoretical underdetermination. Take, for example, the problem of identity
in QM. In essence, even if an interpretation is deliberately determined, QM does not yet provide an
answer to whether or not there are identity and individuality, in a metaphysical sense, for the quantum
domain – see French and Krause (2006).
7 Frigg (2010) considers this line of criticism towards the semantic approach when presenting a meta-
physical account of models as representing fictional entities, that is, hypothetical entities, rather than
purely mathematical structures. As interesting as this suggestion may be, this work does not enter the
metaphysical debate accounting for the concept of “models”. For now, it suffice to say that the critique
of the semantic approach presented by Frigg (2010, §2) is agreed almost in totum, concerning its lack
of commitment in relation to real objects.
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dressed: for instance, of entities’ kinds are not described by the interpretation function.
This approach to scientific theories entails, then, that the theory is silent over several
philosophical questions concerning the objects that are dealt with.
This is, as Muller (2011, p. 98) declares, the “problem of lost beings”. These
beings, however, are not to be found within the structures, and thus the ontology of
scientific theories concern something else. This point is further explained as follows.
Take, for example, CCCH and MWI: both interpretations of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠8 postulate
different entities with fundamental (but also distinct) theoretical roles, which do not
appear in formalism. Where are the (ontological) entities of theories, then? Certainly
not in the formalism, but surely within the theories’ scope: in CCCH’sQM𝑐𝑜𝑙, for example,
the causal agent of the collapse (recall axiom𝒜col 5) is human consciousness (WIGNER,
1983, p. 421); in MWI’s QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, the branching process (recall axiom 𝒜bra 4) depends on
multiverses. In the sense the term “ontology” was defined here, as a catalogue or list
for what there is in the world (accordingly to a given theory), entities such as human
consciousness and multiverses should be regarded as fundamental components of
the ontology of CCCH and MWI respectively. So it appears that the mathematical
approaches explored in Chapter 1 do not comprise the totality of what scientific theories
are.9
Thus, if one gets asked something like: “Okay, but where does the discussion
about the interpretation of QM, often mentioned, fit in? That is, where are the beings,
say, consciousness or the many worlds, in this scheme?”, the following answer must
then be (awkwardly) provided: “Nowhere!” Is this a drawback of formal approaches to
philosophy of QM? This answer is not quite as simple as the previous one.
According to Ruetsche (2015), the interpretations regarding QM are precisely
the realist content of the theory. Thus, it is non-trivial to postulate, for instance, the
causal act of the observer’s consciousness (WIGNER, 1983) or the world-branching
process (DEWITT, 1971). Once the semantic approach leaves the problem of clarifi-
cation unanswered, it should be expected that the metaphysical aspects of the realist
features of a scientific theory are not addressed within the theory’s mathematical con-
structs. This very question produces an insight into the nature of the interpretation of
QM: its non-formal characteristics.10
As suggested in Chapter 1, the interpretation of QM in this broader sense dif-
fers from the notion of “interpretation function” in mathematical logic, is defined as
8 This chapter simply writes “QM”, except when further specification is needed.
9 That is, the semantic view and the syntactic view.
10 Before abandoning formal aspects, it is essential to review what the semantic approach has achieved.
The “axiomatization” of QM made largely possible to express the assumptions of the theory in order
to discuss its fundamental traits. That is, it was possible to observe, with a large extent of precision,
what the quantum theory is, and where its theoretical pieces fit – its axioms, mathematical (and
metamathematical) tools, logic, and so on. It is essential to stress here, however, that this cannot be
the end of the story if a realist approach to QM is intended.
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something which talks about this scenario: a meta-physical scheme. Where, then, are
the ontological beings in the 𝑛-uples presented in Chapter 2? The point is: they are
nowhere there. The most interesting point is: they should not be expected to be there.
Let this statement be examined in more detail.
Considering QM, the problem stressed by Muller (2011) becomes even more
evident: what do interpreters of QM interpret? An obvious answer is “Quantum theory ”.
Recall that manners of doing so were defined in Chapter 2 with QM𝑏𝑎𝑠. The mathe-
matical tools seem to enable one to precisely observe what QM, in its syntactical and
semantic aspects, can be. Call the lato sensu interpreter of QM the one who interprets
precisely mathematical structures (i.e., QM𝑏𝑎𝑠) – this was presented in in Chapter 2.
As an example consider CCCH and MWI: a theorist inclined to CCCH formally
interprets the measuring act as collapse, and ontologically interprets it as a causal
power of human consciousness over the measurement processes. Conversely, a the-
orist inclined to MWI formally interprets the measuring act as the branching process
that ontologically leads to physically distinct worlds at every superposition situation.
Even though the act of measurement is the crucial point, each interpretation tells a
different story concerning what happens throughout the whole experiment, e.g., what
are superpositions, whether there is a single experiment, in a single universe, or not.
These ontological claims state something concerning the very existence of pro-
cesses and entities that describes physical phenomena. However, this – further – inter-
pretative element seems to escape formalization and therefore axiomatization. There
are no such matters as consciousness or the many worlds present in the theories’
mathematical treatments (such as QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 respectively). If not in the syntactic
part of the language of the theory, nor the semantic part of the language, these beings
seems to be lost indeed.
Call, then, an interpretation in stricto sensu the attribution of philosophical mean-
ing to mathematical structures. This work suggests, then, that it may be more accurate
to introduce the act of ontologically interpreting QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 in stricto sensu as a meta-
metatheoretical element, which attributes ontological meaning to both the mathematical
theory and its (partially interpreted) physical metatheory. As stated by Sklar (2001),
interpretation seems to add a layer to the theory. As such, the interpretation is mainly
considered to be a non-formal layer of the theory.11
If the goal is to move towards a worldview based on scientific realism, an es-
sential ingredient is missing: a further sense of interpretation concerning ontological
issues. One metaontological method of extracting the ontology from theories could
be a Quinean-like approach of ontological commitment.12 Thus, when looking at the
11 Naturally, it could be formalized under the price of relying on an unformalized meta-meta-
metalanguage in which its formalization would be done – see Church (1956, §1).
12 Issues concerning metaontology will not be addressed in this work. Suffice it to say that the ontological
commitment à la Quine is assumed as a background metaontology.
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entities that play some theoretical role in scientific theories, one may argue that these
theories are committed to the existence of such entities. Therefore, even though the
term “consciousness” does not have any mathematical counterpart in the formalism of
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, it plays a fundamental theoretical role as the causal agent of 𝒜col 5 It is safe to
affirm, then, that QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is committed to the existence of human consciousness, and
hence it should be regarded as part of the theory’s ontology; the same holds for the
multiverses in QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
Is there a legitimate place for ontological and metaphysical discussions in the
interpretation of QM? Apparently, there is not – at least to what concerns syntactic and
semantic structures. If so, the efforts to characterize scientific theories as a class of
models – the so-called “semantic view” – or as a formal calculus – the so-called “syntac-
tic view” – are insufficient to provide a complete account for what a scientific theory in
fact is. Particularly, those approaches fail to cover the theory’s interpretational aspects
of the theory, responsible for most of its explanatory power regarding its ontological and
metaphysical accounts of the world, i.e., the “what the world is like” modulo a scientific
theory. Instead, perhaps the most reasonable way to address those aspects would
be within a meta-level of the discussion, so that metaphysics would lie in a metamet-
alanguage of the theory (the object language being the mathematical level and the
metalanguage being physical level). This may provide a better understanding of where
and when notions of metaphysics may be applied to scientific theories. Questions con-
cerning the place of metaphysical and ontological discussions within the interpretation
of QM are far from finished. However, its place in the discussion is now clearer than it
was before: it lies within the non-formal aspects of the theory.
Perhaps. Nevertheless, there is one view that considers possible to extract at
least some fundamental ontological aspect from formalism alone, called “wave function
realism”. This view is sometimes presented as a natural attitude towards QM (ALBERT,
2013), or through the famous Quine-Putnam argument of indispensability for obtaining
the ontology from QM – that is, that ontology can be “read off” directly from the formal-
ism. A scheme of the argument, as proposed by Colyvan (2019) and generalized by
Ney (2012, p. 67), is presented as follows.
𝑃1 We ought to have ontological commitment to the entities that are indispensable to
our best scientific theories.
𝑃2 Entities of kind X are indispensable to QM.
∴ We ought to have an ontological commitment to entities of kind X.
As representation of the wave function (|𝜓⟩) is indispensable to the quantum-
mechanical description of quantum systems, one ought to be ontologically committed
to the wave function as an entity in the theory’s ontology. Take the which-detector
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description of the Mach-Zehnder experiment, as shown in Equation (12), as an example.
It shows the motion of the wave function |𝜓⟩ through time, so the entity “wave function”
should be included as an existing entity modulo QM.13 Then, at least some part of the
ontology is read off directly from the theory’s formalism, and thus (some) of Muller’s
lost beings may be found within the mathematical structures of QM.
So that’s it, right? Theories gave away their ontology, thus there is the science-
based worldview in a naturalistic fashion: science states what the world is like, and
according to QM, the world is such and such. Not quite so. Theories’ ontologies may
have been extracted – directly from formalism or otherwise – which is an account of
what there is. Nevertheless, what it is like? Is ontology informative concerning the
metaphysical nature of those entities? Not really.
4.3 LOST METAPHYSICS
Regarding the wave function, Ney states that even if one concludes that the
wavefunction exists – there is have no prima facie reason preventing this statement
to be extended to a consciousness-based or world-splitting account of the universe –
there is no “[. . . ] justification for making factual assertions about what sort of entity this
wave function is” (NEY, 2012, p. 68). Therefore, QM (QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 or else) does not
provide an answer regarding what are, in metaphysical terms, the entities to which it
ontologically commits itself.
This might be a drawback for the attempt to look to QM to achieve informa-
tion what the world is like – a cornerstone of scientific realism. Regarding this matter,
Chakravartty wrote:
One cannot fully appreciate what it might mean to be a realist until one
has a clear picture of what one is being invited to be a realist about.
(CHAKRAVARTTY, 2007, p. 26).
This claim calls for the need for a metaphysical explanation, the so-called clear
picture that explains in metaphysical what those entities are. This further sense of
interpretation is here called the attribution of a “metaphysical profile”. It should be
evident, however, that obtaining such a clear picture of the metaphysical profile is
not so simple: it should be handled, as French (2013) argues, with some degree of
epistemic humility (as there is not such a thing as a point of view of nature from a
cosmic exile to evaluate between rival options in metaphysics). Handling the need for a
13 Whether wave function realism should be regarded as an interpretation of QM, in addition to QM𝑐𝑜𝑙
and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 (ALBERT, 2013), or as a general attitude towards the ontology of QM, which is indepen-
dent of theoretical choices one might make to solve the measurement problem (LEWIS, P., 2004;
NEY, 2013) is a matter not discussed here, for the point made by this discussion does not depends
on such stances.
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metaphysical profile (the “clear picture”) with epistemic humility was called by French
(2013, p. 85) the “Chakravartty’s challenge”. According to the challenge, it is not enough
to point to some feature of a theory and claim realism about it. In order to achieve a
legitimate realism about the contents of a scientific theory, one must specify what are
those contents, and doing so involves – at least partially – providing a metaphysical
characterization of such content.
Suppose, then, that one claims to be a realist about QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. This means this
person believes that QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 makes true statements about the world, including its un-
observable processes – such as the causal power of consciousness (to which the
theory is ontologically committed). However, if no metaphysical profile is offered for
consciousness, the alleged realism about the theory is empty.
Here, the philosophical aspects of interpreting QM (e.g., ontological in the sense
of the existence of a causal consciousness or multiple actual worlds, and metaphysical
in the sense of the kind of existence of those entities) are at stake, not a function
between mathematical and physical systems. In this sense, these aspects represent
separate metaphysical possibilities – distinct proposals about the nature of the physical
world. Therefore, this feature of interpreting of QM leads to a worldview, an essentially
metaphysical discussion, as it tells stories about the world and the kinds of entities
which integrate it – the objects which compose its ontology. Again, this metaphysical-
ontological sense of interpreting QM is referret to here as interpretation in stricto sensu,
from which arise the problems of ontological and metaphysical underdetermination, as
all the options briefly stated above are available.
The next chapters address the subjects concerning underdetermination. The
main concern in this chapter is methodological, i.e., it lies on the question of how
ontology and metaphysics comes into the conceptual scheme of QM.
One may be naturally led to the question: how to obtain a metaphysical profile
(e.g., Chakravartty’s “clear picture”) for a theory’s ontological entity? Can philosophers
simply create metaphysical characterizations that, as French (2011) worries, “float free”
from scientific theories themselves? Worrying about the risk of driving metaphysical
inquiries which are distant from the empirical results, thus creating the need for justifica-
tion, led many authors to argue for discontinuation of this maner of conducting analytic
metaphysics as a philosophical discipline.14
Metaphysics, however, must float free from physics in the context of the meta-
physical profile; otherwise, it would be impossible to attribute a metaphysical profile
to QM. Furthermore, it would be impossible to claim realism about QM, according to
Chakravartty’s challenge. The quest for realism through Chakravartty’s challenge, then,
justifies the use of the metaphysical work that is not necessarily scientific informed –
14 See Ladyman and Ross (2007) and references therein.
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the so-called armchair methods.15
In such a project, some authors acknowledge the utility of metaphysics to scien-
tific theories precisely related to filling this metaphysical gap, being, in principle, useful
for the (stricto sensu) interpretative work. Analytic metaphysics, thus, may be regarded
as a “toolbox” (FRENCH; MCKENZIE, 2012) used to interpret scientific theories, or a
“spot for pillaging” (FRENCH, 2014, p. v). The last suggestion comes from French’s
(2014) “Viking Approach” to metaphysics, which justifies the free development of meta-
physics based on the scientific usage of metaphysical concepts. According to the Viking
Approach, as French (2014, p. 50) argues, “[. . . ] the products of analytic metaphysics
can be regarded as available for plundering!”.
Chakravartty’s challenge is thus addressed by the Viking Approach in the follow-
ing way: one simply chooses among the available options in the metaphysics’ literature
in order to fill or dress the ontological entities in a metaphysical profile.16 In this sense,
metaphysics, as a discipline, presents roughly the same level of independence from
empirical science as mathematics, for it provides theories, tools and strategies of investi-
gation and speculation which can be employed in order to interpret scientific theories.17
An interpretation of a scientific QM, then, not only provides the realist content of the
theory (RUETSCHE, 2015) but also, following Chakravartty’s challenge, presents the
possibility of obtaining a realist content.
One question, at least, remains unanswered: when is the challenge completed?
Or, at least, when is the challenge sufficiently completed in order to fill one’s realism
about unobservable entities of a given scientific theory? Recall that it is not possible to
extract metaphysical profiles from scientific theories and it is not possible to be a realist
about something without knowing its metaphysical profile. However, “[i]t is always possi-
ble to ask finer-grained questions [. . . ]” (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2019). Then, when does the
metaphysical profile become sufficiently developed in order to justify a realism about
it? This is here called the “Meta-Chakravartty’s Challenge”. By recalling that the clear
picture challenging demands can only be obtainable within a floating-free metaphysics,
the Meta-Challenge appears not so shocking, becoming more naturally acceptable. Af-
ter all, it is indeed always possible to investigate finer-grained metaphysical questions –
this consists most of the metaphysical work as well as its prerogative.
French (2018, p. 394) acknowledges this problem, by asking “how much fur-
ther should the realist go”, and “to what extent should our realism be metaphysically
informed?” (FRENCH, 2018, p. 395). The problem, then, returns to the matter of epis-
temic humility. As metaphysical claims cannot be directly given by observation (e.g., no
physical theory can tell whether the concept of “mass” is an instantiated universal or a
15 See Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 10).
16 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 deal with examples of this matter.
17 A similar argument for the independence of a priori metaphysics from empirical sciences and the
analogy with pure mathematics, can be found in Morganti and Tahko (2017).
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trope), a humble attitude towards metaphysical profiles must be adopted. The amount
of humility one should adopt, however, is unclear: if too much, the risk is telling the
same story that relevant scientific theories already do (thus not forming a worldview); if
too little, then one may have to face underdetermination.
To French (2018, p. 401), the perfect balance lies in the Viking approach, close
enough to the “Toolbox” approach: metaphysical literature provides many views, moves
and approaches which can be used for articulate a metaphysical profile for relevant
features of the believed theory.18 According to this view, QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 may be assumed to be
within a Cartesian-like dualism (CCCH) or a Husserlian-like phenomenology (CRCH).19
Therefore, Chakravartty’s challenge and the Meta-Challenge are completed with the
use of metaphysical theories, developed by metaphysicians, in a way that allows the
realist to employ the tools for articulating questions concerning how the world is –
modulo CCCH or some other interpretation of QM.
This is, clearly, a heuristic move, as one may articulate, by itself, such a clear
picture. Then again, French (2018, p. 404) asks: “why reinvent the wheel?” – to what
we wholeheartedly agree: it is more fruitful first to examine the available options.20
French’s method of approaching metaphysics within the context of science, thus, is
not an anecdote. The Viking and the Toolbox approaches are not just ways of stating,
in a dismissive tone, something along the lines of “let us look at many things that
metaphysicians have done”, but instead poses a literal suggestion. Concerning such
suggestion, French states that scientific metaphysics is:
[. . . ] to engage with extant metaphysics, draw on the tools it has already
developed, and work with metaphysicians themselves to hone and sharpen
them in various ways, so that they can be developed more precisely to help us
understand what it is that science is telling us. (FRENCH, 2018, p. 405).
Looking at scientific metaphysics from this angle, it does not seem to be so
distant from traditional, armchair metaphysics. One first and somewhat obvious reason
for this is: if the Viking approach to metaphysics employs what metaphysicians have
already done in the history of philosophy, then much of what is plundered are products
of this traditional metaphysics (in which, for example, Plato is still an available source for
pillage). A second, perhaps speculative, reason for this conclusion is that the so-called
scientific metaphysics do not seemed to produce metaphysical content, thus remaining
distant from a methodological attitude towards metaphysics – a possible reason as to
why it might be more prudent to call it a metametaphysical attitude.
This chapter argues for the indispensability of ontological and metaphysical
considerations in the development of a worldview based on QM. It was also argued that
18 See also French and McKenzie (2012).
19 These metaphysical profiles are carefully analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
20 Chapter 8 parts ways with this suggestion.
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French’s approach, based on the application of Chakravartty’s challenge and the Viking
approach to metaphysics, makes more sense if metaphysics is somehow considered
to be independent of QM – if it floats free from science.
Even if sticking to French’s approach, the realist will be bothered with interpre-
tational underdetermination: should one believe the metaphysical profiles of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 or
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙? Why? Put differently: is there a causal consciousness according to QM? Are
there parallel worlds? There are no easy answers. Cushing (1993, p. 269) eloquently
states that “[a]ll interpretations of quantum mechanics have price tags attached.” The
discussion presented here argues that philosophy might have a reasonable opinion in
this business. If the currency of this market is philosophical, maybe a metaphysical turn
is required: to compare theoretical virtues and explanatory power in order to choose
between them. This is, however, as Arenhart (2017, p. 124) states, “[. . . ] what typical
metaphysical debates already do”. The question of whether there are metametaphys-
ical methods available for objectively evaluate rival metaphysical theories in order to
“break” metaphysical underdetermination will be subject of Chapter 5.
Part III
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5 UNAVAILABLE METAPHYSICAL STORIES
“All interpretations of quantum
mechanics have price tags
attached. Again, it’s a buyer’s
market.”
JAMES T. CUSHING
Underdetermination,
Conventionalism and Realism
In standard formulations (more specifically, Hilbert-space formulations), QM,1 is
compatible with several distinct interpretations (or theories, as argued in Chapter 2).
Up to this date, no objective criteria based solely on scientific constraints have been
established in order to choose an interpretation. Moreover, while those interpretations
provide general guidelines concerning the furniture of the world, they generate trouble
by being compatible with a different set of metaphysical profiles. In other words, distinct
metaphysical approaches can be provided to each of the possible furniture or ontology
provided by the interpretations.
In summary, the situation is as follows: different quantum theories (theoretical
underdetermination) populate the world differently (ontological underdetermination), ac-
cording to the interpretation chosen. Each interpretation, then, might be compatible
with a multiplicity of metaphysical profiles, depending on the chosen approach to meta-
physics (metaphysical underdetermination). It is far from clear how quantum theories
may help cut down the proliferating number of options. This may be seen as part of a
reasonably well-known problem called “underdetermination”, a worry that concerns the
naturalistically-oriented scientific realist, who considers QM to tell a single story about
the furniture of the actual world.2
Notice that the source of the problem is directly related to interpretation. Why
do scientific theories need to be interpreted? Concerning QM, the most straightforward
answer is measurement. Measurement in QM seems to require a process apparently
at odds with the theory, having no intuitive or natural place in the world or dynamic
processes described by the theory. In essence, this is the so-called measurement
problem.
Dealing with this problem is a task left to interpretations. As Sklar (2010, p. 1124)
remarkably states, this is not to be taken as an imperative from philosophers alone:
1 For simplicity, the terminology employed in the previous chapters will be momentarily suppressed,
and “QM𝑏𝑎𝑠” will be simply referred to as QM, except when the need for explicitly in stating the basic
formulation of QM (QM𝑏𝑎𝑠) arises.
2 This discussion does not concern the so-called instrumentalist or the working physicist and other
FAPP approaches to QM ruled by the maxim “shut up and calculate!”, for which the effort to interpret
QM, in the sense of assigning it a “worldview” is meaningless.
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“[. . . ] the demand for interpretation [of QM] arises within theoretical science”. Scientists
who aspire to develop a scientific image of the world rely on interpretation – and,
consequently, on ontology and metaphysics. As a result, they are also subject to the
underdetermination problem.
In order to clearly present the problem, take a rough characterization of the
word “interpretation” in this context, as given by van Fraassen (1991, pp. 242, 336–
337): interpretation of a scientific theory informs us “what the world is like” modulo
such theory. This characterization seems to lead to a kind of “naturalist” stance to
ontology and metaphysics if regarded to be the theoretical view that attributes the
task of answering what is there and what the world is like to scince. In this sense, an
interpretation of QM (ideally) enables one to “extract” a scientific image of the world as
if QM were true, thus playing a non-trivial role in a scientifically informed metaphysics.
This is really tempting, and it would be a straightforward situation if there existed a
single picture of the world modulo QM. If it were possible to extract an interpretation
from the theory somehow, then the metaphysician’s job would be completed – the world
is just as QM says it is. Were that the case, one would completely agree with Maudlin’s
naturalist claim:
Evidence for what exists, at least in the physical world, is provided solely by
empirical research. Hence the proper object of most metaphysics is the careful
analysis of our best scientific theories (and especially of fundamental physical
theories) with the goal of determining what they imply about the constitution of
the physical world. (MAUDLIN, 2007, p. 104).
Unfortunately, the situation is not that simple: there are several scientific images
compatible with QM, as many as there are interpretations of QM. This results from the
fact that interpretations operate fundamentally on non-testable statements, discussing
unobservable entities and processes. In order to evaluate them properly, it is necessary
to inquire about the evaluation of ontological and metaphysical theories. Otherwise,
the necessary elements to adhere to a particular scientific image of the world are non-
existent, as there are different interpretations positing different entities. The theories,
with added interpretations, cannot be simultaneously true in any sense of truth relevant
to the realist.
In line with Ruetsche’s (2015) claim that the realist content of QM is the realist
content of an interpretation of QM, discussed in Chapter 3, Sklar also emphasizes that,
in QM, the three kinds of underdetermination sketched above imply that:
Our foundational theories usually exist in a scientific framework in which they
are subject to multiple, apparently incompatible, interpretations. And given the
interpretation you pick, your view of what the theory is telling us about the
basic structure of the world can be radically unlike that of someone who opts
for a different interpretation of the theory. (SKLAR, 2010, p. 1123).
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Consequently, the scenario is as initially described: QM is an invaluable source
of empirical results; however, it falls prey to different forms of underdetermination when
it is considered a guide to what there is and how the entities look. Given that the math-
ematical story told by QM alone is unable to break underdetermination, this chapter
suggests adopting the required philosophical spin in the discussion. Leaving naturalistic
concerns aside, the inquiry made here is whether philosophy, as a discipline, could be
of help to a better understanding of this general framework of metaphysical underdeter-
minations entailed by the efforts of interpreting QM.
For this purpose, a distinction between metaphysics and ontology is further
explored, as well as their interrelationships. From a methodological point of view, this
shall provide two kinds of possible manners in which metaphysics may help QM: the
possibility to discard some metaphysical views associated with interpretations due
to quantum mechanical reasons, or, when that fails, due to metaphysical reasons.
(Naturally, it is impossible to break the underdetermination fully, but at least the range
of options is limited.) This provides a relation between science and metaphysics that
does not need to appeal to intuitions, which in some cases may somehow benefit from
the epistemic privileges attributed to QM.
The overall structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly recall the
measurement problem, advancing two interpretations in order to serve as test cases
for metaphysical methodology. Section 3 discusses two methodologies that could help
settle the question of which interpretation and which metaphysics to choose. Section 4
advances this work’s own proposal. As mentioned, this proposal seems to be the one
that better uses the resources of the scientific theory to aid theory choice in metaphysics.
The final remarks in Section 5.
5.1 THE PROBLEMS IN A NUTSHELL
This section begins with another formulation of the measurement problem. This
is the source for the need for interpretations, which span a wide array of possible
ontological and metaphysical theories, generating underdetermination.
The measurement problem can be stated in numerous ways. Perhaps the most
intuitive (although and rather cruel) way to perceive it is through the thought experiment
made famous by Schrödinger in his “Schrödinger’s cat” scenario. Consider the following
situation. Suppose the following elements are locked in a box: a cat, a venom flask, a
hammer and a quantum system. After one hour, the quantum system |𝜓⟩ has equal
probabilities of dacaying or not, in which case two distinct chains of effects may result:
a) If the quantum system decays, the flask is broken by the hammer, and the cat
dies. Its vectorial representation is |𝜓↑⟩;
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b) If the quantum system does not decay, the hammer stands still, the flask remains
intact, and the cat remains alive. Its vectorial representation is |𝜓↓⟩.
These vectors are presented here with simplifications, since the point of interest
is the fact that each possible chain of effects, if actual, excludes the other. After one
hour, QM describes the state of affairs involving the cat inside the box as a linear
combination of the two possible outcomes for the fate of the cat, being |𝜓↑⟩ the case
where the cat remains alive and |𝜓↓⟩ the case where the cat dies, so that the sum is:»
1
2
(︁
|𝜓↑⟩+ |𝜓↓⟩
)︁
. (13)
This result does not describe a possible measurement outcome, but rather a
linear combination of state vectors related to possible measurement outcomes. To
find the cat in a determinate state, one must open the box (a metaphor to the act
of “performing a measurement”), so the quantum-mechanical description of the cat
changes from the vector sum to |𝜓↑⟩ or |𝜓↓⟩, with equal probability, that is, |𝜓↑|2 =
|𝜓↓|2 = 0, 5 = 50%. One can naturally wonder about what exactly happened, in order
to change the description from a vector sum to a single-state description (called an
“eigenvector”). As soon as one this kind of inquiry starts, one enters the realm of the
interpretation of QM.
The standard textbook approach to the measurement problem is as follows.
While undisturbed, quantum systems evolve in time according to the Schrödinger equa-
tion, a linear and deterministic equation that implies that, if the eigenvector |𝜓1⟩ evolves
to |𝜓′1⟩ and the eigenvector |𝜓2⟩ evolves to |𝜓′2⟩, then |𝜓1⟩+ |𝜓2⟩ evolves to 𝑎 |𝜓′1⟩+ 𝑏 |𝜓′2⟩.
As the latter is not an eigenvector, it is posited that when a measurement is done, it
collapses to one of its eigenvectors (say, |𝜓′1⟩), in the form of
𝑎|𝜓′1⟩+ 𝑏|𝜓′2⟩ −→ |𝜓′1⟩. (14)
Then, the problem becomes assigning meaning to this change in description,
which seems to be an unnatural process that is not governed by the Schrödinger
equation – again, this is the domain of the interpreter of QM.
As we previously stated, there are many distinct possible interpretations to QM,
but in order to illustrate the metametaphysical point stressed by this work, only two
interpretations are considered:
1. The QM𝑐𝑜𝑙’s CCCH, presented by Wigner (1983);3
3 As argued in Chapter 4, even though literature considers von Neumann (1955) as a proponent of
CCCH (see Jammer (1974, p. 480)), it is safer to point Wigner (1983) as CCCH’s leading original
proponent – see Bueno (2019) for details.
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2. The QM𝑏𝑟𝑎’s MWI, proposed by DeWitt (1970).4
The choice of the interpretations considered in the case study is based on the
clear divergence of the ontological theses entailed by them. Whereas CCCH commits
to the idea that human consciousness has some kind of privileged reality, thus exerting
a causal role in quantum measurement, MWI commits to the idea of actual splitting
worlds and to the existence of a plurality of physical worlds, different than the one we
live in, all of them equally real.
As a disclaimer, it is worth mentioning that the discussion presented here does
not engage in the debate regarding whether those are reliable options to interpret QM
based on theoretical standards, such as whether QM needs consciousness as stated in
CCCH, or whether the decoherence-based MWI approach to the measurement problem
actually provides a solution.5 This is not the point here. Rather, this chapter’s goal
is methodological : how to evaluate metaphysical theses in the case of metaphysical
underdetermination. Considering this goal, the discussion shall proceed inferentially :
if both CCCH and MWI are available options in the efforts of interpreting QM, then
we proceed with the methodological discussion. Once that point is established, the
discussion evolves to a schematic overview of these interpretations of QM.
1. CCCH’s reasoning is simply put as follows:
∙ Assuming QM holds for all physical systems, the attachment of a macro-
scopic measurement would not be enough to generate a measurement out-
come, as the linear evolution predicted by the Schrödinger equation must be
obeyed;
∙ This must be true for all further measuring apparatuses which one could, in
principle, attach to the first;
∙ Moreover, this should also hold for the experimenter’s eye, its optical nerve,
and its brain. This this chain, however, must stop somewhere;
4 Some comments on this issue are necessary. Traditionally, Hugh Everett (1957) should be on the
list of main proponents of MWI – see Jammer (1974) and Wallace (2012). It is not trivial, however,
to place Everett among the proponents of MWI. Although Everett himself mentioned, in a debate
with Podolsky, and others, that his theory contains a non-denumerable number of worlds (WERNER,
1962), it is also clear that he distances himself from the idea propagated by DeWitt (1971) that QM𝑏𝑟𝑎
dictates the need for multiverses as real as the one in which this PhD thesis is written. Furthermore,
there are “single world” interpretations of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, in which the main claims are based on Everett’s
writings. In our terms, this consists of another ontology for QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, that explicitly differs from many-
worlds ontologies (this matter is discussed in Chapter 8). To mention a few of the main references
to such an interpretation, see Ben-Dov (1990), Barrett (2011),and Conroy (2012, 2018). Thus, the
“many worlds” notation is employed here only with relation to DeWitt’s conception, remaining neutral
in relation to the historical debate concerning Everett’s position on the ontology of many or a single
world.
5 Turns out it does not. See d’ Espagnat (1999, §14.5) for a survey on “improper mixtures”, an erroneous
argument concerning decoherence as a solution of the measurement problem.
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∙ The proponents’ hypothesis is that the consciousness of the observer causes
the superposition dynamics to collapse in a single-state description, as it is
not subject to the laws of QM.
2. The central point of MWI’s reasoning is:
∙ Accepting the universal validity of the Schrödinger equation, the superposi-
tion is taken literally: both terms in Equation (13) are equally real ;
∙ To the MWI, the world branches itself into each possible outcome of a super-
position. If a live cat is found in the box as a measurement outcome, then we
happen to live in this branch of the world – the dead cat still exists in another
branch of the world, where such measurement outcome is simultaneously
found;
∙ Then, although the collapse is apparently happening (in the sense that the
superposition is not actually seen), it is not really occurring. What happened,
in truth, is the branching of the world in two, and those branches do not
communicate with each other.
In terms of ontology, the catalogue of what exists, the world can be populated
with two distinct kinds of being, according to what is stated by each interpretation.6
From an ontological point of view, CCCH considers human consciousness to be real.
That is, human consciousness is not an epiphenomenon and plays a causal role in
the quantum measurement process. However, it says nothing about the existence of
multiple worlds. Conversely, MWI defends the world branching as real, and not a merely
logical, counterfactual possibility. Therefore, it is causal in the quantum measurement
process. Note that it says nothing about consciousness. In this sense, as it was argued
in Chapter 4, there is an ontological underdetermination in QM. This is literally all that
can be extracted from CCCH and MWI.
At this point, one may ask: “but does QM entails that there are multiple worlds?”
or “does QM entail that our consciousnesses acts upon matter?” to what the must
answer must be: “we do not know.” QM does not answer that. In fact, QM cannot
be said to entail such facts about interpretations, given that those interpretations are
being added to QM in order to make sense of the theory (that is, to tell a story about
the physical world that suits its mathematical description). CCCH and MWI cannot
simultaneously be true regarding correspondence with the world, and therefore are
competing interpretations of QM. Since both interpretations of QM differ, and is not
possible so far to conduct experiments to distinguish them, QM alone seems to provide
6 There is no clear and definitive metaontological method to extract some kind of catalogue of the
furniture of the world modulo an interpretation of QM. However, we assume as a working hypothesis
that any such method would agree with this part of the catalogue considering these examples.
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no clue as to which of them is to be preferred. This is ontological underdetermination in
a nutshell.
The problem, however, still worsen. In terms of metaphysics, each of these two
ontologically different catalogues can be connected to at least two different metaphysi-
cal theses. On the one hand, CCCH is compatible with a dualist metaphysics, as it con-
siders that consciousness and physical processes lie in different ontological domains
of reality, thus obeying different dynamic laws (ALBERT, 1992). However, as presented
in Chapter 4, that is not the only possible interpretation of the role of consciousness in
QM. Recall that, alternatively, London and Bauer (1983) present a phenomenological
account of CCCH, comprising a different metaphysics within the same ontological com-
mitment with a causal consciousness.7 Thus, the same ontology of consciousness is
compatible with distinct metaphysical dressings of ontological posits. The same holds
for the MWI, which seems to require some type of metaphysical realism for possible
worlds, that is, the idea that there are indeed parallel worlds, physically real, in some
sort of modal realism. QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 can, however, be understood in several metaphysical ways
other than the typical modal realist.8 Again, branching ontology may be metaphysically
understood in incompatible ways. This is a familiar worry, called “metaphysical under-
determination”: two empirically equivalent and rival metaphysical theories to interpret
QM are presented.
Given that QM is silent about which interpretations, and, consequently, which
ontology and metaphysics to adopt, how to proceed? This is clearly a question of theory
choice involving not only physics, but also ontology and metaphysics. It is here that
such philosophical disciplines step in. Debates on metaontology and metametaphysics
addressing the issue of theory choice in ontology and metaphysics could be, perhaps,
of some help.
5.2 EVALUATING PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES
The naturalist stance has been roughly characterized by stating that ontological
and metaphysical questions should be settled by science alone. Science was argued
to be compatible with distinct ontological outputs, which must be further extended to
distinct metaphysical theses in order to generate different scientific images of the world.
Therefore, a radical naturalistic stance to metaphysics appears to be quite problematic
and does nor provide a solution concerning metaphysical underdetermination.9
7 See also French (2002) and references therein for details. The interpretation presented by London
and Bauer (1983) is discussed in Chapter 7.
8 Chapter 8 deals with this issue.
9 It should be noted that this section suppresses the distinction between ontology and metaphysics
pointed previously, as the authors engaged in this section do not make such a distinction. This is done
without any theoretical loss. It should be mentioned, however, that ontology and not metaphysics that
is at stake in this section. In the next section we proceed with our distinction.
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Therefore, the first metametaphysical question to be answered is the following:
what kind of features concerning theory choice in metaphysics could, at least in princi-
ple, help to thin the number of possible interpretations? There are at least two obvious
contenders, which can be defined according to their degree of proximity with the em-
pirical results10 obtained from QM. An appeal to science, from which ontology in a
naturalist-fashion can only be extracted from scientific theories, and an appeal to meta-
physics, according to which empirical results do not need to be considered in order to
inquire about the world as a whole. This two contrary, radical stances seem to lead to a
dilemma, as French argues:
[. . . ] either the metaphysics floats free of the physics and requires justification
itself; or it is continuous with the physics but then it can’t actually break the
underdetermination. (FRENCH, 2011, p. 210).
If one is not to stick with QM solely in metaphysical investigations, how far from
it can one go? The suggestion proposed by this study provides an initial approximation
to answer this question. Before presenting it, however, it is essential to consider two
alternative approaches.
Aesthetic values
When dealing with the evaluation of metaphysical theses, it is perhaps conve-
nient to initiate an inquiry by questioning when to do so. For instance, if two meta-
physical theses are equivalent in some sense, perhaps there is no need to choose
between them: the debate, in this case, is merely verbal, not substantial. To our best
knowledge, up to this date, the CCCH and the MWI are empirically equivalent11 in
the sense that both lead to the same set of empirical results.12 Are they, however,
metaphysically equivalent? In order to attempt to settle this fundamental question, the
recent metametaphysical methodology proposed by Benovsky (2016) is considered to
the discussion.
Benovsky (2013, 2016, §1, §4) argues for a metaphysical equivalence based on
the role of the primitives of metaphysical theories at stake: if the primitives of theory
𝒯 and the primitives of theory 𝒯 ′ are the same, the difference between 𝒯 and 𝒯 ′ is
not substantial. Such primitives come into play as “problem-solvers”, being individuated
according to the theoretical roles played on these theories (i.e., a kind of functional
approach to individuation of primitives). In essence, whenever a metaphysician meets
a problem, it can be solved by positing primitives and relations between such prim-
itives. Benovsky (2016, p. 66) warns that his functional criterion to individuation of
metaphysical theses may be somehow vague, and metaphysicians should carefully
10 See Chakravartty (2013).
11 See Allori (2015), Peter Lewis (2016), and de Barros and Oas (2017).
12 That is, both take into account the same models of data – see Suppes (2002).
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analyze each case – which is done here for the selected cases of interpreting QM. One
of his arguments is that even the so-called content view to individuation is reducible
to the functional view in the sense that if two primitives differ due to their content, it is
so because they also do not play the same functional role. Therefore, it makes sense
to apply the account of Benovsky (2013, 2016, §4) for metaphysical equivalence to
selected cases of interpretation of QM, CCCH and MWI.
As mentioned earlier, interpretations of QM operate on a non-testable level.
Moreover, they are mainly engaged in response to the measurement problem. Thus, it
seems safe to consider their ontological charge as primitives: whereas “consciousness”
is a primitive entity of CCCH, parallel worlds are primitive entities of MWI. Clearly, the
interpretations may be compatible with a common core ontology involving particles,
waves, space, and time, but the uncontroversial portion of the discussion shall be left
aside.
Both interpretations utilize primitive notions as problem-solvers to the measure-
ment problem, in the sense that these solutions cannot be analyzed within the frame-
work of the theory. This matters can be schematized as follows. Consider the answers
to this question: “What happens during a measurement process?”
CCCH: Postulates the action of an arbitrary observer’s subjective consciousness, from
a separated ontological domain, that collapses the superposition of states in a
single-state description.
MWI: Postulates the world-branching process, in which the two states in superposition
literally occur, each in different ontological domains (different parallel, physically
real, worlds) that do not interact with each other.
If one were to investigate the functions and details of each ontology, they would
appear not to present results. Consider the dualist metaphysical approach to CCCH
again: according to it, there is a real consciousness in the world (and there is only
one world as far as we can extract our ontology from what the theory tells about the
world). Moreover, the process by which this primitive operates has a mathematical
counterpart in the theory: the collapse. Consciousness causes the collapse. On the
contrary, consider MWI: according to it, there is more than one real world (probably way
more than one), and consciousness has no privileged role on that, considering that
what there is is to be determined judging solely from QM.
Additionally, by the process by which MWI’s primitives operate, there is also,
a mathematical consequence in the formalism: there is no collapse. In the MWI, all
terms of a superposition are actual, each in its corresponding world. Therefore, their
primitives are distinguished by virtue of the theoretical process by which they operate.
The metaphysical differences between CCCH and MWI appear to be, then, more than
verbal: there are substantial differences in the primitives they postulate, and so they are
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not metaphysically equivalent in the sense argued by Benovsky (2013, 2016, §1, 4). It is
worth emphasizing that, as employed by Benovsky (2013, 2016), the term “metaphysics”
here is to be understood as “ontology”. That is, the so-called “metaphysical equivalence”
is then an “ontological equivalence”. Ontological underdetermination, then, strikes back
(as if it never really left the scene).
So far, the ontological aspects of the selected interpretations of QM have been
dealt with. What about the metaphysical profiles within CCCH and MWI? Since both
CCCH and MWI have, firstly, ontological differences, it is to be expected they also have
metaphysical differences. Metaphysical underdetermination, then, also strikes back.
Could the theory proposed by Benovsky (2013, 2016) help in this matter? Unfortunately,
it seems that it cannot. In fact, Benovsky (2016, p. 70) acknowledges this. According
to the author, finding objective reasons to choose one theory over another is not an
easy goal. As for this positive proposal, he utters: “I do not have a good answer to
this question”, proceeding to state that this choice must be grounded in aesthetic
considerations since metaphysical theories are literally beautiful and could be allegedly
chosen over another based on such beauty. The problem in this metametaphysical13
view is precisely the lack of objectivity regarding theory choice: one could always choose
a less beautiful metaphysical theory over another. It is easy, indeed, to imagine cases
where some find more beauty in CCCH than in MWI – and vice versa. In fact, Benovsky
(2016, p. 123) concedes that such aesthetic move is not objective: “[. . . ] the evaluator’s
taste plays a role from the beginning to the very end of the evaluative process”.
Moreover, to objectively (in a strong sense) assess the dispute between meta-
physical theses related to scientific theories, something along the lines of a “the whole
picture” might be needed, which Benovsky (2016, p. 84) calls the “‘widen the net’
criterion”. Interesting as it may seem, this sort of goal sounds somehow unrealistic, es-
pecially when working with metaphysics of scientific theories. All metaphysical inquiry
related to scientific theories should be as provisional as the scientific theories them-
selves. Thus it seems to be unnecessary asking metaphysicians to wait for fundamental
science achieves a final theory of everything (if there may be such thing at all) before
beginning their work with a scientifically-informed metaphysics. Instead, the work of the
metaphysician, when related to science, is to account for a better understanding of the
scientific(s) image(s) of the world that may be compatible with scientific theories.
Furthermore, even if it was possible to reach an agreement over which interpre-
tation and its accompanying metaphysics is the most beautiful, Benovsky’s solution
is not based on science, in any possible sense of how metaphysics could relate to
13 As remarked by Benovsky (2016, p. 122), the alleged beauty of metaphysical theories is not an
additional metametaphysical criterion, but rather a way of seeing the non-aesthetic metametaphysical
features that a metaphysical theory already has, such as internal consistency and explanatory power.
Nevertheless, this nomenclature is maintained in the discussion since aesthetic values are, in fact,
considered in the process of (metaphysical) theory choice. It seems odd, then, that this notion escapes
the nomenclature of “metametaphysics”.
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science. Any interpretation that could somehow have its admissibility lent by a scientific
theory, indirect as this seems, would have more credentials than a choice based on
beauty. The main problem, then, is that this approach leaves too much to be achieved
by the metaphysician, and nothing for science. The choice is entirely based on a first
philosophy.
Well, perhaps our expectations are too high to be met. Maybe it would be more
advisable to step back and try to focus on the wrong alternatives, rather than on the right
one, in order to momentary settle the issue. That is where this discussion is heading.
Epistemic risk
In order to better understand metaphysical underdetermination in the interpre-
tation of QM, this work attempts to evaluate metaphysical theories to verify whether
there is – objectively – an alternative that fares worse than another. The general crite-
rion of simplicity, and subsequently, the notion of “epistemic risk” recently proposed by
Chakravartty (2017a), analyzes whether these criteria are sufficient. Spoiler alert: they
Are not. The explanation to why it is so begins considering simplicity as a metameta-
physical criterion to compare rival metaphysical theses.
The argument states that simpler alternatives should be preferred. This attitude
towards metaphysics and ontology applies the famous Ockham’s razor, which seems
to be weightless in establishing a metametaphysical criterion to evaluate metaphysi-
cal theories. It presents, at best, heuristic value for evaluating ontological aspects of
theories. As stated by Terence Parsons (1979):
There is no prima facie reason to suppose that the universe contains a small
number of things, or a small number of kinds of things. There is no prima facie
reason to believe that a theory that endorses a smaller number of things, or
kinds of things, or employs a smaller number of primitives, is simpler or likelier
to be true or likely to yield more insight than another. (PARSONS, T., 1979,
pp. 660–661).
Briefly, as simplicity is not related to truth, it can hardly be an acceptable objective
metametaphysical criteria in the evaluation of rival metaphysical theories. As remarked
by Benovsky (2016, p. 87), “the requirement of parsimony and simplicity comes from
us rather than from the metaphysical reality” (just as beauty). Therefore it seems safe
to assume that simplicity is a criterion that should be dropped in this kind of inquiry.14
14 The same seems to apply to the appeal to intuitions, a metametaphysical criterion that states, roughly,
that concerning theory choice, one should stick to the metaphysical theory that somehow better
preserves our “intuitions” (which is another manner of saying “save the appearances”). An example
is the “phenomenological principle” proposed by Shimony (1997).An extensive account of this matter
will not be provided since QM is not intuitive at all – and therefore, its corresponding metaphysical
theory does not need to be either. Nevertheless, the reader interested in a critical account of this
particular metametaphysical criterion should refer to Benovsky (2016, §6).
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Chakravartty (2017a, §3.4–3.5) presented the idea that the epistemic risk of
some metaphysical theories should somehow guide the process of theory choice:
roughly, the smaller our ability to assign truth value to a hypothesis, the greater the epis-
temic risk. Such risk increases when the hypothesis strays from the empirical test and
decreases the greater its explanatory power. A closer look at this proposal is needed in
order to evaluate whether it could allow the decision between rival metaphysical theses.
As intended, epistemic risk should be applied to metaphysical propositions rather
than to metaphysical theories. Therefore, considering CCCH, propositions such as, in
the case of CCCH, “a causal act of subjective consciousness upon the measurement
device15 is responsible for measurement outcomes” are being evaluated. When one
is not in a position to judge whether a metaphysical proposition is true or false, such
proposition is epistemically risky (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2017a, p. 84). Again, when dealing
with a non-testable field, i.e., the interpretation of QM, such effort tends to be of high
epistemic risk – and Chakravartty’s (2017, p. 85) argues that “the less epistemic risk the
better”. As an alternative measure to epistemic risk, one might appeal to a proposition’s
explanatory power, which basically claims that the higher the explanatory power, the
lower is the epistemic risk. Bearing in mind the selected interpretations of QM, these
two criteria do not seem to be different, as both explain the measurement problem,
albeit in different (incompatible) manners. What they explain, really, is the working of
QM when a measurement is happening.
Therefore, it seems that even if one takes the notion of epistemic risk to be
the metametaphysical criterion considered to choose between the ontologies of CCCH
and MWI, both interpretations ultimately seem to yield the same measure of epistemic
risk. The same is true for their metaphysical profiles. As a result, this criterion is not of
help in the search for an objective way to evaluate these interpretations of QM, as the
discussion remains stuck with both ontological and metaphysical underdetermination.
Chakravartty (2017a, p. 215) approaches this stalemate trough voluntarism: the notion
that “[. . . ] relevant beliefs and actions are freely chosen, or voluntary, as opposed to
being forced in virtue of reason alone”. Again, there is no objective evaluation here,
as the decision concerns the one who decides, not the world. Notice, however, that it
seems challenging to recommend voluntarism when the very constitution of reality is at
stake.
Suppose that the metaphysical theses put forth by CCCH and MWI indeed differ
in their degree of epistemic risk: assume that it is possible to determine that CCCH,
per example, has more epistemic risk than MWI. Would that really help to objectively
evaluate them? Again: no. Imagine a diehard proponent of CCCH: one may always
choose an alternative with higher epistemic risk than another (someone may be willing
15 More precisely, the vector which represents the state of a measurement apparatus entangled with
the vector which represents the state of a quantum system.
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to take the risks!).
Thus, ontological and metaphysical underdetermination remains unbroken. This
seems to be a difficult spot, but it deserves one last try.
5.3 AN INTERPLAY BETWEEN TWO PARTIES
Metaphysics over ontology
Here, the distinction between ontology and metaphysics presented in the In-
troduction, and drawn throughout the previous sections of this chapter is explicitly
employed. Such distinction is not standard but is becoming more widespread recently,
and so the relation between the two concepts is now less vague than before, even
though many authors employ them in confusing ways. Following recent literature, such
as Arenhart (2012, 2019), Berto and Plebani (2015) and Tahko (2015), the task of
“ontology” is understood here as that of providing a catalogue of the furniture of the
world (what are the beings), whereas “metaphysics” is, among other things, taken to
be the theorizing on a correspondent story about such furniture (whether they have
properties or not, how they relate or not to each other, and mainly answers regarding
“what are those things that are”). In this sense, “metaphysics” present a broader sense,
i.e., “ontology” is considered a branch of metaphysics.
Two senses of the term “ontology” shall be acknowledged. In the first sense,
“ontology” is characterized by the investigation of ontological categories, which provide
the most general ways to approach and classify existent beings, closely related to the
so-called “metaphysical dressing”, following French (2013), or what is here called the
“metaphysical profile” of entities. In a second sense, “ontology” is characterized by the
investigation of the furniture of the world modulo some scientific theory according to its
ontological commitments. The first sense is said to be ontology in a traditional sense,
while the second is accepted as a naturalized sense.
Perhaps, it would be more appropriate to follow Jacquette (2002) and name
them “pure” and “applied” ontology, respectively, but it depends on what naturalized
ontology amounts to. To avoid possible misunderstandings grounded on terminological
issues, the first sense of “ontology” (i.e., the “traditional” or “pure” sense) shall be called
“metaphysical profile”.
Initially, the metaphysical profile and applied ontology may be taken as incompati-
ble, as one may reasonably indicate that the former is taken to be universal, prescriptive
and independent of contingent empirical findings of any scientific theory (as stated by
French (2011), “floating free” from the empirical content), whereas the latter is descrip-
tive and relative to a scientific theory. In fact, there is an ongoing debate between
authors who favor that contemporary philosophy should study exclusively the metaphys-
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ical profile16 and those who exclusively favor the applied ontology.17 The novelty of our
proposal18 lies precisely on an attempted reconciliation between those two parties by
establishing a middle ground utilizing a scheme for a “scientific oriented metaphysics”.
The first step towards such reconciliation is acknowledging that the applied
sense of ontology does not imply that the only existing things are those to which a
given scientific theory is committed to, since different theories may present different
ontological commitments. In order to exemplify this claim, is has been previously argued
that the CCCH and MWI approaches to QM fulfil these requirements. The second
step is to understand that the metaphysical profile studies a plurality of possible ways
to address these ontologies, meaning it is possible to assign different metaphysical
theses to each ontology extracted from the same set of interpretations of QM, per
example. Whereas the study concerning the metaphysical profile of entities provides an
investigation that accounts for what may possibly exist, applied ontology accounts for
the connection between those ontological categories with the ontological commitments
which may be presented by the empirical investigation of some specific scientific theory.
Thereby, when an ontologist attempts to study the ontology associated with a scientific
theory, both senses of “ontology” complementarily employed.
Thus, it is no surprise that the theory alone does not provide an answer concern-
ing what kind of metaphysical profile would be more (or less) adequate to its interpre-
tation’s ontology, as such a discussion ought to be conducted not within science, but
on a rather different ground, precisely the domain of the metaphysical profile.19 One
option For narrowing the field of possibilities entailed by underdetermination consists of
recognizing it is false that anything is valid in applied ontology: one may discover that
some kinds of entities are not compatible with a specific scientific theory.
In this context, the applied sense of ontology could preclude some form of meta-
physical profile. Notice this is almost a paraphrase of Arenhart (2012, p. 354): “[. . . ]
ontology in the naturalized sense bans some form of ontology in its [traditional] sense”.
In some sense, the discussion presented here updates Arenhart’s (2012) work with
substantial terminological distinctions as to better apply it to the discussion concerning
metaphysical underdetermination in QM, as well as to the relationship between science
and metaphysics in general.
As a classical example of this negative feature of applied ontology, the “experi-
mental metaphysics” of Shimony (1984, pp. 35–36) might be recalled, which considers
that some experiments (such as the experimental tests of Bell’s Inequalities) as “[. . . ] a
near decisive test of those worldviews which are contrary to that of QM”. To Shimony
16 See, for instance Lowe (1998).
17 For which the work of Ladyman and Ross (2007) can be cited.
18 Following Arenhart (2012, §2).
19 Reiterating: when dealing with the interpretation of a theory, such as QM, one is also dealing with
elements that lie outside the structure of the theory itself, as stressed by Bueno (2011, p. 93), even
thought this interpretative effort often emerges within the scientific community (SKLAR, 2010).
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(1984, p. 44), this means “[. . . ] the [empirical] evidence has narrowed the [metaphysical]
choices”.20
One may object that this may be a hasty move and that a diehard metaphysician
may not be convinced due to the lack of objectivity on theory choice. If this is so, this
positive proposal fails as badly as other metametaphysical alternatives that we critically
analyzed in previous sections.
At least to what concerns the theoretical and ontological domains, this seems to
be the case. It seems there was no advance in establishing a good criterion to objec-
tively choose between CCCH and MWI as competing scientific and ontological theories.
However, recall Chakravartty’s challenge: the metaphysical profile gap in our ontology
must be filled in order to understand what does being a realist about CCCH or MWI
mean. Within the metaphysical realm, there seems to be a sort of objectivity at stake
in such negative feedback resulting from the interplay between applied ontology and
metaphysical profile. Apply, then, the methodology sketched above to the discussion
analyzed in the previous sections, to evaluate whether it is possible to provide a way to
better understand the matters of underdeterminations in the selected examples when
interpreting QM.
Ontology over metaphysics
According to the CCCH approach to QM, consciousness is an entity that inhabits
the furniture of the world: CCCH is ontologically committed to consciousness – what-
ever it may be, in terms of a metaphysical profile. This is the best conclusion one may
withdraw regarding consciousness as per the applied ontology.
The metaphysical profile, then, comes as an extra layer that attempts to dress
this very entity so-called “consciousness” metaphysically. Traditionally, the metaphysical
profile associated to consciousness in CCCH is a form of dualism separating conscious-
ness from matter (WIGNER, 1983). CCCH is, however, incompatible with several meta-
physical profiles in which consciousness is epiphenomenal and devoid of causal power,
such as materialistic accounts of consciousness and physicalist accounts of conscious-
ness. In this sense, the ontology furnished by the interpretation of the theory rules out
some metaphysical options for the understanding of the world. Thus, if one desires to
stick with CCCH, the applied sense of ontology tells us that this particular interpretation
of QM is incompatible with the metaphysical profile of epiphenomenalism. It is, however,
compatible with the metaphysical dressing of dualism and with phenomenology.
Something similar may be said of the MWI. Once it is posited that there is no
collapse, and that all terms present in a superposition are equally real when a measure-
ment comes up, then, we are invited to ontologically understand the resulting theory in
which the branching processes of reality arises in the catalogue of the world modulo
20 For an account of several experiments in this field, see Aspect (2002).
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MWI. In fact, according to this account, each terms in which a wave function is decom-
posed, depicting one possible outcome of a measurement, represents an alternative
branch of reality. Some will choose to metaphysically dress them as possible worlds,
all of them equally real, containing a copy of the whole world and of the measurement
apparatus plus a determinate outcome (LEWIS, D., 2004).
But recall that MWI is not the only ontology that can be extracted from QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
There are single-worlds ontologies for QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, such as Relative state interpretation (RS)
(CONROY, 2018) and mind-branching ontologies, such as MMI (LOCKWOOD, 1989).
Adhering excluively to worlds in order to illustrate the approach defended by this work
regarding the relation between ontology and metaphysics, it is clear that, metaphysically,
there seems to be many ways one may understand a plurality of worlds. In essence,
one simple accept all of them as equally real, in a form of modal realism, or adopt
a fictional approach to possible worlds, where only the actual world is real, or, still,
a combinatory approach, where only the actual world is real, and such actual world
provides the ingredients with which to assemble the possible worlds.
Our approach suggests that checking the relation of a branching ontology with
those distinct metaphysical dresses, what results is that those who do not conceive
the many worlds as equally real fail to account for the lack of collapse. Indeed, if
only a single measurement outcome is real, the theory is simply a collapse theory
in disguise. Therefore, accounts such as fictional and the combinatorial approaches
to worlds seem to be discarded as incompatible, to say the least, with MWI.21 The
metaphysical possibilities are narrowed down by the choice of ontology (given by the
MWI) and the attempts to make sense of the theory (due to the requirements for
understanding a measurement through branching without collapse).
It seems that even a Lewisian account of possible worlds would fail in this ac-
count, given that the branching must create the worlds, and that the resulting worlds
must be copies of each other, with the same measurement apparatus and measurer,
differing in nothing but the result of the measurement. This is clearly not the case for the
approach advocated by Lewis, of course: although distinct worlds are all equally real,
it is not true that the same entity may be seen as populating distinct worlds: an entity
exists wholly in only one world. This argument seems to oppose the idea of branching
worlds. As so, not any kind of realism about possible worlds will suffice to understand
MWI in metaphysical terms.
Put briefly, the negative metametaphysics proposed by this thesis is as follows:
Step I: Applied ontology allows the identification of ontological commitments of an
interpretation of a scientific theory, and the metaphysical profiles compatible with
such ontological commitments.
21 A detailed account of this issue is presented in Chapter 8.
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Step II: Metaphysical profiles for such entities can be sought outside of scientific theo-
ries, in metaphysical regions that “float freely from science”.
Step III: Returning to the domain of scientific theories, the existence of any theoretical
restrictions to those metaphysical profiles that were considered, at least in princi-
ple, compatible with the theory’s ontology, is evaluated. This is the step that can
now receive a positive contribution: from the previous steps, the abandonment of
some metaphysical theses attached to some scientific theories is established.
5.4 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter expanded the meta-Popperian method initially proposed by Aren-
hart (2012), originally applying it as a metametaphysical method for theory choice in
metaphysics related to scientific theories. Such reconstruction and expansion are la-
belled as the method of “Unavailable Metaphysical Stories”. The following chapters deal
with the application of the method of Unavailable Metaphysical Stories in three different
cases, concerning metaphysical underdetermination within different interpretations of
QM.
As privileged access to the nature of the world, science should be a guide not
only to what there is, but also to how those things are. As discussed, the naturalist has
expectations of discovering answers to those questions, somehow inferring them from
science. However, at least to what concerns QM, there is much interpretative work to be
done if one is to determine an answer to those questions. Furthermore, the interpreta-
tions always encompass extra-empirical ingredients, additions which cannot be judged
purely on empirical grounds. As was presented in this chapter, distinct interpretations
provide general grounds which account for the population of the world.
The problem toughens when it is discovered that distinct interpretations provide
information only for ontology, the catalogue of what there is. If one is to understand
how those things are, the inquiry is of a higher level, on the metaphysical profile of the
posited entities. This investigation cannot be supplied by QM. Once it is noticed that
distinct metaphysical profiles are available for each interpretation, metaphysical under-
determination ensues. Naturalism is unable to deal with the situation, and therefore
some dose of metaphysics is salutary.
Three metametaphysical methodologies were evaluated in order to verify what
help they provided when trying to reduce the alternatives of metaphysical underdeter-
mination. The three approaches in metametaphysics, however, were unable to break
theoretical and ontological underdetermination in matters of interpreting QM. As a
result, questions concerning which interpretation one should adopt could not be ad-
dressed. As previously discussed, Benovsky’s appeal to beauty leads to a form of
anti-realism in metaphysics that is not conducive with the project of deriving a meta-
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physics of science. In fact, very goal of engaging metaphysics engaged with science
to attempt to benefit from the success of science in gaining objective knowledge of
reality. In this sense, remaining at the level of the inquirer’s subjective choice seems to
abandon the challenge too early.
Chakravartty’s solution seems to provide better grounds for choice. While rec-
ommending that epistemic risk should be avoided, adopting theories that are more
explanatory and closer to empirical confirmation, the solution seems to put metaphysics
on the same path as science. However, that is not enough to break metaphysical un-
derdetermination. In fact, metaphysical dressings are still able to multiply themselves
without clear criteria to discriminate them according to their explanatory powers, being
equally distant from empirical predictions that could allow the attribution of a truth value.
The solution proposed by Chakravartty in this case, voluntarism, is again an appeal
to subjectivity. There is nothing to prevent one from choosing the riskier theories, and
nothing relating voluntarism with truth.
Perhaps the avoidance of epistemic risk could be wedded to this work’s proposal,
which consists in investigating whether some metaphysical options could not be ruled
out on quantum mechanical grounds. That point was verified: on what concerns the
test cases addressed in this chapter, CCCH and MWI, it was concluded that some
metaphysical theories are clearly not compatible with QM. This provides more objective
grounds for rejecting some options. A careful investigation of the precise articulation
between metaphysical theses and the ontologies provided by interpretations of QM may
prove useful in order to reduce the number of options To do so in a somewhat objective
way, benefiting from features of QM itself and not on subjective preferences, is seen as
the most interesting advantage of such an approach.
It is important to mention that the method proposed here has a certain proximity
to the thesis called, in the philosophy of mathematics, “deferentialism”, according to
which philosophical theses that speak against non-philosophical disciplines must be
abandoned.22 Ultimately, part of our method involves looking towards science in order
to justify the incompatibility of certain metaphysical profiles with certain scientific theo-
ries. However, it is essential to emphasize that this method does not determine which
metaphysical theory is wrong; that is, it does not advocate the abandonment of certain
philosophical theses at all.
The method of Unavailable Metaphysical Stories only provides information con-
cerning the incompatibility of specific metaphysical profiles with certain scientific the-
ories. Since scientific theories are fundamentally provisional, metaphysical profiles
compatible with a given theory also inherit the same characteristic of provisionality. As
a scientific theory can be abandoned for many reasons, either by scientific or extra-
scientific criteria (KUHN, 2012), the metaphysical profiles related to a theory can be
22 For an exposition and critique of deferentialism, see Daly and Liggins (2011).
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abandoned as well, unless they are compatible with the scientific theory that succeeds
the previous one. This feature approximates our method to Lycan’s (2019) thesis, which
states that the only permanent contributions in the history of philosophy are negative
contributions: a metaphysical theory identified as incompatible with a particular scientific
theory will be permanently incompatible with it.
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6 CASE 1: COLLAPSE AND DUALISM
QM is problematic; as is consciousness. As argued in Chapter 4, some ontolog-
ical implications of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 supposes there is a connection between these two factors.
Although a number of claims constantly made on behalf of such relation are quite du-
bious,1 they have an undeniable pedigree, with sources found on the earliest attempts
to understand QM, when von Neumann (1955) proposed an interpretation based on
the concept of a non-physical causal agent in quantum measurement process. This
suggestion is frequently labeled as CCCH, after Wigner’s (1983) suggestion that human
consciousness is this non-physical agent. Remarkably, as recently demonstrated by
de Barros and Oas (2017), the CCCH has survived as many empirical tests as any
other interpretation of QM. Moreover, its specific features (namely, the introduction of a
causal consciousness) cannot be independently subjected to an empirical falsification,2
thus remaining a live option to interpreters of QM.
However, as verified by the poll presented by Schlosshauer, Kofler, and Zeilinger
(2013), CCCH is rather unpopular among theorists working in foundational fields of QM.
For example, a recent book published by Peter Lewis (2016, §9) does not even consider
the possibility of CCCH as a candidate for an interpretation of QM that could offer a
reasonable worldview, a position justified by the theory’s commitments to dualism. It
seems, then, that having the label “dualism” attached is enough for CCCH to be rejected.
However, what are the grounds for this rejection?
By rejecting CCCH due to its ties to dualism, what precisely is being rejected,
and why? The answer does not seem to be clear. Debates concerning mind and con-
sciousness have always been problematic per se, so it should not come as a surprise
that the issue becomes more complicated to what regards QM. Difficulties arise, mainly,
from the fact that the concept of “dualism” is applied to a wide range of metaphysical op-
tions throughout the history of philosophy. As a result, even if CCCH clearly falls within
the metaphysics of dualism, it is still far from clear to which form of dualism CCCH is
committed (e.g., is it dualist regarding substances or properties?).
This chapter addresses the issue of the nature of consciousness involved in
CCCH. Given that the central hypothesis of CCCH cannot be independently falseable
with empirical testing (DE BARROS; OAS, 2017), this metaphysical approach is useful
1 A simple search of the keywords “quantum consciousness coaching” should be enough to attest this.
See also Pessoa Junior (2011), Firmo de Souza Cruz (2011) and S. Livramento Machado and Firmo
de Souza Cruz (2016).
2 Nevertheless, CCCH is not assumed to be unfalsifiable, as claimed by de Barros and Oas (2017).
The main argument against that is as follows: recall Chapter 4, in which CCCH was argued to be an
ontological counterpart of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. Recall, still, Chapter 2, in which QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 were considered
to be different quantum theories, thus aligning the discussion to the claim made by C´irkovic´ (2005),
that collapse and no-collapse (hence QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎) are in principle empirically distinguishable.
Thus, future experiments (even if they are not feasible soon), should allow one to know which, if any,
of the interpretations remain empirically adequate, and which have been falsified.
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for those who favor or are against CCCH. As so, this is the first step towards a more
rigorous investigation into the metaphysical basis of CCCH. The discussion begins by
arguing that, unlike many other interpretations of QM, CCCH largely determines its
ontology and, to a lesser degree, the metaphysical profile of its posits. That happens
because the CCCH is incompatible with several metaphysical profiles available in the
philosophical literature on consciousness. Following the Viking Approach (FRENCH,
2014) to metaphysics of science, it is argued that, if one considers the distinct ap-
proaches to dualism available in the philosophical literature, it can be noticed that
most of them cannot be applied to CCCH. That shifts the focus to some very spe-
cific approaches to dualism, turning the evaluation of the theory and its ambitions a
more straightforward task. Furthermore, given that dualism shall be metaphysically ad-
dressed, it is argued that there seem to be no good metaphysical reasons to discard
dualism simply because it is a dualist approach. To justify that claim, metametaphysical
literature grounds the evaluation of whether dualism could be objectively discarded
when confronted with other available metaphysical theories.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the measurement
problem, along with von Neumann’s solution. The second section presents a distinction
between ontology and metaphysics that allows the extraction of an ontological com-
mitment and the determination of a metaphysical profile related to such commitments.
Furthermore, the ontology given by the theory is incompatible with many versions of
dualism. The third section approaches literature on metametaphysics to verify how du-
alism survives some of the typical arguments addressed against it. The fourth section
stresses that CCCH is compatible with some rather specific kinds of dualism, so that
not every approach to consciousness in QM qualifies as CCCH approach, thus consid-
erably reducing the scope of the discussion concerning the mind, causality, and QM.
Section five concludes the discussion.
6.1 COLLAPSE AND CONSCIOUSNESS
CCCH, as numerous other interpretations of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠, is essentially a response to
the measurement problem. As presented in Chapter 2, the measurement problem can
be understood as the inconsistency of three basic assumptions of the wave-function
representation of quantum states |𝜓⟩, basic assumptions of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠:
1.A |𝜓⟩ is complete;
1.B |𝜓⟩ evolves linearly though time;
1.C Measurements of |𝜓⟩ always have determinate outcomes.
An informal proof of the inconsistency of the conjunction of these assumptions
can be found in Chapter 2 and in Maudlin (1995, pp. 7–8), and thus will only be briefly
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commented. Suppose an experimentalist intends to measure the position of a quantum
system 𝑆 by means of a measurement apparatus 𝐴. According to 1.A and 1.B, the
composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴 evolves according to the Schrödinger equation. Then, by
linearity, the states of 𝐴 are also in superposition, meaning that the possible 𝐴-states
corresponding to, for example, different pointer positions, are superposed (hence, no
definite single-state outcomes). According to 1.C (and to the phenomenal perceptions
made in laboratories and daily life), however, there are definite outcomes as a result of
measurements. Therefore, at least one of these assumptions must be dropped.
Since the interest of this discussion lies on the CCCH approach, von Neumann’s
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is implicitly assumed (which, as seen in Chapter 5, denies assumption 1.B). The
idea of “measurement” as an outcome of the interaction between a quantum signal (𝑆)
and a macroscopic measurement device (𝐴) is, nevertheless, an intuitive. Therefore,
with the purpose of preserving this intuitive reasoning, one may suggest the attachment
of a second measurement apparatus ?ˆ?′ to measure the composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴, in
order to complete a measurement. One can reasonably consider this apparatus to be
the experimentalist’s eye, that observes the pointer reading. However, as the second
apparatus relates to the first in the same manner the first apparatus relates to the
quantum object, linearity yields that this is a new composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴 + ?ˆ?′.
The problem remains in the sense that such interaction does not provide a
solution for the superposition describing the states of the composite system. This is, in
fact, the first step of an infinite regress, since one could suggest a third measurement
apparatus attached to the second, such as the optical nerve. This optical nerve is
related to a further measuring apparatus such as the brain, and so the argument goes
ad infinitum.
This problematic situation is known as “von Neumann’s chain”.3 The main issue
in von Neumann’s measurement theory acknowledged here is that linear descriptions
of physical systems lead to an infinite regress: any attempt to reduce the superposition
of the joint system involving the introduction of further physical measuring apparatuses
is doomed since as physical systems, they are to be described as a superposition.
If the system is described by unitary dynamic laws, it will always be described by a
superposition. As Baggott (1992, p. 186) stresses, it is difficult to fault the logic behind
CCCH’s conclusion: if the measuring device is a physical system, it should be described
by QM’s equations of motion, as quantum systems are. Moreover, if macroscopic phys-
ical measuring devices are composed by quantum systems, they should, at least in
principle, behave similarly. Therefore, the superposition of macroscopic measuring de-
vices’ states (e.g., different pointer positions) is conceivable, and the interaction with a
non-physical agent terminates the superposition’s chain.
According to von Neumann (1955, pp. 418–420), the solution to this problem lies
3 Chapter 7 returns to this issue.
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in the recognizing that the “act of measurement” occurs in the (subjective) perception
of the observer, as one’s subjective perception is the most reliable source in which su-
perpositions are not experienced. von Neumann (1955, pp. 418–419) calls this feature
the “principle of psychophysical parallelism”4 breaking down the meaurement process
into three stages in order to explained (VON NEUMANN, 1955, p. 421). These are the
stages 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, and 𝐼𝐼𝐼, where “𝐼” is the quantum object, that is, the system 𝑆 being mea-
sured; “𝐼𝐼” is the measurement apparatus (which could correspond to anything, from
the instrument to the image registered in the observer’s brain); and “𝐼𝐼𝐼” is the observer
– more precisely, it is the observer’s abstract ego.5 The result of a measurement on 𝐼
performed by 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the same as the one yielded by a measurement on 𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼
provided by 𝐼𝐼𝐼. In the first case, the Schrödinger equation applies to 𝐼, while in the
second case, it applies to 𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼. That is, in all cases, the linearity of the Schrödinger
equation does not apply to 𝐼𝐼𝐼, meaning 𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the only part in which a measurement
occurs: it is the only part that presents the interaction of the abstract ego, that collapses
the chain of superpositions.
This agent is described as being outside the ontological domain of physical
systems. As argued by Becker (2004, p. 129), the most relevant feature of the reasoning
described above is that “physical processes must be explainable entirely in physical
terms, but collapse, which is essential to the dual processes of quantum mechanics,
cannot be explained entirely in physical terms”. Therefore, the transition between a
linear and a non-linear evolution is to be understood as a causal act of the observer’s
abstract ego upon the composite system.
Note that this means the agent that completes a measurement does not obey the
same laws of systems describable by quantum states. This is somewhat close to the
view of complementarity, especifically as presented by Bohr (1928, 1962).6 Famously,
one of Heisenberg’s efforts was to determine the boundaries of the quantum-like do-
main, a central aspect of von Neumann’s theory of measurement. This boundary is
known as “Heisenberg’s cut”, which is placed in the measurement act.7
This discussion usually concerns circumstances under which this “act” occurs.
According to CCCH and complementarity, the circumstances necessary for the mea-
4 See also Barrett (1999, §2.6). As Heidelberger (2003, pp. 9–10) pointed out, the term “psychophysical
parallelism”, as used by von Neumann in this context of the interpretation of QM, is marked with
several misunderstandings regarding the mind-body problem. This is why we will not use it anymore.
For more details, see Heidelberger (2003).
5 Although the term “consciousness” is absent in the writings of von Neumann (1955, pp. 418–420),
there is a standard reading in which he refers to the consciousness of the observer when he enunci-
ates the causal feature of the “subjective perception” of the observer. For a historical motivation of this
reading, see Jammer (1974, p. 480). We find it more prudent to maintain ourselves agnostic towards
such reading.
6 See also Faye (1991, pp. 128–129), Heisenberg (1983), Jammer (1974, p. 98) and da Costa and
Krause (2006).
7 The German term “Heisenbergscher Schnitt” was coined by Pauli (1950); to a historical approach of
it in the Copenhaguen spirit, see Landsman (2007) and Howard (2004).
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surement to occur are placed outside the domain of QM, yet, they present a fundamen-
tal ontological difference in the following sense. While CCCH considers the measure-
ment act (‘𝐼𝐼𝐼 ’) to be placed upon a macroscopic measurement apparatus (hence, a
physical system), von Neumann (1955, p. 421) places it outside the domain of physics
– not only quantum physics but outside physics itself. As von Neumann (1955, p. 418)
states, the so-called intellectual inner life of the observer is “[. . . ] extra-observational
by its very nature”. This suggests a “Cartesian cut”, as the cut is placed on a different
ontological level rather than within the same (physical) ontological domain of existence.8
Another feature of CCCH that should be considered in this discussion: whose
abstract ego causes the collapse? This issue is initially by Wigner (1983) in his “Wigner’s
friend” paradox, a thought experiment in which an intermediate observer (the “friend”)
observes an experiment and then tells a final observer (“Wigner”) about the observed
result. In this case, one may consider the following solutions (accepting the debatable
thesis that the macroscopic instrument enters in a superposition of pointer states):
𝑊1 : The friend collapses the composite superposed state – this is, apparently, von
Neumann’s solution. The second observer, “Wigner”, should describe the quan-
tum system, the apparatus, and his friend as a collapsed state. This position is
adopted by Wigner (1983, p. 177).
𝑊2 : The friend and “Wigner” enters in superposed state, as well as any other observer
in the chain. This is essentially QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
𝑊3 : The friend also enters in superposition, so “Wigner” is responsible for the collapse
of the apparatus and the friend. This view can be encompassed within the rela-
tional interpretation of Rovelli (1996), in which the state of the world is relative to
the observer. Therefore, from the friend’s perspective, he is the one who causes
the collapse, while Wigner assumes that he himself is the one who does it.
𝑊4 : The last observer in the chain seems to have a privileged status in provoking
the overall collapse, while the others are in a superposed state during all the
experiment. This solution leads to solipsism, the theory in which there is only one
causal consciousness, and there is no consensus about to whom it belongs.
It should be clear that only 𝑊1 is being considered in this discussion. 𝑊2 will
not be discussed, as to keep this work self-contained since it stands for a different
formulation of QM (i.e., no-collapse). 𝑊3 will also not be discussed since it does not
relate to the main subject of this chapter, consciousness. 𝑊4 is briefly covered, since it
is a frequently adopted solution by authors who propose an integration between QM and
spirituality via consciousness – see, for instance, Bass (1971) and Goswami (1989).
8 See Atmanspacher (1994).
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As 𝑊4 leads to solipsism, the authors modify the hypothesis that states subjective
consciousness causes the collapse, but there is only one god-like consciousness that
causes it. The problem is 𝑊4 appears to be a straw-man version of Wigner’s friend,
which does not imply solipsism by any means.
Another problem regarding 𝑊4 is the status of “cause”. In order to avoid mis-
understandings concerning this (already controversial) subject, it is crucial to establih
that a statement regarding the “causal power of consciousness” usually means that
consciousness causes the collapse (and hence, the measurement), and not that con-
sciousness is the cause of physical phenomena (e.g., 𝑊4). In this sense, the notion
of causal power of consciousness should be understood as the power of causing a
change of state from indeterminate to determinate.9 Nevertheless, it should be clear
that the measurement apparatus, although not sufficient to cause the collapse, is a
necessary element of the measurement process in the sense that consciousness is
unable to directly perceive the state of the microscopic quantum-mechanical system
without an intermediate apparatus. This is noted by de Barros (2014, §3), who argues
that in order to measure some observable of a quantum system, an experimental setup
that amplifies the signals of the system of interest in so that they can be perceived by
the observer must be produced. Thus, the experimental setup needs to exist, as the
state of the quantum system cannot be produced by consciousness alone.
6.2 ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
“Ontology” is here understood as the study of what there is. Following Quinean
tradition, it is assumed to be possible to study scientific theories in order to extract
the ontological commitments, and therefore discover what there is in the furniture
of the world modulo such theories. That provides a sort of catalogue of the beings
the theory assumes as existing. Applied to CCCH, this approach allows claiming that
consciousness exists. Whatever it is in metaphysical terms, consciousness is causally
efficacious in the quantum measuring process, being introduced in the furniture of the
world by CCCH with certain features such as causal power.
The fact that consciousness exists in CCCH’s ontology is believed to be pacific.
Recall what was discussed in Chapter 4: according to Ruetsche (2015, §3.3), “[w]hat
a realist believes when she believes a theory 𝑇 is an interpretation of 𝑇 , an account of
what the worlds possible according to 𝑇 are like”. Therefore, interpretation would provide
the content of the theory for the realist. Concerning QM, it is well known that pragmatists
do not generally believe that QM needs an interpretation. A theorist inclined to accept
CCCH must embrace consciousness and the role ascribed to it by the interpretation.
This is, however, as far as the theory leads, in philosophical terms. That is, interpretation
9 For a further discussion, see Shimony (1997).
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forces the positing of consciousness; however, the theory alone provides no means to
understand what such consciousness is in metaphysical terms. Thst is a pressing issue.
Is consciousness a fundamental property of all beings? Is it an emergent property, or a
separate one? As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, QM is silent about these questions. One
simply cannot extract a metaphysical profile from an ontological catalogue accounting
for what there is, therefore, if one was to inquire about this, one enters the domain of
metaphysics.
As argued in Chapter 4, the idea that a metaphysical profile is needed in order
to specify the realistic content of a theory completely was called by French (2014,
p.48) the Chakravartty’s challenge. According to the challenge, point to some feature
of a theory (“consciousness with causal powers” for instance) and say “I am realist
about that” is not enough to claim realism about such feature. In order to achieve a
legitimate realism about, say, consciousness, one must specify what it is, and doing so
involves, at least partially, providing a metaphysical characterization of consciousness.
This connects ontology to metaphysical profile. Furthermore, providing such profile may
be enlightening, if one is to know what CCCH amounts to, providing a better grounding
for any kind of attitude towards such interpretation of QM (either accept it, reject it, or
whatever else).
As is often the case, the posits of scientific theories may be “metaphysically
profiled” in many incompatible ways, giving rise to a kind of metaphysical underdetermi-
nation. CCCH is much less liberal with metaphysical profiles allowed to join the theory,
and, in this sense, the ontology of a conscience with causal power requires a mind with
very specific features.
Dualism and metaphysics
Traditionally, CCCH’s consciousness is understood within a substance-dualist
metaphysical profile.10 As mentioned above, von Neumann’s solution to the measure-
ment problem states that the agent causing the collapse is placed beyond the domain of
application of QM, which concerns only the physical (in the sense of material) domain
of reality. Therefore, according to this traditional viewpoint, consciousness acts upon the
material domain, causing the superposition of states to collapse into a non-superposed
state. The quantum system, then, is found to be in a definite state due to such a causal
act of the observer’s consciousness. This is a metaphysical statement regarding the
nature and behavior of this entity that was introduced in CCCH’s catalogue of existing
beings, and, metaphysically, this is a dualist claim.
However, it is important recognizing that to label CCCH “dualist” does not mean
much to the search for the nature of the posited consciousness. There are many forms
of dualism, and the CCCH is not compatible with all of them. This section determines,
10 See Albert (1992, p. 83), Stapp (2011, p. 167), and Stöltzner (2001, pp. 58–59).
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as much as possible, which dualism(s) may fit CCCH’s ontology (so that one may ad-
dress Chakravartty’s challenge). In sequence, a part of the dualist taxonomy presented
by Rodrigues (2014, pp. 201–203) will be sketched, making for a more explicit case
concerning the situation one is getting involved when adhering to CCCH.
Namely one of its weakest formulations, the fundamental dualism will be defined
as property dualism (ROBINSON, 2017), holding that material properties (e.g., mass,
charge, spin, and so on) and mental properties (e.g., consciousness, intentionality,
and qualia) are not reducible in terms of each other. Moreover, matter and mind are
defined as fundamentally being of a different nature. This is dualism at its most basic
characterization, from which other types of dualism can be distinguished evaluating
how they modify this fundamental thesis.
1. Substance dualism: Material and mental properties are different substances, and
the bearer of such substances are also of a different nature;
a) Strong substance dualism: The mental stuff is immaterial, and their proper-
ties are distinct and exist independently of the material stuff;
b) Moderate substance dualism: The mental stuff is immaterial, and their prop-
erties are distinct; their existence depends on the material stuff.
The focus here lies on substance dualism, as dictated by CCCH’s ontology.
Moreover, although the main difference lies between the strong and moderate versions,
dualism’s taxonomy can be further extended as:
1. Pure dualism: Material objects are defined by material properties only;
2. Compound dualism: Material objects are defined by material and mental proper-
ties;
3. Non-spatial dualism: Mental objects are defined by merely temporal properties;
4. Spatial dualism: Mental objects have spatial properties; hence dualism is ex-
tended through space;
5. Theistic dualism: Mental objects and properties are created by God;
6. Naturalistic dualism: Mental objects and properties are integrated into the material
world;
7. Interactionist dualism: Material and mental objects maintain two-way causal rela-
tions;
8. Epiphenomenalism: Material stuff cause mental stuff, but the opposite is not true;
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9. Pre-established harmony : There are no causal relations between the material
and the mental.
According to this dualist spectrum, Cartesian dualism may be classified as a
strong theistic interactionist non-spatial pure dualism (RODRIGUES, 2014, p. 203).
What about CCCH, however? Which metaphysical taxonomy of dualism should apply to
its ontology? As argued in Chapter 4, there are at least two CBI approaches to the mea-
surement problem in QM, but only CCCH’s approach to QM requires a consciousness
with causal powers. Therefore, the fundamental ontological features of consciousness
in CCCH are:
1. Causality : Consciousness must be a causal agent in the quantum measuring
process;
2. Transcendence: The laws of QM that apply to physical systems should not apply
to consciousness;
3. Interaction: There must be an interaction between physical systems and con-
sciousness, as the latter modifies the dynamics of the former.
These three main ontological features of CCCH’s consciousness make evident its
incompatibility with several metaphysical profiles listed above. As currently formulated,
the only metaphysical profiles compatible with CCCH’s ontology are strong versions of
naturalistic and interactionist dualism, all others being discarded by some features of
the ontology.
Take epiphenomenalism, for instance: it does not admit mental causation, thus
being unable to count as an interpretation of CCCH’s consciousness. In essence, it is
incompatible with the ontological output given by the theory. The same holds concerning
any moderate version of dualism: if the very existence of a substance, say, mental, is
dependent of the material, consciousness would not be able to act as a causal agent in
the measuring process of QM. Conversely, the opposite would not be compatible either,
as the mind alone could not create a result of quantum measurement since its causal
power is strictly dependent of the experimental setup in which the quantum system lies.
In this sense, the discussion reached a position to examine some very specific
attempts at determining what consciousness could be (and what it could not) according
to CCCH. Naturally, this does not solve the problem but presents a clearer situation
(even allowing one to formulate the difficulties related to the view clearly). Recall that
Chapter 2 argued that interpretations of QM are new quantum theories. Bearing this in
mind, notice also that, once CCCH is adopted, even if simply as a working hypothesis,
this counts as a quantum theory. From this perspective, it is the theory that discards
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certain metaphysical versions of dualism, providing a sort of epistemic credentials that
metaphysics alone would not.11
6.3 METAPHYSICS DISCARDING DUALISM?
Even though it is possible to classify what CCCH’s consciousness could be in
metaphysical terms with greater precision, dualism remains a very unpalatable idea
for many. Perhaps it could be discarded on other grounds other than empirical? This
section addresses the debate from a metametaphysical perspective, searching for an
evaluation of metaphysical theories in order to verify whether there are good arguments
for excluding at least some forms of dualism compatible with CCCH.
Widen the net
If dualism could not be directly ruled out by physics (DE BARROS; OAS, 2017), it
could perhaps be excluded if the scope was to be expanded to other sciences somehow
dependent on results given by fundamental physical theories, such as neurosciences.
This metametaphysical criterion was recently coined by Benovsky (2016, pp. 82–84)
as “widen the net”: one should not look at isolated areas, but rather evaluate how a
metaphysical theory fits in a broader picture. In this sense, if dualism is compatible with
physics but incompatible with everything produced by neuroscientists so far, widen the
net would be a satisfactory metametaphysical criterion to recommend the abandonment
of such metaphysical theory. However, this not seems to be the case. As demonstrated
by Arshavsky (2006), there would not be a single result in neurosciences incompatible
with dualism (at least so far). In fact, his study shows that much of neuroscientists’ vo-
cabulary is essentially dualist. This metametaphysical criterion, then, would not suffice
when one is looking for a way to discard dualism.
Causation
If dualism is the only metaphysical profile that can be connected to CCCH’s
ontology, it could be argued that despite solving the measurement problem, von Neu-
mann’s proposal also raises philosophically puzzling problems concerning mind-body
causation. In fact, causation is the ground from which traditional challenges to dualism
often occur. Therefore, the fact that the best theories about causation are incompatible
with dualism poses a problem to the interpreter of QM adhering to CCCH. However,
as claimed by Rodrigues (2014, pp. 214–216), most popular theories about causation
(such as counterfactual, covering law, probability raising, primitivist and energy flow
theories of causation) are compatible with at least interactionist versions of dualism –
with which the CCCH is also compatible. Therefore, still according to Rodrigues (2014,
11 See also Arenhart (2012).
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p. 84), “[w]hatever truth about causation is, the best theories we have now don’t rule
out immaterial minds causing bodily changes”.
Causal closure and naturalism
Consider another objection commonly held against CCCH: the violation of the
causal closure of the world. Roughly, the causal closure thesis asserts that every
physical event must have a physical cause, and if that is true, it is violated by the
attribution of causal power to a non-physical entity.12 The argument can be written as:
1. Everything happens according to the laws of physics;
2. There is no mental causality in the laws of physics;
∴ There is no mental causality in the world.
Notice that the second premise is based on naturalism, the thesis which holds
that science is the best guide to metaphysics. If such a premise is correct (and that is
debatable), one may add CCCH with mental causality to the laws of QM, hence denying
this very step. Therefore, causal closure cannot be used to exclude dualism, once such
metaphysical profile is compatible with CCCH.
Uninformativeness
Another common ground of criticisms against dualism is uninformativeness (RO-
DRIGUES, 2014, pp. 203–207). It is often objected that dualism does not adequately
characterize, in metaphysical terms, what the mind-stuff is. As stated by de Barros
(2014, §2), CCCH’s solution seemingly replaces “[. . . ] a mystery by another mystery,
without adding any explanatory power”. It does not explain consciousness in terms of
what it is, but in terms of what it does. In this sense, CCCH is uninformative and hence
should lose its attractiveness to interpreters of QM.
To resist this objection, one might look at opposite metaphysical views. Take
materialism, for example. Does it answers what matter is? Its answer is as functional as
the dualist’s. In QM, other approaches to the measurement problem fail to explain what
the mechanisms of measurement are: what are parallel universes (DEWITT, 1970)?
What is the mechanism responsible for physical collapses (GHIRARDI; RIMINI; WE-
BER, 1986)? The answers, again, Are functional. CCCH is not in a worst situation than
the alternatives.
Rodrigues (2014, p. 222) argues that dualism raises more questions than an-
swers. However, so does QM to what concerns the measurement problem.13 Therefore,
there seem to be no definitive objections to CCCH and its dualist metaphysics.
12 See Auletta and Wang (2014, p. 263).
13 Although some would say that there is a fundamental difference: QM gives confirmed practical results.
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FINAL REMARKS
Dualism suffers from a curious fate. While it seems a rather natural step in
explaining conscious phenomena that will not leave by any empirical means, it is widely
regarded as excessively exoteric in order to account for quantum collapse. In fact, there
are rarely arguments against it; it simply is taken by many to be a non-starter. To worsen
the situation, dualistic understandings of quantum mechanics are responsible for most
of the pseudo-scientific literature on quantum mechanics, making it difficult to provide
a sensible account of the view, free of prejudices.
This chapter attempted to provide clearing of the ground for further serious
work concerning the relation of mind and quantum mechanics on the CCCH. Carefully
articulating the view requires the role of consciousness in QM to be interpreted as a
causal factor responsible for the collapse. In this sense, the ontology associated with
CCCH requires a consciousness with causal powers over matter and a clear distinction
between matter and mind. This, in turn, results in a pricing the kind of approach to
consciousness compatible with CCCH, as well as in a restriction on the scope of
available metaphysical theories. That illustrates a collaborative work between science
and metaphysics, with science providing for a test ground for metaphysical theories, as
explicitly shown in Figure 5.
𝑄𝑀 𝑏𝑎𝑠
Measurement problem
𝑄𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑄𝑀𝑏𝑟𝑎
CCCH CRCH
Dualism Physicalism
Theistic Interationist
NO NO
CBI
M
athem
atics
P
hysics
O
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M
etaphysics
YES
M
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etaphysics
Figure 5 – QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and CCCH.
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Furthermore, this chapter argued that, given that metaphysics plays a crucial
role in dressing the posited consciousness with some important features, purely meta-
physical arguments are also – at least so far – unable to rule CCCH as implausible.
Therefore, CCCH could be better understood if current forms of dualism compatible
with it could be articulated more clearly, so that existing metaphysical theories could be
employed to clarify the role of consciousness in CCCH somehow. This is a demanding
task, left for future works.
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7 CASE 2: COLLAPSE AND PHENOMENOLOGY
As presented in Chapter 5, currently, the matters concerning the choice of an
interpretation of QM are not strictly objective. Suppose, then, one chooses one of the
interpretations presented in Chapter 2 as a working hypothesis. In favor of advancing
the discussion, let QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 be the chosen interpretation.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 argue that the ontological aspect to be extracted from QM𝑐𝑜𝑙
is that consciousness exists; and it is somehow related to the process of collapse. It
must, then, somehow exist in the catalogue of the world modulo QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. Such ontological
aspect of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, as presented in Chapter 4, is CBI.
However, even if CBI is chosen as a working hypothesis, how to interpret it
in metaphysical terms is still unknown, as different metaphysical profiles can be as-
sociated with the concept of “consciousness”. For example, as argued in Chapter 6
Chakravartty’s Challenge can be met by understanding the ontological commitment to
“consciousness” through metaphysical profiles according to which CCCH, such as spe-
cific forms of dualism. This chapter analyzes a different possibility: attempting to fulfill
Chakravartty’s Challenge by attaching CBI’s ontology to a metaphysical profile in which
consciousness does not cause the collapse, but recognizes it. This is, in summary,
London and Bauer’s (1983) proposal of a theory of quantum measurement, labeled
CRCH in Chapter 4.
As French (2002) demonstrated, CCCH is the received view of CBI. The criti-
cism found in the lteratura concerning CBI, however, also classifies London and Bauer’s
(1983) CRCH within CCCH’s metaphysical scope. This is a common mistake. Despite
London and Bauer’s efforts indicate a phenomenological view of their quantum mea-
surement theory, literature interpreted it as a natural continuation of CCCH.1
With conflations between CCCH and CRCH left aside, the discussion returns to
the underdetermination issue. Since CBI is compatible with more than one metaphysi-
cal profile (CCCH and CRCH), this proposal argues that it is subject to the problem of
metaphysical underdetermination, even though they are developed upon the common
hypothesis that consciousness has a role in the measurement process. Both metaphys-
ical options are equally compatible with QM𝑐𝑜𝑙’s CBI, but the metametaphysical method
proposed by this thesis, the Unavailable Metaphysical Stories, would be of no help in
objectively deciding between CCCH and CRCH. There is, however, still a point to be
considered.
Suppose CRCH is selected as a working hypothesis: it is still unknown how it
should be interpreted in (even further ) metaphysical terms. This chapter presents a
case study on the metaphysical profiles (or phenomenological profiles)2 of CRCH.
A milestone of the CRCH metaphysical profile is set by French’s (2002) paper,
1 See French (2002) for this detailed characterization and references therein.
2 In this chapter, we use both terms interchangeably.
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whose account demonstrates that the CBI proposed by London and Bauer (1983)
should be metaphysically understood within a phenomenological framework, and, as
such, radically different from CCCH. There seem to be at least two metaphysically
incompatible phenomenological profiles to CRCH, the eidetic and the transcendental. If
thas is, indeed, the case, CRCH raises the problem of not determining its metaphysics.
This discussion argues that French (2002) combines both approaches. An argument
in favor of the eidetic approach is also presented, making use of the Unavailable Meta-
physical Stories as presented in Chapter 5.
For that purpose, the chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews
how CBI responds to the measurement problem in QM. The second session analyzes
CRCH in more detail, emphasizing the two metaphysical possibilities for its interpre-
tation in metaphysical terms. Lastly, the third session, offers an assessment of phe-
nomenological interpretations of CRCH, evaluating their effectiveness in deciphering
the formalism of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. The chapter concludes by stating that the eidetic approach
is compatible with the formalism of London and Bauer, whereas the transcendental
approach is not. Thus, the most viable way to metaphysically interpret the CRCH is,
among these choices, through the lens of an eidetic phenomenological metaphysics.
Such efforts allowed the understanding of the available options for interpreting QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 in
the case of CRCH in (further) metaphysical terms.
7.1 CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEASUREMENT
The framework of quantum measurement proposed by von Neumann (1955)
utilizes two distinct dynamical laws of movement, as presented in Chapter 6. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, the usage of two apparently incompatible dynamic laws, however,
originates the measurement problem, briefly defined as their problematic conjunction.3
Remarkably, von Neumann’s approach to the measurement problem is QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, and its
ontological counterpart is CCCH, which, argued in Chapter 6, considers both dynamics
(𝒜col 4 and 𝒜col 5) to operate within different ontological domains of reality, one material
and other mental, thus, replacing the solution of the measurement problem with the
solution of the mind-body problem. Similarly, London and Bauer (1983) advance the
rationale in von Neumann’s framework of quantum measurement, stating that the tran-
sition from one (linear) dynamics from another (non-linear) – i.e., the collapse – can
only occur due the interaction with the conscious mind of a human observer.
This ontological aspect of QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 is labeled here as CBI. CCCH became the re-
ceived view about the concept of “consciousness” related to CBI. This discussion states
that CBI is not a unitary interpretation of QM, but a basis for a family of interpretations
(SHIMONY; MALIN, 2006) which is a set of interpretations that share the common
3 Again, this is the reason why QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 needs to be interpreted.
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hypothesis regarding the measuring process. Jammer (1974, §11.2–11.4) labeled the
received view as the “subjectivistic interpretations” of QM.
However, in contrast to CCCH, London and Bauer (1983) assumed contrasting
assumptions regarding the ontological status of each dynamic law. This fact originates a
divergence of metaphysical interpretations within the CBI: a causal one, due to Wigner
(1983) and the received view on CBI, and a phenomenological, originated by London
and Bauer (1983), in which consciousness does not cause the collapse, but recognizes
in the meaning-attribution process within phenomenological tradition.
The present section briefly outlines CCCH and CRCH approaches to quantum
measurement theory, emphasizing their metaphysical differences. As French (2002)
argues, the critiques presented by these authors towards CBI only affects he received
view of CBI – i.e., CCCH. In essence, these critiques miss the point when one interprets
CRCH through a phenomenological (rather than dualist/subjetivistic) approach. This
issue is dealt with in the next sessions.
The measurement problem
It was mentioned that von Neumann’s framework considers two different dynamic
laws for quantum systems. First let the discussion address the dynamics that account
for undisturbed systems, named “process 2”, or “process of the second kind”. Since the
underlying formalism was already sketched in Chapter 2, there is no need to dwell on
these topics, so considerations in this regard will be kept brief.
Consider, for simplicity, an observable 𝑂 to be measured in a Hilbert space
ℋ as a Hermitian operator ?ˆ? whose state, before measurement, is |𝜓⟩ = ∑︀𝑛𝑖 𝑎𝑖|𝜓𝑖⟩.
When left undisturbed, this system’s states will evolve deterministically according to the
Shrödinger equation (see item 10). Recall that according to QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 the evolution in time
of undisturbed quantum systems is ruled by linearity, which implies that if |𝜓1⟩ evolves
to |𝜓′1⟩ and |𝜓2⟩ evolves to |𝜓′2⟩, then 𝑎|𝜓1⟩+ 𝑏|𝜓2⟩ evolves to
𝑎|𝜓′1⟩+ 𝑏|𝜓′2⟩. (15)
However, recall also that the vector sum in item 2 is not a measurement outcome,
as it is not an eigenvector of the observable in question. In the same vein, should QM
hold true for all physical systems, there seem to be no reasons to preclude that any
macroscopic measurement apparatus is treatable within QM. Therefore, the situation of
a measurement apparatus 𝐴 interacting with a quantum system 𝑆 should be describable
by linearity, meaning the macroscopic measurement apparatus is describable by a
Hilbert subspace ℋ𝐴, and its interaction with a quantum system is described by a ℋ
factorized into “system” and “apparatus” subsystems with Hilbert spaces ℋ𝑆 and ℋ𝐴
respectively, so that: ℋ = ℋ𝑆 ⊗ℋ𝐴.
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If this is the case, it is hard to understand how a measurement apparatus plays a
causal role in the measurement process. That is, it is difficult to grasp how it produces,
alone, a single-term measurement outcome since its states |𝜙⟩ will become entangled4
with the states of the operator 𝑆 in the interaction, so that the formalism describing the
composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴 in a given 𝑡𝑥>0 is as follows:
|𝜓⟩ =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖
𝑎𝑖
(︁
|𝜓𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩
)︁
(16)
This is the most relevant issue for the present discussion concerning von Neu-
mann’s measurement theory: it is committed to an infinite regression of measurement
apparatuses. That is, any attempt to reduce the superposition of this composite system
by utilizing further measurement apparatuses results in further superpositions. Con-
sider the case of adding the image registered in an observer’s eye being represented
by |𝜙′𝑖⟩, its optical nerve being represented by |𝜙′′𝑖 ⟩, its brain by |𝜙′′′𝑖 ⟩, and so on infinitely.
The case will then be described by:
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑎𝑖
(︁
|𝜓𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙′𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙′′𝑖 ⟩ ⊗ · · · ⊗ |𝜙𝑛𝑖 ⟩
)︁
(17)
No eigenvector of the observable (which characterizes the very idea of measure-
ment) is obtained in this process. This is, as labeled by d’ Espagnat (1999, p. 169),
“von Neumann’s chain”. Due to that effect, the number of measurement apparatus one
might introduce as an attempt to reduce the superposition of the composite system is
unimportant, as if the system is described by unitary dynamic laws, it will always be
described by a superposition (even though, awkwardly, a superpositon is never actually
seen).
Due to von Neumann’s (1955) framework, a new dynamic law is introduced
via a postulate to deal with measurement outcomes. The collapse postulate (𝒜col 5) is
introduced to reduce the infinite superposition of measurement apparatus stated above.
This is precisely what “process 1” (or “process of the first kind”) does: it collapses the
deterministic evolution of the composite system into a new state which is one of the
states contained in the superposition:
𝑛∑︁
𝑖
𝑎𝑖
(︁
|𝜓𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩
)︁
−→
(︁
|𝜓𝜆⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝜆⟩
)︁
𝜆∈𝑖
(18)
4 Even though von Neumann did not mention the term “entanglement” (since the term was coined by
Schrödinger in 1935, and von Neumann’s seminal book dates from 1932), it is clearly an entanglement
situation as both subsystems ℋ𝑆 and ℋ𝐴, and not simply the values of observables within the same
system are correlated.
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As we mentioned earlier, the attempts to reconcile these two dynamics is one
way to obtain the “measurement problem”.
The phenomenological response
Examine, now, London and Bauer’s (1983, pp. 251–252) account of the pro-
cess of quantum measurement, which further develops the rationale presented by
von Neumann (1955) by defining “measurement” as an act with epistemic charge: “[a]
measurement is achieved only when the position of the pointer has been observed. It
is precisely this increase of knowledge, acquired by observation [. . . ]”. The referred
“knowledge” would be responsible for the choice of one among several other possible
states within a superposition, as presented in Equation (16).
Then, the composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴 should then be treated with the addition of
the consciousness of the observer 𝐶 in a Hilbert space ℋ𝐶 as a self-adjoint operator 𝐶.
Let {|𝜒𝑛⟩} be the eigenvectors of its observables, which possible values (e.g., a definite
state of mind at a time 𝑡) are given by the sum of all possible states of |𝜒⟩. The state of
this new composite system 𝑆 + 𝐴 + 𝐶, represented by the vector |𝜓⟩, is described in a
subspace ℋ𝑆 ⊗ℋ𝐴 ⊗ℋ𝐶 as follows.
|𝜓⟩ =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖
𝑎𝑖
(︁
|𝜓𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜒𝑖⟩
)︁
−→
(︁
|𝜓𝜆⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝜆⟩ ⊗ |𝜒𝜆⟩
)︁
𝜆∈𝑖
(19)
As acknowledged by London and Bauer (1983, p. 251), from an objective point
of view, the addition of 𝐶 to the composite system does not seem to solve the problem
in comparison with von Neumann’s chain, as expressed in Equation (16). The state of
the system’s objective components remains indeterminate. The subjective component,
however, by presenting a so-called “faculty of introspection” (that is, a subjectivity that
distinguishes the kind of states of 𝐶 from the objective states of 𝑆 and 𝐴), has the ability
to recognize its own states at any time in virtue of some kind of “immanent knowledge”.
This “knowledge” enables the creation of the system’s own objectivity, thus breaking
the chain of superpositions by simply stating “I am in the state |𝜒𝜆⟩” or “I perceive the
pointer in |𝜙𝜆⟩” or even “𝑆 = |𝜓𝜆⟩”. Therefore, the transition depicted in Equation (18)
occurs due to a property of 𝐶 that is not shared by the other – objective – parts of the
system, e.g., subjectivity.
This feature presents a significant difference between the metaphysics associ-
ated with CCCH and London and Bauer’s CRCH use of the notion of “consciousness”
in the role of quantum measurement. The former is compatible with some kind of du-
alist metaphysical profile, which places the role of the observer outside the domain of
physics, suggesting that it needs to be a different substance, other than the material,
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in a substance-dualist fashion. The latter is compatible with a different kind of meta-
physical profile, where mental and material systems occur and interact in the same
ontological level (see Shimony (1963)). As a formal counterpart, in London and Bauer’s
formalism treats the consciousness of the observer is treated as another Hilbert space
ℋ that interacts with the “objective” parts.
The ontology of CBI is shared by both CCCH and CRCH: consciousness ap-
pears as an item of the catalogue of the world modulo QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. Notice, however, that the
metaphysical profiles that we can be connected to this ontology are different for CCCH
and CRCH. London and Bauer’s CRCH dictates, through the formalism, that conscious-
ness, the macroscopic measurement apparatus, and the microscopic quantum system
must be in the same level of existence. Applying our Unavailable Metaphysical Stories,
it follows that CRCH precludes a dualist metaphysical profile in order to interpret its
concept of consciousness. Similarly, as argued in Chapter 6, von Neumann’s theory
of quantum measurement precludes a phenomenological metaphysical profile, since
CCCH dictates that the existence of a non-physical causal agent must be ontologically
separated from the measurement apparatus and the quantum system, in a distinct
realm of existence.
It should be mentioned that it was London and Bauer (1983, p. 259) them-
selves who acknowledged the phenomenological compatibility of their interpretation,
specifically the one regarding Husserl – a point also stressed by London’s biographer,
Gavroglu (2005). Advancing the debate, French (2002) argues that the concepts in-
volved in London and Bauer’s proposal suggest that these should be understood in
terms of the metaphysical profile given by Husserl’s phenomenological project.
Let us press this point again. If London and Bauer’s CRCH is to be understood
within a (general) phenomenological profile, then consciousness should not be regarded
as the cause of the collapse, but rather as a relational act between the objective parts
and the so-called “immanent knowledge”, which can undoubtedly separate itself from
the superposition and continuously track its own.
Phenomenologically interpreted as a relational act, consciousness would,
through collapse, set a new objectivity by stating specific properties of the whole com-
posite system. Consciousness, then, would act in recognizing the collapse rather than
causing it. Hence, CRCH.
In this sense, concerning the phenomenological profile, the objectivity is not
given a priori, neither resides in some subjectivity that is separated from the whole
process of measurement. Instead, objectivity is constituted by a creative act of obser-
vation in which the observer separates itself from the observed object. According to
this approach, a superposition such as Equation (19) correctly describes the situation
externally. However, only consciousness that would be able to describe it internally
through the separation of its “I” from the composite system, becoming able to choose
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one component of the superposition among many others, as described by the formalism
of QM.5 It is worth mentioning that this act constitutes a new objectivity. Due to this fact,
further reference to the internal aspects in judging it can be avoided.
7.2 PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERDETERMINATION
Phenomenology, as it is known, is a philosophical investigation demarcated
by the so-called “method of phenomenological reduction”, which is divided into two
main groups: one concerning intentional objects called “eidetic reduction”, and other,
more radical position, concerning ego or pure consciousness, called “transcendental
reduction”. If French’s (2002) account is to be considered, the two distinct metaphysical
profiles for CRCH are conflated. This work argues in favor of this distinction, which rises
a problem: CRCH, then, seems to be metaphysically underdetermined by both methods
of phenomenological reduction. By applying the method of Unavailable Metaphysical
Stories, we claim that only one of these phenomenological profiles remains an available
option to attach a metaphysical profile to CRCH. These issues are dealt with hereafter.
Two methods of phenomenological reduction
According to Husserl (1964, pp. 18–19), phenomenology is a descriptive science
concerning phenomena.6 The primary function of phenomenology is to explain how
phenomena are constituted and how are they possible. Phenomenology does not con-
cern the discovery or passive receipt of information about the world; instead, it is about
constituting meaning to it. In this sense, phenomenology does not inquire about after
or before the phenomena. Likewise, it is not a matter of interacting with a passive and
hidden world that hopes to be discovered, as it is sometimes presupposed in dualism.
Unlike the dualist profile, phenomenology considers subject and object to be poles
of the same process of meaningfulness. In the phenomenological profile, then, there
is no real difference between observer and observed. In this sense, a measurement
outcome is not to be considered previously available, waiting to be discovered by a
neutral observer. There are several phenomenological profiles with a singular feature
common to all: there is no external (transcendent) reality, and there is no internal reality
(immanent); the reality is what appears for us at any given moment (HUSSERL, 1964,
§6). All that can be reached is the actual phenomenon in each observation.
These ideas do not differ highly from the dualist view concerning measurement.
In the phenomenological profile, however, there is no ontological difference between
5 As such, CRCH avoids the standard criticisms directed CCCH, such as the paradox of Wigner’s friend,
as presented in Chapter 6 – see also Wigner (1983), Shimony (1963) and Jammer (1974). This is so
since in the CRCH there is no such thing as a mental process acting as causal agent in the reduction
of superpositions in CRCH.
6 See also Husserl (1982, §65–66).
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observer and observed: there is simply observation in order to obtain meaning. So
dualism turns out to be an incompatible metaphysical profile for CRCH’s consciousness.
Differently from dualism, the phenomenological profile allows the existence of a meta-
physical explanation of London and Bauer’s measurement process, without the need of
indicating different ontological levels for each term in Equation (19). So, the formalism
for quantum measurement in Equation (19), as presented by London and Bauer (1983),
seems to require an interpretation within a phenomenological metaphysical framework
instead of a dualist one. As previously stated, this was demonstrated by French (2002).
However, where the author identifies a unique option within this general phenomeno-
logical profile, this work argues that there are at least two options while agreeing with
his main point: until now, the phenomenological profile seems to be the better option
to interpret London and Bauer’s account for quantum measurement in metaphysical
terms.
However, we disagree with his view about how Husserlian phenomenology works
in this explanation. Here is the reason: there are two main metaphysically distinct paths
within the phenomenological profile. The first is the eidetic reduction, which deals with
intentional objects and the domains where such objects are disposed. The second
one is the transcendental reduction, which deals with the transcendental ego, where
there is no interest in intentional acts and objects. This is precisely where metaphysical
underdetermination fits: between the eidetic and the transcendental reduction within
CRCH’s phenomenological profile.
The eidetic reduction is a method by which one moves from the consciousness
of individual and concrete objects to the domain of pure essences, thus achieving
an intuition of the essence of a thing, i.e., of what it is in its invariable and essential
structure, apart from all that is contingent to it. These essences are the principle or
necessary structure of the thing. As a science of essences, phenomenology finds this
reduction necessary for its methodology. Apparently, in London and Bauer’s case, the
eidetic method arise as the best philosophical interpretation in order to understand its
philosophical approach to the quantum measurement process.
Conversely, the transcendental approach in phenomenology considers only pure
consciousness, and eidetic reduction is seen as an intermediary method. The use of the
transcendental approach to interpreting London and Bauer’s proposal is unreasonable,
as it does not concern object and subjects, such elements which were previously
presupposed, and are now dismissed in the transcendental reduction.
According to London and Bauer’s proposal, the quantum object (i.e., the inten-
tional object) is considered to be an intentional correlate of the subject, which is not the
point when working with the transcendental reduction. Unlike French’s (2002) approach,
which considers the transcendental method, the position defended here takes London
and Bauer’s (1983) approach to be compatible with the eidetic reduction but not with
Chapter 7. Case 2: Collapse and phenomenology 119
the transcendental reduction.
When French (2002) assumes the complete Husserlian project (both eidetic and
transcendental) as a background for London and Bauer’s proposal, we believe that
he makes a mistake. Inevitably the Husserlian project reaches far beyond London and
Bauer’s conceptual needs. In most cases, Husserl does not deal directly with intentional
objects directly, which is a key characteristic of London and Bauer’s formalism. In
particular, the transcendental reduction presupposed by French (2002) is useless in
London and Bauer’s case, since, according to the transcendental profile of CRCH,
talking about intentional objects (as the quantum system and the measuring apparatus)
carries no meaning whatsoever.
A dangerous conflation
French’s (2002) paper was seminal for the debate between the dualist and the
phenomenological profiles. However, we argue that there is a misconception in his
final position about how to interprets London and Bauer’s proposal, as he conflates
both the eidetic and the transcendental reduction within Husserl’s whole phenomeno-
logical project. This becomes clear when the author interprets London and Bauer’s
formalism as including different stages of Husserl’s philosophy, including eidetic and
transcendental reduction:
Such an account is useful in the present context since it enables us to situate
London’s dissertation, for example, in the Husserlian first stage, whereas, as
we shall see, the considerations of consciousness and objectivity that we find
in the monograph with Bauer span the second and third stages. (FRENCH,
2002, p. 484).
Apparently, French is correct when utilizing eidetic reduction in order to interpret
CRCH, referencing to the ego-object structure as in the following passage:
Note, first of all, that at the beginning of this characterization, the observer is
not set outside of the domain of quantum mechanics. She too is represented by
a wave function within the superposition. But she, as an “I” or ego, possessing
this characteristic faculty of introspection, has “immanent knowledge” – that
is, absolute and indubitable knowledge – of her own state by virtue of which
she can, on the one hand (namely that of the ego), separate herself from the
superposition and, on the other (namely that of the object in question), create
or set up [. . . ] a “new objectivity”. This separation should not be thought of
in terms of consciousness “causing”, in whatever sense, the wave function
to collapse, but rather in Husserlian terms, as that of a mutual separation of
both an Ego-pole and an object-pole through a characteristic act of reflection.
(FRENCH, 2002, p. 484).
It is difficult to understand how London and Bauer’s proposal connect to the last
stages of Husserl’s philosophy. As previously argued, this connection is not possible
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because as it is not compatible with the scheme object-apparatus-subject presupposed
in London and Bauer’s formalism. However, French employs the concept of pure con-
sciousness (or pure ego), which is a concept of the transcendental phenomenological
reduction, utilizing all of Husserl’s philosophy, as it is possible to observe in the following
passage:
Hence, the perception of something immanent is indubitable, in the sense that
there can be no failure of reference. This is not so for something transcendent,
of course. This then leads to a further difference between the physical and
mental, that bears on the apparent retention of the pure ego: the positing of
things in the world is always a contingent positing, but the positing of my “pure
ego”, as – crucially – the subject of mental acts, is necessary and absolute
[. . . ]. (FRENCH, 2002, p. 480).
Although French (2002) stated that the phenomenological profile is the best
way to understand London and Bauer’s formalism in metaphysical terms, he eventually
commits himself to a much broader philosophical position, making use of the eidetic
and the transcendental reduction in order to explain how London and Bauer’s proposal
works. In CRCH, as shown by Equation (19), the quantum object, the measurement
apparatus and the observer are included in the same mathematical level. However, in
some sense, the observer has a privileged status in the measurement process (i.e., the
observer is capable of reducing superpositions and stopping the chain effect).
Therefore, how can the observer to be on the same mathematical level, but on
a different ontological level? For the CCCH, this is not a real problem: it is just the way
it is! However, for the CRCH, it is possible that the observer and the observed can be
in the same ontological level, since, according to phenomenology, when there are an
observation and an observer, they are always codependents. It is possible to argue that
there is no observer without something which is observed, and there is no observed
without an observer. If there is some object of our actual knowledge it is present for us
in some kind of relation. For instance, when looking at the Sun, there is the intentional
act of seeing something, and there is the intentional object which is presented in each
relation. Seeing, perceiving, thinking about an object is always a new way to perceive
such an object, but the object cannot possibly be a source of meaning without being
part of that relation.
This is why London and Bauer (1983) chose the phenomenology as a metaphys-
ical profile to explain their formalism and their ontology. Let us focus in this point. In
phenomenology, the “same” object can be part of different kinds of relations. A change
in the relation implies a new meaning for this object. Therefore, one can observe a
mountain and perceive something beautiful or sad, or have an impression about the
past or future; one can hate or love that place. The object itself is the same in all in-
stances, but the kind of meaning (or information) is always different in each of them.
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The same applies to the process of measurement in QM: it is possible to obtain different
kinds of information in each measurement – the type of observation simply needs to be
modified. The object is the same, but the information provided by it is always different.
However, when French (2002) accepts the whole phenomenological project,
including transcendental reduction, a problematic conflation between two distinct meth-
ods of phenomenological reduction – which, as argued in previous discussions, is very
problematic in the specific case of interpreting CRCH. The next section demonstrates
how the phenomenological profile for CRCH can be better understood through the
eidetic reduction.
7.3 NEGATIVE METAMETAPHYSICS
The goal is to reduce the number of options which form (a state of) metaphysical
underdetermination concerning both the eidetic and the transcendental phenomeno-
logical profiles to CRCH. This problem is engaged here in a further analysis of the
formalism presented by London and Bauer (1983, pp. 251–252).
There are in fact historical reasons to believe that London and Bauer (1983) con-
sidered only the eidetic approach, specifically if one considers the philosophical roots
of London. Jammer (1974, pp. 482–483) stated that London became deeply interested
in philosophy in the 1920’s, having earned his PhD degree for a thesis in philosophy
studying phenomenology under a Husserl’s follower, Pfänder. The main point among
the historical reasons to support this thesis’ argument is precisely London’s relation with
Pfänder. Like many others disciples, Pfänder was a controversial follower of Husserl’s
ideas, defending that only the eidetic approach was a viable path in phenomenology as
the investigations about the ego were some kind of idealist turn inside the Husserlian
project. Moreover, still as stated by Jammer (1974, pp. 482–483), Pfänder and London
were also influenced by Lipps, who was also was very critical concerning the idealist
turn in phenomenology. Gavroglu (2005, p. 179), however, states that at the time of
the discussions between London and Pfänder took place, Pfänder (2009) had already
published his critique on philosophical psychologism, such as that proposed by Lipps.
Nevertheless, Pfänder (2009) endorses the eidetic phenomenological profile.
Therefore, it is improbable that London, who, according to Jammer (1974, p. 483) and
Gavroglu (2005), primarily wrote the philosophy part of their monograph, could possibly
endorse a transcendental reduction within the phenomenological profile. London could
be referring to a specific kind of phenomenological profile, namely the eidetic one.
However, from London and Bauer’s monograph, only the phenomenological insight
can be defined, albeit not specifically. Thus, this thesis cannot be ground solely in this
historical argument.
The next subsection, then, justifies the position adopted here by comparing both
phenomenological profiles and identifying which is more compatible with the formalism
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presented by London and Bauer (1983). In some sense, even if London and Bauer
stated that their position was the one exposed by French (2002), the defense of an
eidetic approach presented in this thesis is much more coherent with their formalism,
precisely with relation to Equation (19).
A coup de grâce through the formalism
There is a natural relationship between the transcendental ego and other inten-
tional structures. There is no point, however, in resorting to transcendental reduction
in order to interpret the formalism of quantum measurement put forth by London and
Bauer (1983), as such method of phenomenological reduction cannot make any clarifi-
cation over their formalism. This becomes clearer when considering that London and
Bauer presuppose at least three instances in its formalism: the object, the apparatus
and the consciousness of observer. This assumption matches the eidetic reduction
perfectly, which examines the intentional structures that enable the formation of phe-
nomena. Eidetic reduction examines the intentional acts and their intentional correlates
(intentional objects). In contrast, the transcendental reduction casts those structures
aside, by a demand of the method itself. For this reason, CRCH’s formalism becomes
meaningless to the transcendental reduction.
The whole endeavor conducted by London and Bauer (1983) had two main
objectives. First, to explain when a measurement is made without falling into the reductio
ad infinitum of von Neumann’s chain, as in Equation (17). Second, to explain how
consciousness operates in the measurement process without committing oneself with to
the problems of dualism. There is indeed no metaphysical underdetermination problem
in this case, for the transcendental phenomenological reduction is not really compatible
with the formalism presented by London and Bauer (1983). Take, for instance, London
and Bauer’s description for a quantum superposition, as in Equation (19). Then, rewrite
it utilizing the concepts of the eidetic phenomenological profile to CRCH, as presented
by Equation (20):
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑎𝑖
(︁
|𝜓𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝜙𝑖⟩⏟  ⏞  
intentional objects
⊗
intentional act⏞ ⏟ 
|𝜒𝑖⟩
)︁
(20)
This notation aligns well with the eidetic approach as it considers intentional
objects and intentional acts. Consciousness (|𝜒𝑖⟩) as an intentional act states its own
the contents as well as the content of the intentional objects. Notice that this distinc-
tion between intentional acts and intentional objects only makes sense in the eidetic
phenomenological reduction. Conversely, in the transcendental phenomenological re-
duction, such division would not be possible. Thus, the transcendental approach to
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London and Bauer’s CRCH does not seem to be possible. If that is the case, as argued
in the previous section, French’s (2002) conflation of the eidetic and transcendental
phenomenological reduction is indeed misleading due to the concepts involved in the
transcendental reduction.
Schematically, this thesis’ criticism towards the transcendental approach to the
phenomenological CRCH is as follows:
∙ The transcendental reduction does not concern an intentional act and its corre-
lates; it concerns the reduction of the natural ego in order to describe the pure
ego. The pure ego, or absolute consciousness, is empty. As Husserl states:
As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely
simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and
in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.
(HUSSERL, 1989, §24).
∙ As such, the transcendental reduction does not consider mathematical construc-
tions, since such constructions are taken to be simply abstractions over pre-
scientific experiences of the world. Different from other stages of Husserl’s philos-
ophy, in the transcendental reduction there is no interest in ideal objects, such as
mathematical objects like those presupposed by London and Bauer;
∙ The transcendental reduction is a radical position inside the Husserlian phe-
nomenological project, which is considered, even for his most known followers,
as impracticable.7 Without a reference to a more concrete conceptual apparatus,
several philosophers discredit a productive use for the transcendental reduction,
which is directed for the investigations about the pure ego;
∙ The transcendental approach does not deal with mathematical constructions
as London and Bauer’s formalism. Conversely, the eidetic approach considers
such constructions in the object-subject schema by labelling mathematical ob-
jects as intentional objects. Therefore, between these two (apparently) available
phenomenological profiles to CRCH, the eidetic phenomenological profiles, the
eidetic profile is the only viable option to interpret London and Bauer’s formalism.
This occurs since the thesis regarding the transcendental ego represents a
return to idealism (HUSSERL, 1970, §65–67), giving special attention to the pure ego,
an instance without reference to intentional structures as intentional acts and objects.
When French (2002) employs such a radical instance of Husserl’s phenomenology, he
7 As an example, Heidegger (1996, p. 210, §219) was one of the leading opponents of Husserl’s late
work on the transcendental reduction, emphasizing that “[t]he idea of a ‘pure ego’ and a ‘conscious-
ness in general’ are so far from including the a priori character of a ‘real’ subjectivity [. . . ]”.
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eventually abandons the explicit correlation between London and Bauer’s formalism
and the intentional structures presupposed by the eidetic reduction. Thus, it seems that
eidetic reduction is the only compatible metaphysical profile to interpret CRCH, as the
transcendental reduction does not deal with quantum objects, and quantum objects do
appear in London and Bauer’s formalism, as shown in Equation (19).
Therefore, the transcendental reduction is not a phenomenological profile that is
compatible with the author’s interpretation of QM. There is no obvious way in which the
formalism in Equation (20) can be understood in a transcendental phenomenological
profile to CRCH: thus, it was never really an option to interpret it as ipso facto. Hence, if
the CRCH poses a meaningful option to interpret QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 metaphysically (as it apparently
does) since until now the only way to understand it further in metaphysical terms is
through the eidetic phenomenological profile, thereore there is one less metaphysical
option in this case.
7.4 FINAL REMARKS
The matters of interpreting QM is far from obvious, and also far from concluded
in the sense of a settlement of a unitary, single scientific image of the world modulo QM.
Nevertheless, with the application of Unavailable Metaphysical Stories, it was argued
that philosophy might indeed help to understand the available options for interpreting
QM, in the sense that it could offer criteria for “discarding” some alternatives for the
interpretation of QM.
This chapter presented a distinction between two alternatives metaphysical pro-
files for CRCH and offered motivations for the rejection of one of them, as it does not
conform to the formalism of CRCH. Thus, it was evidenced that:
∙ Dualism is an incompatible metaphysical profile to interpret CRCH;
∙ Phenomenology is an incompatible metaphysical profile to interpret CCCH;
∙ Transcendental reduction is an incompatible metaphysical profile to interpret the
phenomenological profile to CRCH.
Therefore, eidetic reduction remains as the only available option so far, as expli-
cated by Figure 6.
This chapter concludes the inquiry concerning QM𝑐𝑜𝑙. Therefore, as sketched in
Chapter 5, the discussion shall evolve to the analysis of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
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𝑄𝑀 𝑏𝑎𝑠
Measurement problem
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Figure 6 – QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and CRCH.
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8 CASE 3: MANY WORLDS
“Never put forward a
philosophical theory that you
yourself cannot believe in your
least philosophical and most
commonsensical moments.”
DAVID K. LEWIS
On the Plurality of Worlds
Almost every chapter of this thesis begins by stating the obvious: quantum me-
chanics works. And, yes. It does. It seems there is a natural attitude towards such
empirical success that suffices our naturalist and realist expectations. However, why
doesn’t QM provide an explanation of how the world is? The short answer for it is un-
derdetermination. That is, there are many available accounts of “what the world is like”
that shows compatibility with QM.
Let us recall the lessons learned so far. As stated in Chapter 2, there is no such
thing as a unitary view that can be called “QM”. Chapter 5 argued many ontologies can
be read off the many available quantum theories, and that several metaphysical profiles
can be connected to them, allowing for an explanation of what are those things that
ontology states that there are. One way to do it is to employ French’s Viking approach
to metaphysics: searching in the history of philosophy for what sort of metaphysical
profiles philosophers developed, and choose some of the theories to attach to scientific
theories’ ontologies, since, as argued in Chapter 4, a scientific-realist stance for QM
must inform its metaphysical profiles; otherwise the realism lacks content.
According to the discussion developed in Chapter 5, the decisions concerning
theory choice in physics and ontology are not strictly objective. Therefore, one can
follow the voluntarism put forth by Chakravartty (2017a, p. 215) and pick a theory to the
customer’s choice. The work developed in this thesis closely examines the ontological
constraints of the theories to assess which metaphysical profiles cannot be bound to dif-
ferent theories, by applying the Unavailable Metaphysical Stories in a metametaphysical
evaluation.
So, until now, the discussion engaged underdetermination. There was always
more than one option for understanding quantum phenomena, both theoretically, onto-
logically and metaphysically. A remarkable point concerning QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 was that all these
three levels of description presented available options.
This chapter analyzes the ontological outcomes of QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 found in Chapter 4
and applies the methodology presented in Chapter 5 in order to (𝑖) attest whether
some metaphysical profile can be found (in the Viking’s way) and (𝑖𝑖) evaluate the
available options to narrow metaphysical options. Therefore, from this point onward, the
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discussion addresses one ofQM𝑏𝑟𝑎’s ontological counterparts, which is MWI. Narrowing
the number of options is important for numerous reasons, the most important one,
perhaps, allowing for the proper handling of humility.1
So far, there seemed to be many options. We will see, in this chapter, that the
whole thing seems to be going in another direction: perhaps there are no metaphysical
profiles available to interpret the entities postulated by scientific theories. This chapter
deals exclusively with MWI, but in the end, we will see that the argument can be
generalized to other interpretations of QM.
The absence of metaphysical profiles is a major obstacle to meeting
Chakravartty’s Challenge. Such a problem is here called “null-determination”, present-
ing difficulties for both realistic and naturalistic expectations.
Let us see why.
8.1 NATURALISTS’ EXPECTATIONS
The naturalist project must be considered if the expectation of extracting a world
view from QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 is nurtured. As Wallace (2012, pp. 3–4) nicely states, naturalism is
“[. . . ] the thesis that we have no better guide to metaphysics than the successful practice
of science”.
One part of the project consists of criticizing so-called “traditional” metaphysics.
Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. vii) open their famous book by criticizing contemporary
analytic metaphysics, considering it a failure “[. . . ] to qualify as part of the enlightened
pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued”. The propositional part of the
project is represented by the efforts to naturalize metaphysics (or to establish a scientific
metaphysics), in which metaphysical questions are answered by science,2 or at least in
a scientifically respectable manner.
Therefore, the naturalist expectation is to extract metaphysics from science
somehow. To naturalists like Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 65), metaphysics should
be “[. . . ] a unified world-view derived from the details of scientific research”. In this way,
the naturalist’s claim aligns with the scientific-realist stances, as argued in Chapter 3.
French (2014, p. 48) even characterizes such a thesis in the form of a recipe: “[. . . ] we
choose our best theories; we read off the relevant features of those theories; and then
we assert that an appropriate relationship holds between those features and the world”.
The attractiveness of these conceptions lies in the compatibility with the intuition
that scientific theories are true because they refer to the world in which we live (and
not a purely theoretical construct). However, as argued in Chapter 3, such scientific-
realist’s expectation may be too high to what concerns fundamental physics, since QM
underdetermines its own interpretation.
1 See French (2013).
2 See Guay and Pradeu (2017, §2).
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But what about the naturalist’s expectations? They are, also, too high, being
torn apart by QM, partly due to a common conflation between “ontology” and “meta-
physics”. Therefore, there are arguments such as Maudlin’s (2007, p. 104), for example,
stating that “[m]etaphysics is ontology”. As defined in the Introduction, and throughout
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, ontology is concerned with issues of existence, so a catalog
that lists entities in the world is part of ontology. Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated
that ontology can be extracted from theories, in a sense that it is possible to “read
off” its elements based on ontological commitments criteria. Ontology, then, might be
naturalized. The problem lies within the number of ontologies available in the case of
QM (as many as there are interpretations of QM), so ontological underdetermination
is at sight: the necessary elements to choose which one of such ontologies are true
descriptions of this world are not available. This may frustrate some scientific-realist
expectations; however, it does not frustrate the naturalist’s expectations: it i possible to
extract ontologies from interpretations of QM.
What completely frustrates the naturalist’s expectations is to extract metaphysics
from interpretations of QM. As argued in the previous chapters, the metaphysical pro-
file is not given by scientific theories. Rather, metaphysical theories can be found in
the philosophical literature and linked to the ontologies of the theory as metaphysical
profiles. This is the Viking Approach to metaphysics in the form of a tweet.
Metaphysics starts where ontology ends. Given the posits of an ontological
theory (the entities comprising the catalogue of reality according to such a theory), one
may further inquire about their status. These questions are of a broader, metaphysical
nature. Answering these questions leads to fulfilling a kind of “metaphysical profile” for
the posits. For instance, if properties are accepted as part of the ontological catalog,
one may ask whether properties are universals or tropes, or if tropes and universals
are needed to characterize properties correctly. This aligns with the Viking Approach to
metaphysics of science, as proposed by French (2013, 2014). These terms shall guide
the discussion further developed here. In this sense, metaphysics is an extra layer to
the theory’s interpretation – a non-trivial layer, since the lack of a metaphysical profile
would render the realist content of an interpretation empty.
Two related levels of interpretational underdetermination must be cast aside
to allow the discussion to proceed: the theoretical underdetermination (regarding, for
example, QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 versus QM𝑏𝑟𝑎), and the naturalized ontological underdetermination
(concerning, for example, CBI versus MWI, or, still, RS versus MWI). Now, following
the Viking’s strategy, the efforts proceed to search for metaphysical profiles that could
accommodate MWI’s ontology. To that purpose, a review ofhow MWI addresses the
measurement problem is presented.
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8.2 MANY WORLDS
Why many worlds? As is well known, MWI is one (among many others) solution
to the measurement problem. Recall Schrödinger’s cat scenario: an idealized closed
box containing a cat, a flask of poison, a hammer, a radioactive material (an 𝛼 particle),
and a Geiger counter. The 𝛼 particle presents the property of having a 50% chance of
decaying or not. If it decays, the Geiger counter detects the 𝛼 particle’s decay and the
hammer is activated, breaking the flask of poison, which kills the cat. If the 𝛼 particle
does not decay, then none of this happens, and the cat remains alive. At the end of
one hour, something happens to the 𝛼 particle, with both cases presented above being
possible subsequent chains of events following the state of the 𝛼 particle.
Assume that |𝜓⟩ is a quantum-mechanical description. Following the notation
presented by Auletta and Wang (2014, p. 290), the whole system |𝜓⟩, composed by the
radioactive particle 𝑅, the hammer and the flask 𝐻, and the cat 𝐶, may be described
by the following superposition state:
|𝜓⟩𝑅𝐻𝐶 = 𝑎|𝑑⟩|𝑎⟩|𝐷⟩+ 𝑏|𝑑′⟩|𝑎′⟩|𝐴⟩, (21)
where:
∙ 𝑎 and 𝑏 are probability amplitudes;
∙ |𝑑⟩ represents the 𝛼 particle decaying;
∙ |𝑑′⟩ represents the 𝛼 particle not decaying;
∙ |𝑎⟩ represents the active hammer;
∙ |𝑎′⟩ represents the inactive hammer;
∙ |𝐷⟩ represents the dead cat;
∙ |𝐴⟩ represents the living cat;
In a simpler notation, the component |𝑑⟩|𝑎⟩|𝐷⟩ can be represented by |𝜓1⟩, and
the component |𝑑′⟩|𝑎′⟩|𝐴⟩ by |𝜓2⟩. Thus, |𝜓1⟩ is the description for the scenario in which
the particle’s decay occurs and |𝜓2⟩ represents the scenario in which it doesn’t. One
of these two scenarios will take place after one hour, which is described by |𝜓′⟩. The
temporal evolution of |𝜓⟩ to |𝜓′⟩ is represented by the Schrödinger equation, which
implies that the state of affairs of the box and its contents, after one hour, is
|𝜓′⟩ = 𝑎|𝜓1⟩+ 𝑏|𝜓2⟩. (22)
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According to the MWI, a branching process happens whenever a quantum sys-
tem enters a superposed state. The cat is then found in a specific state in virtue of living
in the branching of the world in which it occurs. In MWI, the Equation (22) has universal
validity; thus, all the terms of the equation are equally real:
∙ The dead cat, with the poison flask broken, as a result of the falling atom, repre-
sented by |𝜓1⟩;
∙ The living cat, with the poison flask intact, since the atom did not decay, repre-
sented by |𝜓2⟩.
The terms are not real in the same world, but in different worlds that originate in
the superposition described by Equation (22).
Before proceeding, is it important to take a step back and remember something
that was said in Chapter 5. Does the branching process in any way imply the existence
of many worlds? No.
To understand why, the distinction between RS and MWI is indispensable. Both
interpretations use the same formalism to describe the vectors and physical observ-
ables mathematically: the Born Rule for probabilities and the Schrödinger Equation for
temporal evolution. The responses to the two interpretations are also (formally) in line
with the solution to the measurement problem: no collapse. Here’s where RS and MWI
start to disagree: while MWI says the measurement problem is solved because physical
systems somehow branch into distinguishable states, RS would say that what branches
into different states is the states of physical systems.
This is noteworthy because, although MWI’s mathematics is practically the same
as that of RS, its difference in terms of ontology is enormous. By multiplying physical
systems into branches, MWI multiplies entire physical worlds - hence “many worlds”.
On the other hand, RS, when multiplying vectors, multiplies only vectors, that is, mathe-
matical entities in a mathematical space. Therefore, in terms of a naturalized ontology,
the following result can be obtained:
RS −→ One world;
MWI −→ Many worlds.
To recap what was said in Chapter 4, this distinction (which is common, but also
not standard) is used in this chapter.3 To name the names, Everett (1957) would be
better characterized in the interpretive panorama of RS, and DeWitt (1971) in that of
MWI. As stated earlier, the focus of this chapter is exclusively on MWI.
According to the MWI, the notion of “world” is defined by our own experience,
corresponding to the perspective of classical physics that there are no observable
3 See (BEN-DOV, 1990) and (BARRETT, 2011).
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superpositions in a single world. For example, the state of the cat is always perceived
as well defined, and the other worlds are never perceived.
For someone with naturalistic inclinations, MWI provides the catalog of reality
that contains parallel worlds. As a scientific theory, MWI provides the branching process,
stating that the world branches out in each superposition situation, and thus “multiple
worlds” can be included in the ontology as an item in the universe’s catalogue. Thus,
ontology, that deals with what exists, can be naturalized: it (or part of it) can indeed be
extracted from MWI. This catalog, however, does not provide enough elements for one
to infer what are multiple worlds, in metaphysical terms (the so-called “metaphysical
profile” of the worlds).
Let us, then, in the Viking style, assess whether we can find a metaphysical
profile suited to a branched reality, with many worlds, as required by the MWI ontology.
There are two main candidates: a fictionalist treatment of worlds and modal realism
about such worlds. Let’s start with the last one.
The Viking’s pillage
Theories of possible worlds, as proposed in modal metaphysics, seem to be
obvious alternatives to metaphysically profile MWI’s worlds, since the MWI’s account of
worlds shares many characteristics with the possible worlds typically employed to study
modality.
The many worlds of MWI can be employed to explain alternative conceptions of
how the world could have been (maintaining the laws of QM). For example, consider
Schrödinger’s cat: there is a possible result in which the cat stays alive; similarly, there
is a possible result in which the cat is found dead.
MWI and theories of possible worlds consider that a world describes a state of
things that could occur, it is counterfactual description of reality under certain conditions.
Moreover, possible worlds in logic are taken as maximal situations, i.e., any distinct
proposition 𝑝 is either true or false in a given situation. In this sense, maximal situations
are incompatible. Also, those situations are typically thought of as consistent, so that the
same proposition cannot be simultaneously true and false in the same world.4 Likewise,
MWI takes a measurement of a state such as the one described by the Schrödinger
cat’s scenario to induce two incompatible situations (one in which the cat is dead, one
in which the cat is alive). Therefore, two distinct worlds are required to account for the
measurement outcome.
The comparison between the notion of many worlds in logic and QM can be
expanded: roughly, logic employs the notion of the world to explain modalities, while
MWI does so in order to explain the measurement. In both cases, informally speaking of
worlds seems to help this discussion. However, in no case is the metaphysical meaning
4 See Lowe (2002, pp. 81–82).
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of the world clear, seen that a clear meaning of such worlds is given by the metaphysical
layer.
In order to provide a more accurate account of worlds and modality, the Lewisian
account of modal realism may offer the metaphysical profile needed to worlds of MWI.
According to the theory, the plurality of worlds is taken literally.
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit
[. . . ] I emphatically do not identify possible worlds with respectable linguistic
entities; I take them to be respectable entities in their own right. When I profess
realism about possible worlds, I mean to be taken literally. Possible worlds are
what they are, and not some other thing. If asked what sort of thing they are, I
cannot give the sort of reply my questioner probably expects: that is, a proposal
to reduce possible worlds to something else. (LEWIS, D., 1973, p. 84).
Genuine modal realism, however, is not the only available metaphysical option to
profile MWI’s ontology, i.e., worlds. Some authors claim that the idea of many worlds is
only a convenient metaphor for understanding measurement. According to this vision,
MWI does not ask for a reality of many worlds.5 The many worlds would be a convenient
fiction that does not need to be taken literally. Thus, in principle, it also seems legitimate
to attribute a fictional metaphysical profile to the entities postulated by MWI, in which
the many worlds are merely fictional, and only the present world is real.
Thomasson (2014, pp. 177–178) argues that, according to the fictionalist view
the discourse of parallel worlds should be interpreted as merely fictional (metaphorical,
figurative, etc.). Therefore, there is no connection with existence: there is no need,
then, of committing to the existence of MWI’s parallel worlds for the discourse to be
acceptable.
8.3 METAMETAPHYSICS
Thus, there seem to be at least two metaphysical options available to understand
the worlds of MWI. Apparently, there is a metaphysical underdetermination for MWI, and
no metametaphysical approach available seems to help an objective decision between
metaphysical profiles.
At this point of the discussion, it is relevant to review the two metametaphysical
accounts for theory choice presented in Chapter 5: According to Benovsky (2016),
aesthetic values would be sufficient to decide on a metaphysical profile; Conversely,
Chakravartty (2017a) argues that metaphysics could be voluntarily adopted. However,
both decisions are knowingly subjective solutions (that is, are criteria imposed by us
and not by the world).
5 See Skyrms (1976).
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Unavailable metaphysical stories once again
Here the negative metametaphysical method, as presented in Chapter 5 is ap-
plied. Let, then, MWI’s ontology be closely conideredin order to asses which meta-
physical profiles sketched above pass the test of metaphysical compatibility with MWI’s
ontological constrains.
This is what DeWitt, MWI’s main propagator, says about the reality of the worlds.
Our universe must be viewed as constantly splitting into a stupendous number
of branches, all resulting from the measurement-like interaction between its
myriads of components. Because there exists neither a mechanism within the
framework of the formalism nor, by definition, an entity outside of the universe
that can designate which branch of the grand superposition is the “real” world,
all branches must be regarded as equally real. (DEWITT, 1971, p. 178).
Therefore, the worlds must be real and created in events of superposition, since
it is assumed (𝒜1,𝒜2) that |𝜓⟩ describes how reality evolves. The following discussion
presents how metaphysical profiles cope with these ontological constraints, beginning
with the Lewisian modal-realist account of many worlds.
According to the Lewisian modal realism, there is an infinity of worlds as real as
our world. However, Lewis’s conception argues that there are many more worlds than
in MWI. Whereas in the MWI, the worlds are proliferated in situations of superposition,
the Lewisian theory states that there exists a world where, for example, Schrödinger’s
cat studies quantum physics! This incompatibility was already eidenced by Papineau.
[. . . ] the extra “branches” that Everett adds to reality all lie within the actual
world that evolves from the actual initial conditions in line with the actual laws
of physics – these branches by no means include all possibilities. (PAPINEAU,
2004, p. 153).
That is, ontology is not inflated only with the counterfactuals of superposition
cases, but with all possible counterfactuals: the multiplicity of Lewisian-like worlds en-
compasses all possibilities.6
Another difficult point in assigning a Lewisian metaphysical profile to the many
worlds of MWI is that in the former, worlds exists independently (i.e., “have always been
there”). Conversely, MWI imposes constraints for worlds created from the branching,
which happens only in superposition situations. Therefore, the histories of the many
worlds are accessible from and dependent on the branching process.
6 It has been argued it also encompasses impossibilities – see Mortari (2010).
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Finally, Mortari (2000, pp. 43-44) notes at least four major differences between
the worlds of MWI (which the author calls “multiverses”) and Lewis’ logical space,
among which the first relates to the argument constructed so far:
[MWI’s] multiverse is real ; that is, every universe which is part of it really,
actually exists. Reality is just bigger than we thought, whereas for Lewis the
inhabitants of other worlds, though existent, do not actually exist. [. . . ] I guess
Lewis would agree and say that, besides and beyond our own multiverse, there
are other possible ones, which exist, but are not real. (MORTARI, 2000, p. 44).
Lewisian modal realism is, therefore, a metaphysical profile incompatible with
MWI due to restrictions imposed by MWI itself, in what concerns the reality of many
worlds. Thus, it is not a metaphysical profile available to understand what the many
worlds of MWI are.
The application of the method to the fictionalist alternative is even simpler. Ac-
cording to the fictionalist approach, the present world is ontologically privileged. If a
living cat is found, the ramification of the world in which the cat is found dead is merely
imaginative, fictional, deprived of the same status of reality of this world in which you
read this PhD thesis.
For this reason, a fictional metaphysics does not conform to MWI constraints
(e.g., that all the worlds must be equally real), and therefore does not offer a metaphys-
ical profile for the many worlds of MWI.7
8.4 METAPHYSICAL NULL-DETERMINATION
It seems the application of the method of Unavailable Metaphysical Stories re-
sults in a situation similar to that of the beginning of this discussion: deprived of a
metaphysical profile available for the MWI, as current metaphysical layers fail for MWI.
We do not find metaphysical places to plunder, in the Viking way.
This characteristic is here called “metaphysical emptiness”. Like metaphysical
underdetermination, this situation also poses a problem for scientific realism, as the
absence of a metaphysical profile renders the realist content of the theory empty. This
problem is here labeled “null-determination”. It is essential to emphasize that this is a
problem exclusive to the Viking approach explored in the Chapter 4, which aspires to
“loot” the metaphysics produced by a priori methods (the so-called “traditional meta-
physics”) for interpretive purposes. In place of underdetermination, the adherent of the
7 According to the Meinongian approach, the present world is also ontologically privileged. If a living cat
is found, the branch of the world in which the cat is found dead is considered non-existent (there is, but
does not exist), therefore deprived of the same reality status world. Thus, a Meinongian metaphysics
also is unable to understand what the many worlds of MWI are, for the same reasons as the fictionalist
approach is so.
Chapter 8. Case 3: Many worlds 135
Viking Approach to metaphysics faces, according to the terminology adopted here, a
null-determination regarding the (un)available metaphysical options to qualify the nature
of the many worlds of MWI.
Here, the realists about worlds in quantum mechanics seems to be in the same
situation as the realists about objects in quantum mechanics. There is simply no way to
determine a metaphysical profile concerning the individuality of such objects endorsed
by quantum theory.8 Ladyman presents the issue as follows:
We need to recognize the failure of our best theories to determine even the
most fundamental ontological characteristic of the purported entities they fea-
ture. It is an ersatz form of realism that recommends belief in the existence
of entities that have such ambiguous metaphysical status. What is required is
a shift to a different ontological basis altogether, one for which questions of
individuality simply do not arise. (LADYMAN, 1998, pp. 419–420).
Realism is, apparently empty of content, unless one can provide for a metaphysi-
cal profile for its posits.9 If those endorsing the MWI should follow Ladyman’s suggestion
and change the ontological basis, this is an issue that shall be briefly discussed in what
follows.
One less interpretation
As there are several other quantum theories (in the sense of answers to the
problem of measurement) which empirical success is hitherto indistinguishable from
that obtained by MWI, perhaps it would be the case to favor other quantum theories (or
QM interpretations) which have metaphysical possibilities at their disposal. This is one
way to follow Ladyman’s suggestion that we should change the ontological basis.
This alternative seriously interprets the idea that metaphysics, as a philosophical
discipline, could actively contribute actively to the development of science, being a
criterion for the choice of theories10 (which, up to this date, does not exist in the case
of QM).
Quantum metaphysics
As there are no available metaphysical possibilities, considering the Viking ap-
proach, perhaps it would be advisable to develop a metaphysical profile for the many
worlds of MWI that obeys the theory’s constraints and characteristics.
8 In fact, the term “metaphysical underdetermination” originally arose in this context. See French and
Krause (2006).
9 This issue was discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 under the label of “Chakravartty’s Challenge”.
10 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the notion of “theory choice” also involves the choice of an
interpretation – which, in this particular case, is QM𝑏𝑟𝑎.
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This alternative seriously accepts the idea that QM requires a radical revision
of the traditional metaphysical concepts available. In order to illustrate the problem,
consider the possibility that MWI is compatible with a metaphysical profile, such as
Lewis’ genuine modal realism. Does compatibility stands for applicability? That is, does
the fact that a metaphysical theory is compatible with the theoretical and ontological
constrains of a scientific theory imply that such metaphysical theory is applicable in
metaphysically profiling the scientific theory’s entities? Does the fact that a metaphysical
profile was not dismissed as incompatible to a scientific theory mean that it fits perfectly
into the puzzle?
Well, it does not seem to be the case. Recall French’s (2018) worry regarding
reinventing the wheel: it is undisputed that it brings no benefits. However, the mere fact
of grasping an already existing metaphysical theory for interpreting entities of current
science is not assumed as being enough to complete the task. The first argument states
that compatibility does not imply applicability: one might be able to find that a metaphys-
ical profile is not incompatible with a scientific theory. Criteria for the compatible ones,
however, were never mentioned!
The second, more straightforward argument stresses that metaphysical theories
frequently do not enrich themselves with current science, and as so, they are not able
to interpret current science. They simply do not fit.
If a metaphysical profile is not being informed by MWI to its development, the
plundering of a priori metaphysics, Viking’s style, does not seem to help in fulfilling
Chakravartty’s Challenge for the MWI. Some adjustments in the metaphysical theory
should be done. In this case, metaphysics must be tailored to physics, so stakes in
quantum metaphysics seem to be high. French scratched the surface of this develop-
ment by stating the following:
If we want to speculate in a philosophically light-hearted manner then what’s
the harm in letting our imaginations run wild?! However, if we’re engaged
in serious naturalistic metaphysics, as I take it we are here, then our modal
reflections must be appropriately tailored to what we’ve learned about the
world. (FRENCH, 2019, p. 28).
Recall that according to MWI, the branching process is required to be real, so it
may seem a natural attitude for the Viking to look directly at modal realism for metaphys-
ical plundering. At first glance, the Lewisian genuine modal realism would suffice for a
compatible metaphysical profile: MWI’s branching worlds are, metaphysically, Lewisian
worlds. There is, however, evidence of incompatibility between MWI’s ontological cat-
alog and the metaphysics of Lewis’ worlds (MORTARI, 2000; PAPINEAU, 2004). First,
there are many more Lewisian worlds than MWI requires: according to the former, con-
ceivability implies reality, while to the latter, it does not. Instead, MWI takes the worlds to
be made of possible measurement outcomes. Another reason for incompatibility is the
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creation of worlds in MWI’s branching process, which has no parallel within Lewisian
modal metaphysics.
This does not com as a surprise. Lewis’ metaphysics was not being informed
by QM; therefore, it is to be expected that none of these metaphysical theories is
compatible with QM. Lewis is not what Guay and Pradeu (2017) would call a “scientific
metaphysician”. MWI’s ontological restrictions clearly call for a metaphysical profile in
which the postulated worlds are real. Therefore, a genuine modal realism provides the
guidelines by which one can originally develop such a metaphysical profile. Here, it
is accepted that this job is recently being done by Wilson (2013), with his “Everettian
Modal Realism”, considered a tailor-made version of Lewisian modal realism that fits
MWI’s metaphysical gap.
Such reasoning might be extended to other interpretations of QM. Consider
Wigner’s CCCH. It states that consciousness causes a modification in the dynamics
of quantum systems, so it constrains the available metaphysical profiles for that entity.
Whatever it may be in metaphysical terms, ontology requires consciousness to be real,
with causal powers. It has been said that it is incompatible with some metaphysical pro-
files, such as physicalism, and compatible with others, such as specific kinds of dualism
(ARROYO; ARENHART, 2019a). Take a traditional exponent of dualism, for instance. It
is not by chance that the first surname that pops up in one’s mind is Descartes.
Cartesian dualism indeed seems to be compatible with CCCH’s ontology. Quan-
tum systems are res extensa, and consciousness is res cogitans. Fair well. But Carte-
sian metaphysics also depends on a third substance, res divina, which turns out to be
god. But where is such god-substance in CCCH? Precisely: nowhere. Descartes was
not being informed by CCCH to develop his metaphysical theory, and this is why plun-
dering Cartesian dualism, Viking’s style, does not seem to help to fulfill Chakravartty’s
Challenge for the CCCH. In the particular case of the CCCH, a tailor-made metaphysics
was constructed by Stapp (2006), who developed a quantum-mechanical version of
interactive dualism.
This should be one of the attributions of philosophers of science willing to study
scientific metaphysics: to develop metaphysical concepts for scientific theories they
intend to interpret in order to look search in scientific theory and history of philoso-
phy sources from where to derive informative aspects for the development of scientific
metaphysics. The price of asking for a metaphysical profile for ontologies extracted
from science is losing the possibility of a scientific level of epistemic justification for a
metaphysical theory, the point which started the discussion regarding “scientific meta-
physics” in the first place. The gain – if it can be considered so – is a relative autonomy
of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline.
However, the price to pay for such autonomy, as argued in chapter 4, is that meta-
physical underdetermination is taken for granted. Thus, while the Viking approaches
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generate a metaphysical null-determination, Taylor-made approach generates meta-
physical underdetermination.
8.5 FINAL REMARKS
This chapter present a negative approach to metaphysics’ relations with science,
applying the metametaphysical method developed in Chapter 5. As a result, MWI was
found to be incompatible with the metaphysics known hitherto in philosophical literature.
Figure 7 elucidates this conclusion.
𝑄𝑀 𝑏𝑎𝑠
Measurement problem
𝑄𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑄𝑀𝑏𝑟𝑎
RS MWI
Modal Realism
Fictionalism
Lewis
NONO
M
athem
atics
P
hysics
O
ntology
M
etaphysics
YES
M
etam
etaphysics
MMI
Meinongianism
NO
Figure 7 – QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 and MWI.
Therefore, our method is suggested to be a step closer to metametaphysical
methodologies that focus on the choice of theories. It may be, as seems to be the case
with MWI, that there are no alternatives from which we could decide.
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CONCLUSION: ON PHILOSOPHY, DRAGONS AND TAILORS
“But I don’t want to go among
mad people,” Alice remarked.
“Oh, you can’t help that,” said
the Cat: “we’re all mad here.”
LEWIS CARROLL
Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland
The following report exposes the main results of this research. Let’s face it: the
present state of affairs of the foundations and interpretation of QM is undeniable messy,
being adequately described as pure fragmentation. The first point to be made is: there
is a basic mathematical formalism that says nothing about physics. The basic formalism
of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠 tells a mathematical story. QM, however, is quantum physics; thus one might
want to add some physics to mathematics. When this is done, a foundational problem
arises (the measurement problem). In order to have a physical story, an interpretation
where the measurement problem is addressed must be added. This fragmentation
begins to solve this problem and continues to grow indefinitely.
Some would stop here. “So what? Just pick one! Flip a coin, if you wish”, some
would say. There is no problem with that. The price to pay for digging deeper into the
rabbit-hole is to deepen fragmentation. Empiricists, for example, would reject this step:
they are satisfied with QM’s operational role in society. After all, as this thesis has
repeatedly stated as if it were a mantra, QM works FAPP. If there is pain, however,
there must also be a gain. In this case, the gain is the possibility to discuss the world
in which we live. Each interpretation adds a further ingredient to the world: a causal
role for consciousness, in the case of CCCH; a branching reality in the case of the
MWI. This is ontology, naturalized, right there! Underdetermination? Unquestionably.
Nevertheless, some would gladly embrace it, driven by the motto that science should
talk about the world
However, do these interpretations discuss the world? Chakravartty’s Challenge
argues that they don’t – yet. To do so, one should advance further, dressing the ontology
with metaphysics. While not everyone would accept that step peacefully, an assessment
of the pros and cons can be made. Is the goal to talk about the world? If so, this step
should be taken. For science to talk about the world, it is necessary to respond to the
Chakravartty Challenge, and to answer it, it is necessary to adopt a metaphysical profile.
At this point, you are already inside the rabbit hole.
Ontological catalogues may be understood metaphysically in rather contrasting
terms. However, it is possible to determine that some metaphysical approaches do not
make sense according to the underlying scientific theory. As this thesis remarked, ma-
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terialistic approaches and their proposed interpretations to CCCH’s consciousness are
disregarded due to quantum mechanical considerations. They fail to provide the ingredi-
ents for a collapse to occur. As far as MWI is concerned, a metaphysical understanding
of worlds that does not attribute ontological dignity to all worlds will fail to explain the
measurement problem. The failure of those metaphysical profile is objectively granted
as long as QM is the underlying theory, as the interpretations of QM are not compatible
with any kind of metaphysical profile.
To what concerns CCCH, the very possibility of metaphysically dressing con-
sciousness with epiphenomenalism is precluded, since consciousness (whatever it may
be in terms of a metaphysical profile) must be causal, and therefore, real. However, is it
epistemically justifiable to plunder, Viking’s style, every single dualist metaphysics in the
history of philosophy, even if those who developed them were not directly addressing
QM when developing their metaphysical theories?
The short answer is “no” and the long answer is presented in a few paragraphs
below. For now, it suffices to insist on the previous step: decisions between dualism
and phenomenology seem to be safe from the narrowing of metaphysical choices. Re-
garding MWI, some metaphysical possibilities are discarded due to constraints of the
interpretation itself, according to which all branchings must be equally real; therefore,
there seem to be some precluded metaphysical profiles such as fictionalism. A treat-
ment of possible worlds à la David Lewis (2004) seems to be also discarded when
considering our metametaphysical method, as one must account for the creation of
parallel worlds in the act of branching, and thus the worlds cannot exist independently
before the branching process.
This work was able to restrain the metaphysical profiles inside each interpreta-
tion of QM, within its own ontological commitments, i.e., the metaphysical alternatives
within CCCH, CRCH, and those within MWI. It was not possible, however, to compare
interpretations directly, such as CCCH versus MWI.
This conclusion, however, can be questioned by a somewhat bad argument,
which considers metaphysical null-determination as a sufficient reason for abandoning
an interpretation of QM. Let us look briefly at what this argument is about, and why it
is weak. Consider for a moment the “Viking” approach to metaphysics, as promoted
by French (2014). Roughly, it states that the scientific-informed metaphysician merely
chooses a metaphysical theory available in literature in order to metaphysically dress
the entities of scientific theories. It seems that the Vikings return empty-handed from
their metaphysical pillage, as it was demonstrated here, that there are no available
options to interpret QM in metaphysical ways.
For a realist-oriented philosopher, this situation may be just as bad as metaphys-
ical underdetermination. With underdetermination, there are many options to interpret
a theory, so one is not in a position to say what the world is like modulo such the-
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ory. In the present case, there no options to interpret the theory, which makes one
unable to determine what the world is like. This situation is called here a metaphysical
“null-determination”. In other words, unlike metaphysical underdetermination, where
there was plenty of options and no criteria to choose among them, metaphysical null-
determination poses just the opposite problem: there are no metaphysical options to be
chosen.
Through the application of the metametaphysical method presented by this the-
sis, MWI is found to incur in metaphysical emptiness. There are no known metaphysical
profiles which seem to be compatible with its theoretical and ontological restrains, at
least according to the Viking approach.
It can be argued that the absence of metaphysical profiles available for MWI is
sufficient for such an interpretation to be discarded from the list of possible interpreta-
tions for QM. The problem is that null-determination is an expected consequence of the
Viking approach, which can be generalized to other interpretations of QM. Thus, we do
not consider the argument that null-determination implies abandoning interpretations of
QM to be good. What null-determination seems to disadvantage is the Viking approach
itself!
Fortunately, there is another alternative. This thesis suggests that metaphysical
emptiness could be resolved by a sort of “tailor-made” metaphysics which fully consid-
ers QM’s features and constrains. Therefore, unless one is developed, in the sense of
“fabricating” a metaphysical profile, as stressed by d’ Espagnat (2006), QM is metaphys-
ically empty – and this is crucial – for the Viking only. This result takes seriously the
idea that QM forces us to a radical review in our metaphysical theses.
Let us take a pause for meditation. Much of what was discussed until now is
summed up in Figure 8. This figure is labeled after Cabello’s (2017) “map of madness”
since that’s what it is: a map of the rabbit-hole. We are lost in this maze of fragmentation,
but at least we do have a map! There are cases in which the answer is simply unknown,
as is the case in “???” – which we didn’t had time to investigate.
Notice that the metaphysical level is framed in the evaluation of metaphysical pro-
files, pictured as “YES” and “NO”. NO depict the dead ends. For example, there is no way
to metaphysically profile CCCH’s consciousness with an eliminativist metaphysics con-
cerning the mind. Similarly, to pursue a non-realist account of MWI’s worlds is a dead
end. These are, therefore, the no-go paths. Notice, also, that there are metaphysical
profiles named after philosophers: these are the Viking-only dead ends.
If there are no metaphysical profiles available to plunder, so what about to sowing
and harvesting? This might sound excessively radical – after all, there is the worry of
reinventing the wheel. A different idea might be proposed: tailoring the metaphysics to
the physics.
While the negative points indicate the no-go paths for the tailor-metaphysician
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Figure 8 – A map of madness
to pursue in its tailoring job, the points labeled as “YES” are the ok-go paths. These
pave the way for new studies in the field of contemporary analytic metaphysics: the
development of a metaphysical profile tailor-made for MWI’s ontology. This option is left
to future works.
Nevertheless, the metametaphysical method should proposed in this thesis is
suggested to be adopted as a first metametaphysical inquiry concerning theory choice,
as there may be no metaphysical choices to make.
At this point, it is relevant to present some final remarks concerning scientific
realism. Interpretational underdetermination is, apparently, winning the dispute against
scientific realism concerning fundamental physics (particularly QM), which implies that:
∙ Theoretical underdetermination could not be broken. Up to this date, only ex-
periments can in principle choose between QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎. Such experiments,
although in principle executable, are not forthcoming in the foreseeable future.
∙ Ontological underdetermination could not be broken. The current tools in ontology
and meta-ontology to evaluate among ontological theories are non-objective, thus
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concerning us and not Nature, meaning that one may voluntarily choose between
QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎, even though one is not rationally forced to adopt any possibility.
It’s up to the customer’s choice.
Thus, paraphrasing Sklar (2010), I would love to be realist about QM, if only
I knew what realism was. In this sense, even fine-grained conceptions of scientific
realism, such as OSR, do not seem to be sufficiently justified when faced with the
problem of interpretational underdetermination in QM.
Consider this claim more carefully, however. Most commonsensical beliefs are
not sufficiently justified. After more than two millennia of philosophical discussions, we
still do not “sufficiently” respond to philosophical skepticism concerning the external
world: Are we dreaming? Is our brain in a vat? Are we experiencing external reality at
all? We do not have sufficient reasons for believing in that – at least according to the
skepticism, we don’t. Suppose we do not have such justification. If those standards are
failed to be met concerning something as basic as the external reality, why insist that
scientists must meet these requirements to believe in unobservable processes of QM?
At the end of the day, the question concerning scientific realism seems to be
a problem for philosophers of science, specifically for scientific metaphysicians. As a
metaphysician, I am on the side of doubt. Underdetermination compels me to do that. I
cannot objectively choose between QM𝑐𝑜𝑙, QM𝑏𝑟𝑎 or else. I am personally realistic with
uncontroversial entities offered by QM – if there are any. However, scientists should not
be forced to do this. They may take a voluntary leap of faith. The scientist is pragmat-
ically justified to adopt a realist stance even to what concerns the most controversial
parts of the interpretation of QM, because this is part of scientific development.
However speculative it may be, I would like to conclude by offering another
possibility to this scenario, in which one is not forced to make such difficult choices.
In a well-known passage concerning the metaphysical status of superposition (recall
QM𝑏𝑎𝑠’s 𝒫4), Schrödinger (1983, p. 157) states that “[t]here is a difference between a
shaky out-of-focus photograph and a snapshot of clouds and fog banks”. Krause and
Arenhart interpreted this passage as follows:
It seems that [Schrödinger] is suggesting that the superposed state acts as a
snapshot of clouds, really a situation involving vagueness of some sort. It is
not that the cat, when in the superposed state, is blurred by the cloud, but she
is the cloud. (KRAUSE; ARENHART, 2016a, p. 52).
They refer to Schrödinger’s cat paradox, arguing that superposition is something
clouded by itself, not a pure epistemological indeterminacy of states. Similarly, after the
discussion presented in this thesis, I would like to conclude this work with the following
reflection: it is possible, just as the electron and the cat in the above examples, that
the smoky dragon’s body is not blurred by a smoky cloud. What if the dragon is really
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made of smoke? What if, contrarily to what d’ Espagnat (2006) argues, the so-called
“quantum reality” is not covered by a veil, but is itself, in fact, smoky? To quote John
Bell (2004, p. 214): “Would that not be very, very interesting?” I do think so.
To think of the dragon as a smoky being can be a useful metaphor I wish to
discuss only in passing, but it also can be tricky to frame me as a “no-solution” naysayer.
It is not necessarily so. To embrace the smokiness can also mean to embrace the need
for the development of genuinely new concepts in metaphysics that suits QM. Quoting
Maudlin (2019):
Why think that Aristotle, or any other philosopher or scientist who never con-
sidered quantum theory, had developed the right conceptual categories for
characterizing everything physically real? The quantum state is a novel feature
of reality on any view, and there is nothing wrong with allowing it a novel cate-
gory: quantum state. This is, of course, not an informative thing to say, but it
does free us from the misguided desire to liken the quantum state to anything
we are already familiar with. (MAUDLIN, 2019, p. 89).
The new concepts of a tailor-made metaphysics for such “new category”, which
the development is demanded by QM, are not, in many ways, grounded in QM. Hence
the smoky smoke. So, how about developing clothes that fit dragons?
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APPENDIX A – BOHMIAN MECHANICS
Chapter 2 sketched two interpretations of QM𝑏𝑎𝑠: QM𝑐𝑜𝑙 and QM𝑏𝑟𝑎. Bohmian
mechanics not included in the discussion, as only two options were needed in or-
der to reach the main point throughout this thesis: underdetermination. To argue for
the generality of our scheme, the theoretical aspects of pilot-wave theories, which en-
compasses Bohmian mechanics (here called QM𝑝𝑖𝑙), is presented here. QM𝑝𝑖𝑙 fits the
general schema developed in this thesis’ picture, as shown in Figure 9.
𝑄𝑀 𝑏𝑎𝑠
Measurement problem
𝑄𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑄𝑀𝑝𝑖𝑙
M
athem
atics
P
hysics
𝑄𝑀𝑏𝑟𝑎
Figure 9 – QM𝑝𝑖𝑙 in the big picture.
Recall that QM𝑏𝑎𝑠’s 𝒫5 is the generalization of the notion of measurement. In
pilot-wave theories, the theoretical mechanisms through which this process occurs is a
recognition of a preexisting value (BOHM, 1952).
Pilot-wave interpretations (BOHM, 1952), (BOHM; HILEY, 2006) rejects assump-
tion 1.A1 according to the General Principle 𝒫1, and instantiates the General Principle
𝒫4 in the axiom of dynamics with hidden variables in the differential equations of motion,
thus originating the pilot-wave quantum theory QM𝑝𝑖𝑙.
A.1 PILOT-WAVE QUANTUM THEORY
Bohm’s (BOHM, 1952) pilot-wave solution to the measurement problem is pre-
sented as follows. It modifies (or interprets) QM𝑏𝑎𝑠’s structure, instantiating some of its
General Principles in what are called specific axioms of pilot-wave quantum theories by
denying assumption 1.A. Therefore, a pilot-wave quantum theory QM𝑝𝑖𝑙 is a 𝑛-uple:
QM𝑝𝑖𝑙 = ⟨F,𝒜pil,ℛ⟩ (23)
where:
1. F is the language of QM𝑝𝑖𝑙, similar to QM
𝑏𝑎𝑠’s language, with the introduction of
the quantum potential 𝑄 in F;
1 This assumption states that the state vector |𝜓⟩ gives a complete description of 𝑆.
APPENDIX A. Bohmian mechanics 164
2. 𝒜pil are the specific axioms of QM𝑝𝑖𝑙 (i.e. the instance of the set 𝒫 of QM𝑝𝑖𝑙). The
list of 𝒜𝑝𝑖𝑙 is:
𝒜pil 1 [Configuration space]: The same as 𝒫1, except for the following remarks: 𝑎)
Quantum systems are described in a 3𝑁 -dimensional configuration space
𝒬 (not to be confused with the quantum potential 𝑄 above), not in a Hilbert
space ℋ, where 𝑁 corresponds to the number of particles in the system; the
standard |𝜓⟩ wave-function/quantum-mechanical description is not complete,
but is supplemented with extra parameters (see 𝒜pil 4 below).
𝒜pil 2 [Quantization Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫2.
𝒜pil 3 [Statistical Algorithm]: The same as 𝒫3.
𝒜pil 4 [Hidden-Variable Dynamics]: The same as 𝒫4, except for the following re-
marks. The usual Schrödinger equation (see equation (10) in 𝒜col 4) is sup-
plemented with additional terms and hidden variables that transform its prob-
abilistic nature in a deterministic equation of motion (BOHM, 1952). This
additional term 𝑄 is called “quantum potential”
𝑄 =
~2
2𝑚
∇2𝑅
𝑅
, (24)
which supplements the differential equations of motion with additional param-
eters. In order to do so, the Schrödinger equation is written in function of the
potential operator 𝑉 – instead of the Hamiltonian operator 𝐻, to yield the
total energy of the system, as in equation (10), as:
𝑖~
𝜕|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑡
=
Å
− ~
2𝑚
∇2 + 𝑉
ã
|𝜓⟩, (25)
where |𝜓⟩ is also re-written in its polar form, decomposed between its ampli-
tude and its phase (BOHM, 1952). It is noteworthy that |𝜓⟩ is an abbreviation
of |𝜓(x¯, 𝑡)⟩, where x¯ stands for spatial coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧); these are posi-
tion coordinates, taken to be essentially unknown. These are the so-called
hidden variables, thus denying assumption 1.A. If this is so, the real part
of the Schrödinger equation can be rewritten in a modified Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (also known as its “quantum version” (BOHM; HILEY, 2006)) as
follows:
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑡
= −
[︃
|∇𝑆|2
2𝑚
+ 𝑉 +
~2
2𝑚
∇2𝑅
𝑅
]︃
(26)
Equation (26) is commonly referred to as the “guiding equation” of motion.
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𝒜pil 5 [Measurement ]: The same as 𝒫5. A position measurement, for example, sim-
ply yields the hidden states that were guided by (26) in a purely deterministic
(albeit statistical via Born rule) manner.
3. ℛ are the rules of inference of QM𝑝𝑖𝑙, which are similar to those stated in QM𝑏𝑎𝑠.
